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ABSTRACT—Policy discussions about the affordability of prescription drugs
in the United States are infused with the theme that drug prices are
unconscionably high. Many of the policy interventions proposed in
Congress, the White House, and the states adopt this frame, authorizing
regulatory action when prices exceed particular thresholds or otherwise
constitute “price gouging” on the part of drug companies. Unsurprisingly,
such initiatives have prompted legal challenges by the biopharmaceutical
industry. State laws in particular are vulnerable to challenges on a number of
grounds. In this Article, we focus on one avenue of challenge that has
received little scholarly attention in the context of drug pricing: void-forvagueness claims under the Due Process Clause. These challenges allege that
the law’s definition of “excessive” or “unconscionable” drug prices is so
ambiguous as to fail basic requirements of procedural due process.
To better understand how federal and state legislation can be designed
to survive vagueness challenges, we review and extract lessons from four
adjacent areas of law in which a standard of “excessive” or “unconscionable”
price has been operationalized: (1) price gouging laws relating to times of
emergency; (2) contract law; (3) consumer lending law; and (4) public
utilities rate regulation. We analyze the approaches taken in each field and
their potential applicability to the prescription drug context. We conclude
that consumer lending law offers the most promising model, particularly if
advanced via federal legislation, and offer a series of recommendations for
drafting legislation aimed at identifying and curbing excessive drug prices.
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INTRODUCTION
In February 2019, the United States Senate Committee on Finance
summoned executives from seven large biopharmaceutical companies to
defend their pricing practices before Congress. 1 Senator Ron Wyden’s
1 Christopher Rowland, Drug Executives Grilled in Senate Over High Prices, WASH. POST (Feb. 26,
2019, 4:49 PM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/economy/drug-executives-grilled-in-senateover-high-prices/2019/02/25/abc89c04-393f-11e9-aaae-69364b2ed137_story.html
[https://perma.cc/6LBV-FDX8].
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introductory statement was laced with morally freighted language:
medicines are “outrageously expensive”; “astronomically high” prices are
the product of “profiteering” and “two-faced scheming”; and American
families are driven to “morally repugnant” economic choices.2 Senator
Chuck Grassley’s opening statement similarly spoke of Americans’ “sticker
shock” and the importance of “holding the private sector . . . accountable
through oversight.” 3 On the presidential campaign trail, reflecting on drug
price increases, Senator Cory Booker asserted, “[i]t’s unconscionable how
people are profiteering off the pain of others.” 4 In short, a pervasive theme
in policy discussions about the affordability of medicines is that drug prices
are unconscionably high, and that policy intervention is required.
Public opinion reflects this view. In a February 2019 national poll, 79%
of Americans said the cost of prescription drugs was “unreasonable.”5 Eighty
percent perceived that profits made by pharmaceutical companies were a
major factor contributing to high drug prices, and 52% believed drug
companies’ marketing and advertising expenses were a major contributor.6
Only 25% trusted drug companies to price their products fairly. 7 A majority
or supermajority of respondents supported each of ten proposed regulatory
interventions, with the lone exception of allowing Medicare drug plans to
exclude more drugs. 8
Allegations of unconscionably high drug prices focus on two
dimensions: high prices at a drug’s initial launch and large periodic price
2 Hearing on Drug Pricing in America: A Prescription for Change, Part II Before the S. Comm. on
Finance, 116th Cong. 3–6 (2019) (statement of Ron Wyden, U.S. Senator).
3 Hearing on Drug Pricing in America: A Prescription for Change, Part II Before the S. Comm. on
Finance, 116th Cong. 1–3 (2019) (statement of Chuck Grassley, Chairman, S. Comm. on Finance).
4 Lev Facher, The ‘Big Pharma’ Candidate? As He Runs for President, Cory Booker Looks to Shake
His Reputation for Drug Industry Coziness, STAT (Feb. 12, 2019), https://www.statnews.com/
2019/02/12/cory-booker-presidential-run-pharmaceutical-industry-ties [https://perma.cc/SED3-J5B3].
5 Ashley Kirzinger et al., KFF Health Tracking Poll—February 2019: Prescription Drugs, KFF
(Mar. 1, 2019), https://www.kff.org/health-costs/poll-finding/kff-health-tracking-poll-february-2019prescription-drugs [https://perma.cc/G5LX-8EAE].
6 Id. Experts concur that “the costs of marketing are part of the overall cost structure of drug
manufacturers and thereby place upward pressure on prices.” NAT’L ACADS. OF SCIS., ENG’G, & MED.,
MAKING MEDICINES AFFORDABLE: A NATIONAL IMPERATIVE 89 (Norman R. Augustine et al. eds.,
2018). An analysis of twelve large pharmaceutical companies found that between 2003 and 2015, such
expenditures “increased noticeably and exceeded research and development investments by up to eighty
percent.” Id. at 90.
7 Kirzinger et al., supra note 5. Three percent trusted companies to price products fairly “a lot” and
22% “somewhat.” Id. at fig.3.
8 Id. at fig.4. These interventions ran the gamut from including list prices in direct-to-consumer
advertisements to facilitating generic entry, making changes to Medicare, and importing drugs from
Canada. Id.
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increases. A recent study of drug pricing and insurance claims data from
2005 to 2016 concluded that rising national costs for generic and specialty
drugs are primarily attributable to new drugs, while costs for other, brandname drugs are rising primarily due to increases in the price of existing
drugs. 9 Average annual price increases for orally administered, brand-name
drugs exceeded 9% and injectables 15%—several times the overall rate of
inflation. 10 Among the sixteen new cancer treatments approved by the Food
and Drug Administration (FDA) in 2018, ten were launched at a wholesale
acquisition cost (WAC) exceeding $9,000 for a month’s supply. 11
Congress, the Trump Administration, and the states have responded
with a bevy of policy proposals, many of which focus on taking action
against instances of “price gouging.” 12 Several states have successfully
enacted legislation. 13 Unsurprisingly, these efforts have drawn the ire of
industry actors and prompted litigation. Each of the industry’s major trade
associations—the Biotechnology Innovation Organization (BIO), the
Pharmaceutical Researchers and Manufacturers of America (PhRMA), and
the Association for Accessible Medications (AAM)—have been plaintiffs in
recent drug pricing related litigation.14 One such challenge resulted in the
courts unraveling high-profile legislation in Maryland in 2018.15
State laws are particularly vulnerable to challenge. They have faced
challenges under the dormant Commerce Clause (responsible for the demise
of Maryland’s price gouging law for generic drugs), 16 patent law, trade secret

9 Inmaculada Hernandez et al., The Contribution of New Product Entry Versus Existing Product
Inflation in the Rising Costs of Drugs, 38 HEALTH AFF. 76, 76, 81 (2019).
10 Id. at 82.
11 Lisa M. Jarvis, The New Drugs of 2018, 97 CHEM. & ENG’G NEWS 33, 37 (Jan. 21, 2019). The
highest-cost drug, Loxo’s Vitrakvi, was priced at $32,800 per month, or $393,600 per year, for the oral
formulation. Id. For further discussion of WAC, see LEVINSON, infra note 619 and accompanying text
defining WAC as the offering price set by the manufacturer for wholesalers and direct purchasers, before
discounts and rebates.
12 See generally William V. Padula, State and Federal Policy Solutions to Rising Prescription Drug
Prices in the U.S., 22 J. HEALTH CARE L. & POL’Y 15 (2019) (summarizing legislative activity).
13 See, e.g., the discussion of state legislation infra Section I.B.
14 See Biotechnology Indus. Org. v. District of Columbia, 496 F.3d 1362 (Fed. Cir. 2007); Pharm.
Research & Mfrs. of Am. v. David, No. 2:17-cv-02573 (E.D. Cal. filed Sept. 28, 2018) (still ongoing);
Pharm. Research & Mfrs. of Am. v. Sandoval, No. 2:17-cv-02315 (D. Nev. dismissed June 28, 2018);
Ass’n for Accessible Meds. v. Frosh, 2017 WL 4347818 (D. Md. Sept. 29, 2017), rev’d, 887 F.3d 664
(4th Cir. 2018), cert. denied, 139 S. Ct. 1168 (2019).
15 See infra Section II.B.
16 See Ass’n for Accessible Meds. v. Frosh, 887 F.3d 664, 667–75 (4th Cir. 2018), cert. denied,
139 S. Ct. 1168 (2019).

862

114:859 (2020)

Reining In “Unconscionable” Prices for Prescription Drugs

law, the Takings Clause, the First Amendment, and the Due Process Clause.17
Many of these claims have been summarized previously in the academic
literature. 18 In this Article, we focus on one avenue of challenge that has
received comparatively little scholarly attention in the drug-pricing context:
void-for-vagueness challenges under the Due Process Clause. These
challenges allege that the laws’ definition of “excessive” or
“unconscionable” drug prices is so ambiguous as to fail basic requirements
of constitutionally protected due process rights.
Void-for-vagueness challenges are worthy of greater attention for
several reasons. First, efforts to regulate “excessive” drug prices appear
especially at risk of such challenges given the subjectivity and controversy
involved in what constitutes an excessive or unfairly high price. These legal
disputes tap into deeper normative questions about what constitutes “fair”
pricing and how it should be evaluated. Second, vagueness claims have
already arisen in lawsuits against drug-pricing laws passed in Maryland and
California. These claims therefore have practical salience to policymakers
deliberating which legislative approaches to pursue and how to craft bills
going forward. Finally, as both federal and state laws are vulnerable to
vagueness challenges, the potential implications of such challenges are
broad.
Our purpose is to identify a workable approach to the design of federal
and state prescription drug price gouging legislation—one that will survive
constitutional challenges, in particular on the basis of vagueness, and
facilitate substantial progress in improving drug affordability. To generate
recommendations about surmounting vagueness challenges, we extract
lessons from other areas of law in which a standard of “unconscionable” or
“excessive” price has been operationalized. Our analysis and
recommendations reflect several commonsense assumptions about what a
17 See sources cited supra note 14 (collecting cases); Robin Feldman et al., The Patent Act and the
Constitutionality of State Pharmaceutical Regulation, 45 RUTGERS COMPUT. & TECH. L.J. 40, 50–54
(2019) (summarizing Takings and patent-preemption challenges).
18 See generally Isaac D. Buck, States as Activists, 39 J. LEGAL MED. 121 (2019) (discussing legal
challenges to Maryland’s anti-price gouging law, among other issues); Katherine L. Gudiksen & Jaime
S. King, The Burden of Federalism: Challenges to State Attempts at Controlling Prescription Drug Costs,
39 J. LEGAL MED. 95 (2019) (surveying the legal challenges that states have faced in attempting to
regulate drug prices); Katherine L. Gudiksen et al., California’s Drug Transparency Law: Navigating the
Boundaries of State Authority on Drug Pricing, 37 HEALTH AFF. 1503 (2018) (discussing legal
challenges to California’s drug price transparency law SB 17); Theodore T. Lee et al., Legal Challenges
to State Drug Pricing Laws, 319 JAMA 865 (2018) (discussing the legal claims brought against drug
pricing laws in Maryland and Nevada); Christopher Robertson, Will Courts Allow States to Regulate Drug
Prices?, 379 NEW ENGL. J. MED. 1000 (2018) (describing the dormant Commerce Clause challenge to
Maryland’s HB 631).
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workable definition of unconscionable or excessive prices must be able to
do. First, the standard must advance the government’s purpose in adopting
the law. As these laws are motivated by a desire to advance patients’ interests
by making medicines more accessible, their application must reach the
products posing the greatest financial challenges. 19 Second, the standard
must have a strong prospect of surviving legal challenges. Third, it must be
feasible to operationalize. It must be measurable using available information
and provide useful information about which products regulators should
target for enforcement. Fourth, it must be fair to biopharmaceutical
companies. As we discuss, fairness considerations are both procedural—the
law must put companies on reasonable notice of what will and will not be
considered an acceptable pricing decision—and substantive—it must permit
companies a reasonable return on their overall investment in research,
development, and manufacturing. 20 Finally, it must not be unduly susceptible
to gaming by the regulated entities. For example, approaches that focus
solely on whether a drug’s launch price is excessive will encourage
companies to price the product low on market entry and raise the price
steadily over time, and approaches that focus solely on annual price increases
can be gamed for new drugs by setting the launch price high.
This Article proceeds in four Parts. In Part I, we survey recent state and
federal legislative activity in the prescription drug price gouging,
unconscionability, and rate-setting spaces. For simplicity, we refer to this
legislation collectively as “excessive-price legislation.” Given space
constraints, our review of federal and state bills is illustrative rather than
exhaustive. In Part II, we describe vagueness challenges as part of the
19 In practice “excessive” drug prices may overlap with “unaffordable” drug prices, but it is important
to mark these two terms as conceptually distinct. Although affordability may be a good metric for
controlling prices, an affordable price may not be a fair price. This is a significant normative vulnerability
that also has potentially serious practical implications for innovation incentives. Furthermore, focusing
on affordable pricing as opposed to excessive price could conflict with our fourth criterion, fairness to
drug manufacturers.
20 A related concern, voiced by pharmaceutical manufacturers in response to nearly all proposals to
curb high drug prices, is that price regulation may dampen incentives for investment in drug innovation
to the long-term detriment of the public. At some level of price constraint (holding other innovation
incentives constant) this tradeoff surely must be real—the difficulty is knowing at which level. See NAT’L
ACADS. OF SCIS., ENG’G, & MED., supra note 6, at 17–18, 24; Michelle M. Mello, What Makes Ensuring
Access to Affordable Prescription Drugs the Hardest Problem in Health Policy?, 102 MINN. L. REV.
2273, 2280–82 (2018); Rena M. Conti & Frank S. David, Rebalancing High Prescription Drug Prices
with Innovation Incentives, HEALTH AFF. BLOG (July 1, 2019), https://www.healthaffairs.org/
do/10.1377/hblog20190626.569971/full [https://perma.cc/G4Z2-6NTR]. In evaluating potential policy
models, this conundrum leads us to shy away from stringent approaches such as hard caps on prices. But
given the healthy financial margins enjoyed by many drug companies, we suspect there is some room for
price reductions on the most expensive drugs before innovation incentives are seriously jeopardized.
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biopharmaceutical industry’s litigation strategy to resist these laws. In Part
III, we canvass four adjacent areas of law in which legislatures, regulatory
agencies, and the courts have been involved in regulating excessive prices:
(1) price gouging laws relating to times of emergency; (2) consumer lending
laws; (3) contract law; and (4) public utilities rate regulation. We analyze the
regulatory approaches taken and their potential applicability to the
prescription drug context. Our analysis is based on a review of legal cases,
treatises, and scholarship in these areas. We focus on U.S. law, although it is
noteworthy that drug regulators in Europe and elsewhere have also stepped
up scrutiny of excessive drug prices and applied their own operational
definitions of what is “excessive.” 21 Finally, in Part IV, we provide
recommendations concerning key decisions in the design of excessive-price
statutes.
I.

EXCESSIVE-PRICE LEGISLATION IN CONGRESS AND THE STATES

Legislators at both the federal and state levels have proposed a broad
range of approaches to address expensive prescription medications.22
Proposals run the gamut, from requiring provision of drug samples to
facilitate development of generics,23 to prohibiting gag clause provisions that
prevent pharmacists from informing patients that a prescription would be
cheaper without insurance. 24 A number of measures, however, specifically
target instances of apparent “price gouging,” or “unconscionable” or

21 Fiona Carlin et al., Recent Pharmaceutical Excessive Pricing Cases in Context, GLOBAL
COMPETITION REV. (Sept. 7, 2017), https://globalcompetitionreview.com/article/1147163/recentpharmaceutical-excessive-pricing-cases-in-context [https://perma.cc/65MA-3FBA].
22 The executive branch is also making efforts to address prescription drug affordability under the
White House “Blueprint” for drug costs. See, e.g., DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., AMERICAN
PATIENTS FIRST: THE TRUMP ADMINISTRATION BLUEPRINT TO LOWER DRUG PRICES AND REDUCE
OUT-OF-POCKET COSTS (2018), https://www.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/AmericanPatientsFirst.pdf
[https://perma.cc/PM8G-98XW]. However, the White House proposals, unlike the legislative proposals,
do not directly target “excessive” drug prices for regulatory action. They are therefore beyond the ambit
of our analysis.
23 Creating and Restoring Equal Access to Equivalent Samples Act of 2017, S. 974, 115th Cong.
(2017).
24 Congress has passed two such laws. The Patient Right to Know Drug Prices Act, Pub. L. No.
115-263, 132 Stat. 3672 (2018) (banning gag clauses in certain drug plans); The Know the Lowest Price
Act, Pub. L. No. 115-262, 132 Stat. 3670 (2018) (banning gag clauses in Medicare Part D and Medicare
Advantage plans); see also Gudiksen & King, supra note 18, at 101; Susan Jaffe, No More Secrets:
Congress Bans Pharmacist ‘Gag Orders’ on Drug Prices, KAISER HEALTH NEWS (Oct. 10, 2018),
https://khn.org/news/no-more-secrets-congress-bans-pharmacist-gag-orders-on-drug-prices
[https://perma.cc/EZM8-J5DS] (both discussing these federal laws).
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“excessive” pricing. In this Part, we survey an illustrative sample of recent
legislative efforts in this space. 25
A. Federal Bills
1. Prescription Drug Pricing Reduction Act
On September 25, 2019, Senator Chuck Grassley introduced
prescription drug legislation approved by the Senate Finance Committee. 26
The major provision that directly regulates price is a provision that
effectively caps price increases for Medicare Part B drugs (e.g., outpatient
infusions administered in a physician’s office) at the rate of overall inflation
by requiring manufacturers to rebate any amounts paid by Medicare above
that level back to the Secretary of Health and Human Services (HHS). 27 That
provision does not extend to purchases by non-Medicare plans or to Part D
(orally administered) prescription drugs. 28
2. Lower Drug Costs Now Act
House Speaker Nancy Pelosi and House Democrats introduced
legislation on September 19, 2019 that proposes sweeping changes to how

25 Given space constraints and the plethora of bills introduced, we confine our review to legislation
defining substantive actions to be taken in response to identified instances of excessive pricing. Though
we will not discuss them at length, we acknowledge that an adjacent set of bills—disclosure and
transparency laws—are germane to making such laws effective. Transparency laws require
biopharmaceutical companies to publicly disclose when their products’ prices exceed a specified
threshold. By making available the pertinent data, they serve as handmaidens to laws seeking to take
direct action on excessive prices. See, e.g., Zachary Brennan, Vermont Drug Price Transparency: New
Law Calls Out Egregious Price Spikes, REG. FOCUS (Dec. 6, 2016), https://www.raps.org/regulatoryfocus%E2%84%A2/news-articles/2016/12/vermont-drug-price-transparency-new-law-calls-outegregious-price-spikes [https://perma.cc/CLA7-X6MX]. Transparency laws have been a popular
approach in the states, and in spring 2019, these laws found expression in several federal bills. For
example, H.R. 2113, introduced in April 2019, would require the Secretary of Health and Human Services
(HHS) to annually determine whether an applicable drug has experienced a price increase at or above a
specified level. Prescription Drug STAR Act, H.R. 2113, 116th Cong. (2019).
26 Prescription Drug Pricing Reduction Act of 2019, S. 2543, 116th Cong. (2019); Description of the
Chairman’s Mark, The Prescription Drug Pricing Reduction Act (PDPRA) of 2019 (July 25, 2019) (as
reported by S. Comm. on Finance), https://www.finance.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/FINAL%20
Description%20of%20the%20Chairman’s%20Mark%20for%20the%20Prescription%20Drug%20Pricin
g%20Reduction%20Act%20of%202019.pdf [https://perma.cc/5LU2-QYA9].
27 S. 2543 § 106. Medicare is health insurance administered by the federal government for the elderly
and those with certain disabilities. Part B pertains to outpatient care, and Part D offers prescription drug
coverage. Medicare Program—General Information, CMS.GOV (Nov. 13, 2019, 10:51 PM),
https://www.cms.gov/Medicare/Medicare-General-Information/MedicareGenInfo/index
[https://perma.cc/AC8G-TWNX].
28 S. 2543 § 106.

866

114:859 (2020)

Reining In “Unconscionable” Prices for Prescription Drugs

prescription drugs are paid for in Medicare Parts B and D. 29 Among other
provisions, the Lower Drug Costs Now Act would authorize the HHS
Secretary to negotiate the price of at least twenty-five drugs that lack a
generic or biosimilar competitor. 30 The bill sets a price ceiling of 120% of
the volume-weighted average price in six foreign countries (Australia,
Canada, France, Germany, Japan, and the United Kingdom), which would
apply to Medicare purchases as well as purchases by any commercial insurer
that wishes to opt in. 31 Companies that overcharge Medicare or another payer
after agreeing to a maximum price would be subject to civil penalties of ten
times the overcharge. 32 Drug manufacturers that refuse to negotiate or to
agree to the price cap specified in the legislation would be subject to an
excise tax of 65%–95% of annual gross sales. 33 Further, annual price
increases would be limited to the rate of inflation.34 For Medicare Part B,
these pricing provisions would apply until a generic or biosimilar competitor
enters the market, as a “rebatable drug” is defined as a “single source drug
or biological.” 35 For Part D, a “rebatable drug” is defined as a drug or
biologic that is covered by Part D and does not cost more, on average, than
$100 per year per patient (subject to future adjustments for inflation). 36
3.

Combatting Unreasonable Rises and Excessively (CURE) High
Drug Prices Act
The Combatting Unreasonable Rises and Excessively (CURE) High
Drug Prices Act was introduced on December 13, 2018 by Senator Richard
Blumenthal 37 and reintroduced on February 28, 2019 as S. 637. 38 Although
the Act’s title references “unreasonable” and “excessive” prices (and a press
release calls such high prices “predatory” and “unconscionable”),39 the

29 Elijah E. Cummings Lower Drug Costs Now Act, H.R. 3, 116th Cong. (as passed by the House,
Dec. 12, 2019), https://congress.gov/116/bills/hr3/BILLS-116hr3eh.pdf [https://perma.cc/FE3H-6VP3].
30 Id. §§ 101, 1192, 1194.
31 Id. §§ 1191(c)(3), 1194(c)(1).
32 Id. § 1198(a).
33 Id. §§ 102(a), (c) (adding 26 U.S.C. § 4192).
34 Id. §§ 201, 202.
35 Id. § 201.
36 Id. § 202.
37 CURE High Drug Prices Act, S. 3754, 115th Cong. (2018).
38 CURE High Drug Prices Act, S. 637, 116th Cong. (2019).
39 Press Release, Richard Blumenthal, Blumenthal, Harris, Merkley & Klobuchar Introduce Bill to
End Predatory Price Gouging on Lifesaving Drugs (Dec. 13, 2018), https://www.blumenthal.senate.gov/
newsroom/press/release/blumenthal-harris-merkley-and-klobuchar-introduce-bill-to-end-predatoryprice-gouging-on-lifesaving-drugs [https://perma.cc/J9T7-A3DW].
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statutory term of choice in S. 637 is “price gouging.” 40 The bill provides a
general definition of “price gouging” and identifies three situations in which
there will be a default presumption that price gouging has occurred. 41 The
general definition provides that price gouging is:
an increase in the average manufacturer price [(AMP)] of a qualifying drug
that—
(A) is in substantial excess of an amount that could be reasonably justified
by an increase in cost of producing the drug or by an increase in cost due
to appropriate expansion of access to the drug to promote public health; and
(B) that because of insufficient competition in the marketplace, consumers
cannot reasonably avoid. 42

The presumption of price gouging would be triggered if a drug’s AMP has
increased 10% or more in the previous twelve months, 20% or more in the
previous thirty-six months, or 30% or more in the previous sixty months. 43
Although standards triggering the presumption of price gouging are clear,
the general definition is open to considerable interpretation.
If the Secretary of HHS believes that a manufacturer has engaged in
price gouging, she would be required to notify the manufacturer and request
a “statement of justification” for the price increase. 44 This statement of
justification could include information about the drug’s production costs,
efforts to expand access to the drug, marketplace competition, and “any other
information that the manufacturer believes to be relevant.”45 Manufacturers
would have forty-five days to respond. 46 If the Secretary determined that
there has been a prohibited price increase, she could choose to do nothing,
or pursue one of three options. 47 First, the Secretary could require the
manufacturer to disgorge excessive payments to those who have overpaid.48
Second, the Secretary could order the manufacturer to make the drug
available to certain health plans at the pre-gouging price for up to a year. 49
Third, in situations of repeat offenders or where price gouging knowingly
40

S. 637.
Id. §§ 2(5), 3(b). The Blumenthal bill’s definition of price gouging bears a resemblance to the
language in § 2–801(f) of Maryland’s anti-price gouging law, HB 631, discussed infra note 258.
42 S. 637 § 2(5).
43 Id. § 3(b).
44 Id. § 3(c).
45 Id.
46 Id. § 3(d).
47 Id. § 3(f).
48 Id. § 3(f)(1)(A).
49 Id. § 3(f)(1)(B).
41
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occurs, the manufacturer could be compelled to “pay a civil penalty of up to
three times the excessive amount the manufacturer received as a result of a
violation of this Act.” 50
4. Stop Price Gouging Act
In February 2019, Senator Sherrod Brown introduced the Stop Price
Gouging Act, which would impose an excise tax 51 on biopharmaceutical
companies for sales of prescription medications experiencing a “price
spike.” 52 Entities covered by the Act would be required to submit quarterly
cost, volume, pricing, revenue, and other information on their prescription
drugs to the HHS Inspector General, 53 who would review this information
annually to determine whether a “price spike” has occurred. 54 A price spike
is defined in the bill as “an increase in the average manufacturer price in
commerce of a prescription drug for which the price spike percentage is
equal to or greater than applicable price increase allowance.”55 In other
words, if a drug’s price increased more than an allowable amount—
determined by comparison to the Chained Consumer Price Index—a price
spike would be deemed to have occurred. 56
Unless an exemption (listed in the Act) applied, the Inspector General
would report their findings to the Internal Revenue Service (IRS), 57 which
then would impose a calibrated tax on the offending company. 58 Price spikes
of less than 15% above the allotted allowance would be subject to a 50% tax
on price-spike revenue, 59 those 15%–20% above the allowance would be
taxed at 75%, and those 20% or more above the allowance would be taxed
at 100%. 60 Different calculations would be performed for cumulative pricespike taxes. 61
50

Id. § 3(f)(1)(C).
Excise taxes are taxes paid on the purchase of a specific good or the conduct of a certain activity
(e.g., highway trucking). Excise Tax, IRS (July 29, 2019), https://www.irs.gov/businesses/smallbusinesses-self-employed/excise-tax [https://perma.cc/3J6S-J3DU].
52 Stop Price Gouging Act, S. 378, 116th Cong. (2019). Representative Mark Pocan introduced an
identical bill in the House. Stop Price Gouging Act, H.R. 1093, 116th Cong. (2019).
53 S. 378 § 2(b).
54 Id. § 2(c).
55 Id. § 2(a)(6)(A).
56 Id. § 2(a)(6)(C). The Chained Consumer Price Index, or C-CPI-U, is a cost of living index. See
Chained Consumer Price Index for All Urban Consumers (C-CPI-U), BUREAU OF LABOR STATS. (July
8, 2019), https://www.bls.gov/cpi/additional-resources/chained-cpi.htm [https://perma.cc/JT5L-NPZ5].
57 S. 378 § 2(e).
58 Id. § 4192(a).
59 Id. § 4192(b)(2)(A).
60 Id. §§ 4192(b)(2)(B)–(C).
61 Id. § 4192(c).
51
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5. Prescription Drug Price Relief Act of 2019
In January 2019, Senator Bernie Sanders and Representative Ro
Khanna introduced into the Senate and House, respectively, the Prescription
Drug Price Relief Act of 2019. 62 This Act provided that “excessively priced
drugs” would lose their government-granted market exclusivities.
To determine whether a brand-name drug’s domestic price is excessive,
the HHS Secretary would be required to review all brand-name drugs at least
annually. 63 The Act sets forth two ways in which a drug may be excessively
priced: (1) if the “domestic average manufacturing price exceeds the median
price charged for such drug in the 5 reference countries”—Canada, the
United Kingdom, Germany, France, and Japan 64—or (2) if, based on
consideration of a number of factors, the Secretary judges the drug’s price to
be “higher than reasonable.” 65 The Act’s enumerated factors run the gamut
from the specific (e.g., patient population size, government investment in
research and development) to the very open-ended (“[o]ther factors the
Secretary determines appropriate”). 66 Any person could petition the
Secretary “to make an excessive drug price determination for an applicable
drug” under this second category, and the Secretary would be required to
respond within ninety days. 67
62 Prescription Drug Price Relief Act, S. 102, 116th Cong. (2019); Prescription Drug Price Relief
Act, H.R. 465, 116th Cong. (2019).
63 S. 102 § 2(a); H.R. 465 § 2(a).
64 S. 102 §§ 2(b)(1)(A)–(B); H.R. 465 §§ 2(b)(1)(A)–(B). Another bill proposed by Senator Rick
Scott, the Transparent Drug Pricing Act of 2019, would create an “International Retail List Price Index”
which would prohibit a U.S. retail list price from exceeding the “lowest retail list price for the drug among
Canada, France, the United Kingdom, Japan, or Germany.” S. 977, 116th Cong. § 4(a) (2019).
65 S. 102 § 2(b)(2).
66 Id. § 2(b)(2). The full list of factors to be considered is as follows:

(A) The size of the affected patient population.
(B) The value of the drug to patients, including the impact of the price on access to the drug and
the relationship of the price of the drug to its therapeutic health benefits.
(C) The risk adjusted value of Federal Government subsidies and investments related to the drug.
(D) The costs associated with development of the drug.
(E) Whether the drug provided a significant improvement in health outcomes, compared to other
therapies available at the time of its approval.
(F) The cumulative global revenues generated by the drug.
(G) Whether the domestic average manufacturer price of the drug increased during any annual
quarter by a percentage that is more than the percentage increase in the consumer price index for
all urban consumers for the respective annual quarter.
(H) Other factors the Secretary determines appropriate.
Id. §§ 2(b)(2)(A)–(H).
67 Id. § 2(c)(1).
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For those drugs identified as excessively priced, the bill provides that
the Secretary “shall waive or void any government-granted exclusivities”
and “shall grant open, non-exclusive licenses” to other manufacturers. 68 The
impacted exclusivities fall under various sections of the Federal Food, Drug,
and Cosmetic Act and the Public Health Service Act, but also would include
“[a]ny other provision of law that provides for exclusivity (or extension of
exclusivity) with respect to a drug.” 69 The bill has additional provisions
governing reasonable royalties to be paid from licensees to those who have
lost their exclusivities,70 establishing a database of brand-name drugs and
excessive price determinations, 71 and reporting requirements for both the
Secretary and drug manufacturers. 72
The bill’s definition of excessive price is an unusual hybrid of clear and
opaque measures. The international reference pricing standard is relatively
straightforward (although disputes may arise about how to calculate the price
in foreign countries), but the “higher than reasonable” standard is not.
Although the legislation provides specific considerations to be weighed in
determining whether a price is “higher than reasonable,” the breadth of these
factors and lack of direction as to how to weigh them against one another (in
the absence of clarifying regulations) leaves considerable room for agency
discretion.
6. Affordable Drug Manufacturing Act of 2018
In December 2018, Senator Elizabeth Warren and Representative Jan
Schakowsky introduced into the Senate and House, respectively, the
Affordable Drug Manufacturing Act of 2018. 73 This bill would have created
an Office of Drug Manufacturing within HHS that would either manufacture
generic medications itself or contract with others when it determined that (1)
a drug is “not readily available from existing suppliers”; (2) HHS
manufacture would facilitate market entry of other generics; or (3) it is

68 Id. §§ 3(a)(1)–(2). Other federal bills have taken similar approaches. For example, the FLAT
Prices Act, introduced in February 2019 in both the Senate and the House, identifies three threshold price
increases for which a drug manufacturer loses 180 days of market exclusivities. FLAT Prices Act, S. 366,
116th Cong. §§ 2(a)(1), (b) (2019); H.R. 1188, 116th Cong. §§ 2(a)(1), (b) (2019). It further provides that
for each five percent price increase in WAC over those three identified thresholds, certain market
exclusivities “shall be reduced for an additional 30 days.” S. 366 § 2(a)(2); H.R. 1188 § 2(a)(2).
69 S. 102 §§ 8(5), 8(5)(G).
70 Id. § 4.
71 Id. § 5.
72 Id. §§ 5(b), 6.
73 Affordable Drug Manufacturing Act of 2018, S. 3775, 115th Cong. (2018); Affordable Drug
Manufacturing Act of 2018, H.R. 7348, 115th Cong. (2018).
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“necessary for the Office to carry out its duties.” 74 The Act aimed to increase
competition, reduce prices, address shortages, and “increase patient access
to affordable drugs.” 75 Rather than identify and penalize offending conduct,
this bill sought to ameliorate the conditions which make excessive pricing
possible—namely, limited competition.76
The bill’s provisions pertaining to insulin are of particular interest. The
Act would have required that within a year of enactment, HHS must begin
to manufacture certain insulins. 77 These would include insulins with no
current market exclusivities and less than three manufacturers for the U.S.
market that, in the previous twelve months, had a price hike above the
Consumer Price Index for Medical Care.78 This definition of a trigger price
for regulatory action is quite clear.
7. Low Drug Prices Act
Senator Jeff Merkley introduced the Low Drug Prices Act in November
2018. 79 This bill implicitly addressed the problem of excessive pricing
through reference pricing. The Act would have required HHS to “establish
annual reference prices” 80 and mandated that the total acquisition costs of
prescription drugs for federal health programs could not exceed those
reference prices. 81 The total acquisition cost is the amount paid by the federal
program plus the amount paid by the patient, after discounts and rebates. 82
Reference prices would have been set using the median price of the drug sold
in specified foreign countries (Japan, Germany, the United Kingdom,
France, Italy, Canada, Australia, Spain, the Netherlands, Switzerland, and
Sweden). 83 Further, the bill would have conditioned reimbursement of a drug
74

S. 3775 § 310B(a)(4)(D)(i); H.R. 7348 § 310B(a)(4)(D)(i).
S. 3775 § 310B(a)(2); H.R. 7348 § 310B(a)(2).
76 See Elizabeth Warren, It’s Time to Let the Government Manufacture Generic Drugs, WASH. POST
(Dec. 17, 2018, 8:00 PM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/elizabeth-warren-its-time-to-letthe-government-manufacture-generic-drugs/2018/12/17/66bc0fb0-023f-11e9-b5df-5d3874f1ac36_
story.html [https://perma.cc/6RMC-ZWKU]; Press Release, Elizabeth Warren, Warren, Schakowsky
Introduce Bicameral Legislation to Radically Reduce Drug Prices Through Public Manufacturing of
Prescription Drugs (Dec. 18, 2018), https://www.warren.senate.gov/newsroom/press-releases/warrenschakowsky-introduce-bicameral-legislation-to-radically-reduce-drug-prices-through-publicmanufacturing-of-prescription-drugs [https://perma.cc/9GB6-MPTQ] (calling the bill “an ambitious
proposal to address the skyrocketing price of prescription drugs”).
77 S. 3775 § 310B(d).
78 Id. § 310B(e)(1)(C)(ii)(I).
79 Low Drug Prices Act, S. 3680, 115th Cong. (2018).
80 Id. § 2(a).
81 Id.
82 Id.
83 Id. §§ 2(b)(1)–(2).
75

872

114:859 (2020)

Reining In “Unconscionable” Prices for Prescription Drugs

in federal health programs on drug manufacturers offering the reference price
to all buyers, including the uninsured and patients with commercial and
individual health plans. 84
B. State Bills and Enacted Legislation
While Congress has recently become a locus of bills addressing
excessively priced prescription drugs, states (and the District of Columbia)
have been active in this space for the past several years. 85 In 2019, more than
300 bills were filed at the state level to address prescription drug costs. 86 In
2018, “forty-four states considered 227 bills to address rising drug costs, of
which 55 became laws in thirty-two states.” 87 In the following Section, we
survey two key strategies states have pursued to directly target excessive
pricing: price gouging laws and rate-setting laws.
1. Price Gouging Laws
State price gouging statutes are a common legislative fixture for
addressing steep price increases on necessary goods during emergency
situations. 88 Recently, this approach has been applied to prescription drugs.
During the 2018–2019 legislative session, fifteen states considered price
gouging legislation specific to medicines. 89 The 2019 National Academy for
State Health Policy (NASHP) legislative tracker showed five states
introduced seven prescription drug price gouging bills. 90 These bills all
prohibit unconscionable or excessive prices for prescription drugs. 91
84 Id. § 2(d) (“[A]s a condition for receiving reimbursements under any of the Federal programs, a
drug manufacturer shall offer prescription drugs at the reference price to all individuals, including
individuals who are not insured and individuals who are covered under a group health plan or group or
individual health insurance coverage.”).
85 See, e.g., Gudiksen & King, supra note 18, at 98; Nat’l Acad. For State Health Policy,
State Prescription Drug Legislative Tracker 2019, NASHP (Jan. 3, 2020), https://nashp.org/wp-content/
uploads/2019/12/Final-2019-Tracker-1-3-2020.pdf
[https://perma.cc/NX76-WBWD]
[hereinafter
NASHP Tracker].
86 Data are current as of January 3, 2020. NASHP Tracker, supra note 85.
87 Katie Gudiksen, Spotlight on 2018 State Drug Legislation Summary: The Year in Review, SOURCE
BLOG (Dec. 17, 2018), http://sourceonhealthcare.org/spotlight-on-2018-state-drug-legislation-summarythe-year-in-review [https://perma.cc/NY5G-TYZF].
88 See infra Section III.A for more details.
89 Gudiksen & King, supra note 18, at 110; Gudiksen, Spotlight on 2018 State Drug Legislation
Summary, supra note 87; State Prescription Drug Legislative Tracker 2018, NAT’L ACAD. FOR STATE
HEALTH POLICY (2018), https://nashp.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/01/Rx-Legislative-Tracker-Update9.5.2018.pdf [https://perma.cc/CN7D-2USE].
90 NASHP Tracker, supra note 85.
91 See id. The seven bills are S.B. 415, 121st Gen. Assemb., 1st Reg. Sess., §§ 5–6 (Ind. 2019); H.B.
5109, 100th Leg., Reg. Sess., § 1 (Mi. 2019); S.B. 2630, 218th Leg., Reg. Sess., § 1 (N.J. 2018); S.B.
1590, 218th Leg., Reg. Sess., § 1 (N.J. 2018); S. 977, 218th Leg., Reg. Sess., § 1 (N.J. 2018); S.B. 141,
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Where price gouging bills have become law, they have faced
formidable constitutional challenges. 92 In 2007, the Federal Circuit struck
down the District of Columbia’s excessive-price prohibition for patented
medications on patent preemption grounds. 93 Likewise, a decade later, the
Fourth Circuit invalidated Maryland’s price gouging law for generic drugs,
HB 631, hailed by its advocates as a “first-in-the-nation state law,” 94 on
dormant Commerce Clause grounds. 95 Even before HB 631’s defeat, the
pending legal challenge appeared to have had a “chilling effect on
pharmaceutical price gouging laws” 96: of the fifteen price gouging bills
considered in 2018, none were enacted. 97 Ten of these bills used similar
language to HB 631, including their definitions of “unconscionable
increase.” 98
These setbacks are palpable, but they are not necessarily definitive. The
Supreme Court declined to grant certiorari in the Maryland case, and no
prescription price gouging legislation has yet been reviewed beyond the
courts of appeals. As others point out, if legislation similar to Maryland’s
were enacted by a different state and challenged in another circuit reaching
a different result, a circuit split might encourage Supreme Court review.99
Even if these statutes pass muster under the dormant Commerce Clause,
however, a lingering sticking point for price gouging prohibitions will be
defining key terms such as “excessive” or “unconscionable” in a manner that
2019 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. § 1 (N.Y. 2019); S.B. 1308, 2019 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess., § 32.1-373
(Va. 2019). NASHP Tracker, supra note 85.
92 See, e.g., Dana A. Elfin, Spiked Maryland Rx Pricing Law Could Kill Similar Efforts, BLOOMBERG
LAW (Apr. 16, 2018, 2:57 PM), https://news.bloomberglaw.com/pharma-and-life-sciences/spikedmaryland-rx-pricing-law-could-kill-similar-efforts [https://perma.cc/SV78-2Q4J] (explaining the
successful constitutional challenge to Maryland’s price gouging law).
93 Biotechnology Indus. Org. v. District of Columbia, 496 F.3d 1362, 1374 (Fed. Cir. 2007). The
Federal Circuit opinion treats the District of Columbia as a state. Id. at 1371–72.
94 Darien Shanske & Jane Horvath, Maryland’s Generic Drug Pricing Law Is Constitutional: A
Recent Decision Misunderstands the Structure of the Industry, HEALTH AFF. BLOG (June 22, 2018),
https://www.healthaffairs.org/do/10.1377/hblog20180621.752771/full [https://perma.cc/Z3UX-9BCW];
see also Lucas Allen, Demanding Affordable Medicines: Lessons from Maryland’s Law Against Price
Gouging, TRUTHOUT (Sept. 18, 2017), https://truthout.org/articles/demanding-affordable-medicineslessons-from-maryland-s-law-against-price-gouging
[https://perma.cc/38RP-ZEV6]
(“Maryland’s
passage of HB 631 is one of a few victories in state drug-pricing legislation over the past year.”).
95 Ass’n for Accessible Meds. v. Frosh, 887 F.3d 664, 666 (4th Cir. 2018), cert. denied, 139 S. Ct.
1168 (2019).
96 Gudiksen, Spotlight on 2018 State Drug Legislation Summary, supra note 87.
97 Id.
98 Katie Gudiksen, Spotlight on 2018 State Drug Legislation Summary: Part 4—Price Gouging
Prohibitions, SOURCE BLOG (Sept. 11, 2018), http://sourceonhealthcare.org/spotlight-on-2018-statedrug-legislation-part-4-price-gouging-prohibitions [https://perma.cc/DRR5-7C7J].
99 Id.
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avoids a void-for-vagueness challenge. 100 That issue has not yet been fully
litigated.
This Section details the rise and fall of the two most notable state
prescription drug price gouging statutes—the District of Columbia’s
Prescription Drug Excessive Pricing Act of 2005 and Maryland’s Prohibition
Against Price Gouging for Essential Off-Patent or Generic Drugs—and then
briefly reviews price gouging bills introduced in other states, many of which
follow Maryland’s template. The efforts of the District of Columbia and
Maryland are interesting foils to one another. Each tackled a different
segment of excessive pricing problems—patented medications versus
generics—and each had a distinct approach for identifying problematic
pricing as well as enforcement. These differences had implications for the
kind of legal challenges that would ultimately be their downfall.
a. D.C.’s Prescription Drug Excessive Pricing Act of 2005
More than a decade before the recent spate of state legislative efforts to
control prescription drug costs, the District of Columbia led the field with
the Prescription Drug Excessive Pricing Act of 2005. 101 This Act was passed
based on findings that “[t]he excessive prices of prescription drugs” were
“threatening the health and welfare of the residents of the District.” 102 The
legislation focused specifically on patented medications, and the tool it
utilized was a price cap. 103 The Act prohibited drug manufacturers and
licensees from selling patented medications in the District of Columbia for
an excessive price, stating, “[i]t shall be unlawful for any drug manufacturer
or licensee thereof, excluding a point of sale retail seller, to sell or supply for
sale or impose minimum resale requirements for a patented prescription drug
that results in the prescription drug being sold in the District for an excessive
price.” 104
As with several of the federal proposals already discussed, the law
defined an “excessive price” by referencing prices paid in high-income
foreign countries. 105 It established a prima facie case of excessive pricing if
the wholesale price of a patented medication was more than 30% higher than
that medicine’s price “in any high income country in which the product is
100 See Robertson, supra note 18, at 1001 (“Under any such policy, it will remain difficult and
contentious to determine what is and is not an ‘unconscionable’ price and to set the amount of any required
rebate.”).
101 D.C. CODE § 28–4551 (2005).
102 Id. § 28–4551(1).
103 Id. § 28–4554(a).
104 Id. § 28–4553.
105 Id. § 28–4552(2); see also infra Section I.A.
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protected by patents or other exclusive marketing rights.” 106 The United
Kingdom, Germany, Canada, and Australia served as reference countries.107
Once a prima facie case was established, the law provided that a
defending manufacturer or rights-holder would have the opportunity to rebut
the presumption of price gouging by providing evidence of the
demonstrated costs of invention, development and production of the
prescription drug, global sales and profits to date, consideration of any
government funded research that supported the development of the drug, and
the impact of price on access to the prescription drug by residents and the
government of the District of Columbia. 108

The Act provided that “[a]ny affected party” had standing to file a civil
enforcement suit, and a finding of excessive pricing could yield injunctive
relief, fines, damages (including treble damages), attorneys’ fees, litigation
costs, or “[a]ny other relief the court deems proper.” 109
Pharmaceutical industry organizations BIO and PhRMA challenged the
Act, claiming that it was invalid under the Commerce Clause and preempted
by federal patent law. 110 The District Court for the District of Columbia found
that the Act violated the dormant Commerce Clause as applied to
transactions not within the District’s borders, 111 and further ruled it
preempted by patent law. 112 The patent issue was appealed, eventually
reaching the Federal Circuit Court of Appeals. The Federal Circuit affirmed
the district court and enjoined the Act’s enforcement, deeming it to be
conflict preempted. 113 The court explained that “[b]y penalizing high
prices—and thus limiting the full exercise of the exclusionary power that
derives from a patent,” the Act impermissibly tinkered with the balance set
by Congress in the patent system between incentives for invention and public
access to patented products. 114

106

D.C. CODE § 28–4554(a).
Id. § 28–4552(2).
108 Id. § 28–4554(b).
109 Id. § 28–4555.
110 Biotechnology Indus. Org. v. D.C., 496 F.3d 1362, 1366 (Fed. Cir. 2007); Pharm. Research &
Mfrs. of Am. v. District of Columbia, 406 F. Supp. 2d 56 (D.D.C. 2005).
111 Pharm. Research, 406 F. Supp. 2d at 71. For a discussion of dormant Commerce Clause doctrine,
see infra Section I.B.1.b.
112 Pharm. Research, 406 F. Supp. 2d at 67.
113 496 F.3d at 1374. Conflict preemption occurs when state law “stands as an obstacle to the
accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress.” Id. at 1372 (quoting
Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941)).
114 Id. at 1374.
107
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Although much about this ruling invites further inquiry, if not
skepticism, 115 the issue was not appealed to the Supreme Court. 116 The ruling
appears to have had a chilling effect on states’ attempts to regulate highpriced, on-patent medications through price caps. Importantly, however,
although the decision appears to foreclose state efforts to regulate the prices
at which patented medications may be sold, it does not appear to reach
initiatives that regulate what payers will pay for patented medications. Thus,
rate-setting proposals, discussed below, appear unaffected by the ruling as
long as they do not raise dormant Commerce Clause or other constitutional
concerns. 117 Moreover, the decision does not reach regulation of off-patent
or generic medications.
b.

Maryland’s Prohibition Against Price Gouging for Essential
Off-Patent or Generic Drugs
Given the invalidation of the District of Columbia’s earlier effort to
regulate the prices of patented medications, it is unsurprising that subsequent
state-level price gouging bills focused on generics. The most important of
these was Maryland’s HB 631, which was struck down by the Fourth Circuit
in 2018.
On May 27, 2017, Maryland enacted HB 631, the Prohibition Against
Price Gouging for Essential Off-Patent or Generic Drugs. 118 Maryland’s
legislation put patented medications aside and focused on off-patent or
generic medications for which all federal exclusivities—patent or
otherwise—had expired. 119 Further, the statute only covered medications
deemed “essential” and produced by “three or fewer manufacturers.”120 HB
631’s anti-gouging prohibition stated that “[a] manufacturer or wholesale

115

See, e.g., Joshua D. Sarnoff, BIO v. DC and the New Need to Eliminate Federal Patent Law
Preemption of State and Local Price and Product Regulation, 2007 PATENTLY-O PATENT L.J., https://
patentlyo.com/lawjournal/2007/08/bio-v-dc-and-th.html [https://perma.cc/XKF2-GY4G] (criticizing the
Federal Circuit’s preemption analysis).
116 The Federal Circuit also denied both rehearing and rehearing en banc. See Biotechnology Indus.
Org. v. District of Columbia, 505 F.3d 1343 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
117 See Feldman et al., supra note 17, at 49–50.
118 HB 631, GEN. ASSEMBLY MD. (Nov. 28, 2017), http://mgaleg.maryland.gov/webmga/frmMain.
aspx?stab=01&pid=billpage&tab=subject3&ys=2017rs&id=HB0631 [https://perma.cc/E2G4-L8Y6].
119 MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH–GEN. § 2–801(b)(1)(i) (West 2017).
120 Id. § 2–801(b)(1)(iii). Three seems to be minimum number of manufacturers required for a
reasonably well-functioning generic market. See NAT’L ACADS. OF SCIS., ENG’G, & MED., supra note 6,
at 77 (“If only a single generic producer enters the market, it does not necessarily reduce prices . . . . It
may take several competing generic companies to enter the market [for prices] to reach their lowest
possible level . . . .”).
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distributor may not engage in price gouging in the sale of an essential offpatent or generic drug.” 121
A further distinction between the District of Columbia’s law and
Maryland’s was the metrics used to determine what constituted an excessive
price. While the District of Columbia used foreign reference pricing plus a
30% markup as a benchmark, Maryland’s key terms were not defined
quantitatively. 122 Instead, borrowing terminology from the common law
doctrine of unconscionability, 123 HB 631 defined “price gouging” in terms of
an “unconscionable increase.” 124 “Unconscionable increase” was in turn
defined as
an increase in the price of a prescription drug that:
(1) Is excessive and not justified by the cost of producing the drug or the
cost of appropriate expansion of access to the drug to promote public
health; and
(2) Results in consumers for whom the drug has been prescribed having no
meaningful choice about whether to purchase the drug at an excessive price
because of:
(i) The importance of the drug to their health; and
(ii) Insufficient competition in the market for the drug. 125

Although this definition, on its face, left considerable room for
interpretation as to what counts as an “unconscionable increase,” it was
rendered more concrete when read in conjunction with HB 631’s notification
provisions. HB 631 endowed the state Attorney General with enforcement
121

MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH–GEN. § 2–802(a).
This was done “to avoid legislation that might be significantly under-inclusive or that might seem
to validate an otherwise-unjustified price increase based solely on the fact that it remained below a
particular quantitative threshold, the General Assembly selected a qualitative standard, rather than a
qualitative [sic] one.” Memorandum in Support of Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss at 32, Ass’n for
Accessible Meds. v. Frosh, 2017 WL 4347818 (D. Md. Sept. 29, 2017) (No. 17-cv-01860), 2017 WL
9438490 [hereinafter Frosh Motion to Dismiss].
123 See, e.g., id. at 31 (“[T]he Act draws directly from the well-established common law doctrine of
unconscionability, expressly invoking both the ‘procedural’ and ‘substantive’ components of that
doctrine. The doctrine has been applied by courts in literally hundreds of cases over the course of
centuries, without threat to anyone’s constitutional rights.”); id. at 3 (“HB 631 closely tracks the common
law doctrine of unconscionability, which predates the Constitution itself.”).
124 MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH–GEN. § 2–801(c). The legislation presumed that any generic drug
already has a price, so Maryland could target price increases without worry that it would incentivize
excessively high launch prices.
125 Id. § 2–801(f); see also Frosh, 2017 WL 4347818, at *8–10, rev’d, 887 F.3d 664 (4th Cir. 2018),
cert. denied, 139 S. Ct. 1168 (2019) (describing the statute’s unconscionability provisions and analyzing
dormant Commerce Clause and Due Process vagueness challenges in the context of a motion to dismiss).
122

878

114:859 (2020)

Reining In “Unconscionable” Prices for Prescription Drugs

powers (another departure from the District of Columbia’s statute). 126
Enforcement could begin 127 with notification of a price increase to
Maryland’s Attorney General by the Maryland Medical Assistance
Program. 128 The Maryland Medical Assistance Program could only notify the
Attorney General, however, of certain price increases. 129 Among those
increases were those where the increase “by itself or in combination”
resulted in a 50% or greater increase in the WAC within the past year, or
related to drugs with a WAC over $80 for defined periods of time, dosing,
or course of treatment. 130 Although the notification provisions specified
which price was to be examined (the WAC, which approximates the list price
of the drug), the more general definition of excessive price gave no such
specification.
Once notification of a price increase was received, the Attorney General
had discretion to choose a path forward, if at all.131 One option was turning
to Maryland’s courts for relief. 132 Available remedies included an injunction,
restoration of money acquired through prohibited pricing to consumers and
payers, restrictions on future pricing available to state health programs, and
civil penalties of up to $10,000 per violation. 133
Dismayed with the passage of this legislation, the trade association
representing generic manufacturers, the Association for Accessible
Medicines (AAM), sued. It advanced two main claims: that HB 631 violated
the dormant Commerce Clause, and that it was unconstitutionally vague, in
violation of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 134 AAM
argued that HB 631 violated the dormant Commerce Clause because it
reached transactions occurring wholly outside the State of Maryland. With
respect to vagueness, AAM argued that several of the legislation’s key terms

126

MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH–GEN. § 2–803.
We say “can begin” because it is unclear if enforcement must begin with notification.
Furthermore, the district court observed: “Although HB 631’s reporting provision could serve as a
benchmark, it does not appear to be binding on the Attorney General.” Frosh, 2017 WL 4347818, at *10
(citing MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH–GEN. § 2–803(a)).
128 MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH–GEN. § 2–803(a).
129 Id. §§ 2-803(a)(1)–(2).
130 Id.
131 Id. §§ 2-803(b)–(d).
132 Id. § 2-803(d).
133 Id. §§ 2-803(d)(1)–(5).
134 Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief at 23–27, Ass’n for Accessible Meds. v. Frosh,
2017 WL 4347818 (D. Md. July 6, 2017) (No. 17-cv-01860), 2017 WL 2884401 [hereinafter Ass’n for
Accessible Meds. Complaint].
127
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including “unconscionable increase” and “excessive” were impermissibly
unclear as to proscribed conduct. 135 Maryland filed a motion to dismiss. 136
On September 29, 2017, the district court granted Maryland’s motion
in part and denied it in part. 137 The court dismissed the dormant Commerce
Clause claim but preserved the vagueness claim. 138 AAM appealed, and the
Fourth Circuit reversed the dismissal of the dormant Commerce Clause claim
and invalidated the statute on that basis. 139
The dormant Commerce Clause doctrine, a corollary of the Commerce
Clause, holds that states cannot interfere with or burden interstate
commerce. 140 Its purpose is to guard against economic protectionism and
state legislation that privileges in-state parties at the expense of similarly
situated out-of-state competitors. 141
Dormant Commerce Clause jurisprudence provides several different
routes for evaluating whether state legislation runs afoul of its prohibitions. 142
Though a historically small corner of this analysis, 143 the extraterritoriality
principle played a central role in the Fourth Circuit’s decision. The Fourth
Circuit articulated two ways state legislation could violate this principle: “if
it either expressly applies to out-of-state commerce, or has that ‘practical
effect,’ regardless of the legislature’s intent.” 144 Whereas the district court
135
136
137

Id.

138

Id. at 22, 27–28.
Frosh Motion to Dismiss, supra note 122.
Frosh, 2017 WL 4347818, at *15. It further denied AAM’s motion for a preliminary injunction.

Id.
Id.
140 Id.
141 Id.
142 Ass’n for Accessible Meds. v. Frosh, 2017 WL 4347818, at *3–4 (D. Md. Sept. 29, 2017), rev’d,
887 F.3d 664 (4th Cir. 2018), cert. denied, 139 S. Ct. 1168 (2019) (laying out a “two-tiered” analysis of
per se violations and a balancing test under Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., plus a third “emerging” strand of
cases formulating an extraterritoriality principle) (citing Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142
(1970)). The Pike balancing test, however, has become disfavored, though not yet invalidated by the
Supreme Court. See Dep’t of Revenue v. Davis, 553 U.S. 328, 353 (2008) (“[E]ven on the assumption
that a Pike examination might generally be in order in this type of case, the current record and scholarly
material convince us that the Judicial Branch is not institutionally suited to draw reliable conclusions of
the kind that would be necessary . . . to satisfy [the] Pike burden . . . .”); United Haulers Ass’n, Inc. v.
Oneida-Herkimer Solid Waste Mgmt. Auth., 550 U.S. 330, 348–49 (2007) (Scalia, J., concurring in part)
(“I am unable to join Part II–D of the principal opinion, in which the plurality performs so-called ‘Pike
balancing.’ Generally speaking, the balancing of various values is left to Congress—which is precisely
what the Commerce Clause (the real Commerce Clause) envisions.”).
143 Frosh, 887 F.3d at 681 (Wynn, J., dissenting) (stating that the extraterritoriality principle “has
been characterized by our sister circuits as the [sic] ‘the most dormant’ of the Supreme Court’s dormant
Commerce Clause”).
144 Id. at 668 (citations omitted).
139
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had rejected an interpretation of the extraterritoriality principle as
“stand[ing] for the much broader proposition that a regulation that has effects
outside the state is per se invalid,” 145 that appears to be precisely the
interpretation embraced by the Fourth Circuit. Given that HB 631’s
prohibition against unconscionable increases applied to sales by
manufacturers and wholesalers, the statute would reach transactions
occurring outside of Maryland. 146 The Fourth Circuit concluded:
The Act instructs prescription drug manufacturers that they are prohibited from
charging an “unconscionable” price in the initial sale of a drug, which occurs
outside Maryland’s borders. Maryland cannot, even in an effort to protect its
consumers from skyrocketing prescription drug costs, impose its preferences in
this manner. The “practical effect” of the Act . . . is to specify the price at which
goods may be sold beyond Maryland’s borders. 147

The Court found the argument that the statute only reached upstream
transactions for drugs made for sale in Maryland unavailing. 148 Despite the
states’ and even AAM’s understanding of the statute as only implicating
drugs made for eventual sale in Maryland, the Court found that HB 631 could
reach transactions that had no nexus to drug sales in the state. 149 Maryland’s
petition for a rehearing en banc was denied, 150 as was its petition for certiorari
to the Supreme Court. 151 Thus, Maryland’s price gouging law remains void
until it is reworked to be consistent with the Fourth Circuit’s ruling. Because
the vagueness argument was not fully litigated, it remains a viable basis for
legal challenges to future statutes like HB 631.
c. Other State Price Gouging Laws
The efforts of the District of Columbia and Maryland are the most
notable state-level experiments with excessive price and price gouging
legislation. Maryland’s legislation, in particular, has been remarkably
influential. As noted above, of the fifteen prescription drug price gouging
proposals introduced during the 2018 legislative session, ten included

145 Frosh, 2017 WL 4347818, at *6 (“[I]f any state regulation that ‘control[s] . . . conduct’ out of
state is per se unconstitutional, wouldn’t we have to strike down state health and safety regulations that
require out-of-state manufacturers to alter their designs or labels?” (quoting Energy & Env’t Legal Inst.
v. Epel, 793 F.3d 1169, 1175 (10th Cir. 2015))).
146 Frosh, 887 F.3d at 672–73.
147 Id.
148 Id. at 672.
149 Id. at 671; Id. at 678–79 (Wynn, J., dissenting).
150 Ass’n for Accessible Meds. v. Frosh, 742 F. App’x 720 (4th Cir. 2018).
151 Frosh v. Ass’n for Accessible Meds., 139 S. Ct. 1168 (2019).
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language drawn from or identical to HB 631. 152 Further, the majority of the
price gouging bills tracked by NASHP for the 2018–2019 legislative
session 153—Indiana’s SB 415; 154 Michigan’s HB 5109; 155 New Jersey’s SB
2630 156 and SB 1590; 157 and Virginia’s SB 1308 158—are identical to or share
significant similarities with HB 631’s key language and requirements. 159
Although most state price gouging legislation is modeled after
Maryland’s, there are some departures. Rhode Island’s H 7022, for instance,
hewed closely to traditional price gouging statutes for times of emergency. 160
Contemplating situations of drug shortage, it only applied during a “market
emergency” declared by the governor or President, and then only for six
months. 161 Price gouging would be measured by comparing average prices
(prior to rebates and discounts being applied) of drugs sold before and during
the emergency to determine whether a “gross disparity” existed.162 Another
example is New York’s S 5262, 163 which would have amended New York’s
business law to prohibit price gouging of prescription medications subject to
shortages. Specifically, S 5262 provided that “[n]o party within the chain of
distribution of any drug subject to a shortage shall sell or offer to sell any
such drug subject to a shortage for an amount which represents an
unconscionably excessive price.” 164 The bill provided that a determination of
“unconscionably excessive is a question of law for the court,” 165 but provided
152 For a state-by-state summary of laws introduced in 2018, see Gudiksen, supra note 98 (noting
similar laws were introduced in Colorado, Louisiana, Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi, New Hampshire,
New Jersey, Vermont, Virginia, and Wisconsin).
153 NASHP Tracker, supra note 85.
154 S.B. 415, 121st Gen. Assemb., 1st Reg. Sess., §§ 5–6 (Ind. 2019).
155 H.B. 5109, 100th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Mi. 2019).
156 S.B. 2630, 218th Leg., Reg. Sess., § 1 (N.J. 2018).
157 S.B. 1590, 218th Leg., Reg. Sess., § 1 (N.J. 2018).
158 S.B. 1308, 2019 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess., § 32.1-373 (Va. 2019).
159 In contrast to HB 631, New Jersey’s S 977 targets any FDA-approved medication or health
technology that received government funding; it also focuses on prices paid in other countries. S. 977,
218th Leg., Reg. Sess., § 1 (N.J. 2018). S 977 took inspiration from a federal bill proposed by Senator
Sanders. Rebecca Wolitz, The Pay Twice Critique, Government Funding, and Reasonable Pricing
Clauses, 39 J. LEGAL MED. 177, 190 (2019). New York’s SB 141 is also not limited to generic
medications. It further provides that a determination of an “unconscionably excessive price” is a question
of law and outlines evidence for proving a violation of the law, including “a gross disparity between the
market price of the pharmaceutical . . . and the price of the same . . . over the six months prior . . . .” S.B.
141, 2019 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. § 1 (N.Y. 2019).
160 H. 7022, 2018 Gen. Assemb., Jan. Sess. (R.I. 2018).
161 Id. § 6-13.4-4.
162 Id. § 6-13.4-3(6).
163 S. 5262, 2017 Leg., Reg. Sess. (N.Y. 2017).
164 Id. § 396-rrr(2).
165 Id. § 396-rrr(3).
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some guideposts: courts should consider disparities between the price after
and before the shortage began, or between prices charged by the same seller
to different purchasers. 166 The legislation did not specify which price should
be assessed.
In summary, price gouging laws have been a fairly popular approach
for states, with Maryland in particular inspiring a number of imitators. Given
the discouraging litigation outcomes concerning these early laws, however,
continued policymaking momentum in this area will require finding ways
around patent preemption and dormant Commerce Clause challenges. This
might entail, for example, imposing price gouging prohibitions on patented
drugs via federal rather than state legislation, and focusing on within-state
transactions for state laws that prohibit excessive prices for off-patent drugs.
And such laws may continue to be confronted with vagueness challenges, as
we describe further in Part II, necessitating careful drafting of statutory
definitions of excessive price.
2. Rate-Setting Laws
There is growing interest among states in using rate setting by “drug
affordability boards” (DABs) to address unconscionable pricing. 167 This
approach does not restrict drug prices per se, but rather sets an upper limit
on the amount that specified drug purchasers in the state will pay. 168 In 2018,
seven states considered bills along these lines; 169 in 2019, the NASHP
legislative tracker listed fifteen bills introduced in nine states. 170 In the
highest-profile legislative victories to date, Maryland enacted rate-setting

166

Id. §§ 396-rrr(3)(b)(i)–(ii).
Ed Silverman, If the States Don’t Treat Pharma as a Utility, It May Be ‘Lights Out’ for Too Many
Patients, STAT (Apr. 25, 2019), https://www.statnews.com/2019/04/25/states-pharma-utility-price-capspatients [https://perma.cc/A57N-836V]; see also Jane C. Horvath & Gerard F. Anderson, The States as
Important Laboratories for Federal Prescription Drug Cost-Containment Efforts, 321 JAMA 1561, 1561
(2019) (describing initiatives in Maryland and other states to establish “all-payor upper payment limits”
for select high-cost drugs).
168 Horvath & Anderson, supra note 165, at 1561.
169 Gudiksen, Spotlight on 2018 State Drug Legislation Summary, supra note 87.
170 See S.B. 27, 2019 Gen. Assemb. (Conn. 2019); S.B. 370, 2019 Gen. Assemb. (Conn. 2019); H.B.
3493, 101st Gen. Assemb. (Ill. 2019); L.D. 1499, 129th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Me. 2019); H.B. 768, 2019 Gen.
Assemb. (Md. 2019); H. 1133, 191st Gen. Court (Mass. 2019); S. 706, 191st Gen. Court (Mass. 2019);
H. 4000, 191st Gen. Court (Mass. 2019); H. 4134, 191st Gen. Court (Mass. 2019); H.F. 1668, 91st Sess.
(Minn. 2019); S.B. 310, 100th Gen. Assemb. (Mo. 2019); S.B. 977, 218th Leg., Reg. Sess. (N.J. 2018);
H.B. 2692, 80th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Or. 2019); see also NASHP Tracker, supra note 85; Comparison of
States’ Prescription Drug Affordability Review Board Legislation, NASHP (Mar. 19, 2019),
https://nashp.org/comparison-of-bills-creating-state-prescription-drug-affordability-review-boards
[https://perma.cc/R4NQ-KT64]. Of note, New Jersey’s proposal caps prices, rather than sets payment or
reimbursement rates. Id.
167

883

NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

legislation known as HB 768 in May 2019, 171 and Maine enacted similar
legislation, LD 1499, the following month. 172 In September 2019,
Massachusetts also enacted HB 4000, a general appropriations bill, which
included provisions enabling an affordability review process for negotiating
supplemental rebate agreements with manufacturers for drugs covered by
MassHealth. 173
Early permutations of rate setting in the prescription drug space,
proposed by ballot initiatives in California and Ohio, would have imposed a
price ceiling for state government payers, such as state employee health
insurance plans. 174 That price ceiling was keyed to the prices paid by the
United States Department of Veterans Affairs, which receives a statutory
discount of 24% “off of the nonfederal AMP” 175 plus additional, negotiated
rebates. 176 The Ohio Drug Price Relief Act and its California cousin both
failed at the polls. 177
The general mechanism in rate-setting proposals is the creation of a
board that is empowered to review drug prices and set upper payment limits.
These bills also often incorporate transparency provisions requiring drug
manufacturers to submit information pertaining to price increases and launch
prices. 178 Some proposals frame rate setting as triggered by drugs that present
an “affordability challenge,” 179 but many are explicitly concerned with
regulating “excessive” prices—including the influential model legislation
171 Prescription Drug Affordability Board Act, H.B. 768, ch. 692, 2019 Md. Laws 692; Lev Facher,
Pharma Lobbyists Flooded Maryland to Block a Drug-Pricing Bill. Opponents Pushed Back—and Won,
STAT (Apr. 11, 2019), https://www.statnews.com/2019/04/11/pharma-lobbyists-flooded-maryland-toblock-a-drug-pricing-bill-opponents-pushed-back-and-won [https://perma.cc/9HK7-HYHG].
172 Maine Prescription Drug Affordability Board Act, ch. 471, 2019 Me. Laws 471 (2019).
173 H. 4000, 191st Gen. Court (Mass. 2019); see also NASHP Tracker, supra note 85.
174 California Proposition 61, Drug Price Standards, BALLOTPEDIA (2016) https://ballotpedia.org/
California_Proposition_61,_Drug_Price_Standards_(2016) [https://perma.cc/8KQ4-VW2X]; Ohio Issue
2, Drug Price Standards Initiative, BALLOTPEDIA (2017) https://ballotpedia.org/Ohio_Issue_2,_Drug_
Price_Standards_Initiative_(2017) [https://perma.cc/B8T8-ZXHW].
175 Rachel E. Sachs, Delinking Reimbursement, 102 MINN. L. REV. 2307, 2338 (2018) (citing
38 U.S.C. § 8126(a)(2) (2012)); California Proposition 61, supra note 174; Ohio Issue 2, supra note 174.
176 Catherine Candisky & Megan Henry, Ohioans Nix Controversial Drug-Price Issue, COLUMBUS
DISPATCH (Nov. 8, 2017, 5:54 AM), https://www.dispatch.com/news/20171107/ohioans-nixcontroversial-drug-price-issue [https://perma.cc/8SSN-FX6Z].
177 Id. For further thoughts about why such initiatives may not work well, see Sachs, supra note 175,
at 2328–29.
178 See, e.g., Drug Rate Setting Model Act Overview, NASHP, https://nashp.org/wp-content/uploads/
2018/08/Rate-Setting-Model-Act-Explanation-final.pdf [https://perma.cc/XV6M-THZD] (discussing
NAHSP’s Model Act and stating “[t]he reporting requirements in this section parallel the NASHP
Transparency Model Act, which requires reporting for drugs priced at or above specific thresholds”).
179 See, e.g., Prescription Drug Affordability Board Act, ch. 692, 2019 Md. Laws 692, §§ 21–2C–
08(B)(2), (C)(4).
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proposed by NASHP. 180 The model legislation seeks to “protect State
residents, state and local governments (including their contractors and
vendors), commercial health plans, providers, state-licensed pharmacies, and
other health care system stakeholders from excessive costs of certain
prescription drugs.” 181
Many state legislators have proposed legislation following this
approach. 182 Provisions commonly include setting out criteria for a board or
commission’s makeup, identifying triggering requirements for which drugs
will be subject to potential cost review, identifying information required
from manufacturers, establishing policies for public disclosure, determining
which drugs based on submitted information will be subject to a maximum
payment allowance, establishing criteria for setting payments, and
specifying enforcement provisions. 183 For instance, a rate-setting bill
proposed in Oregon, HB 2696, is specifically structured to set rates for drugs
imposing excess costs. The bill provides: “If the Drug Cost Review
Commission finds, based on a drug cost review, that the cost of a prescription
drug will result in excess costs for payers in this state, the commission shall
establish the maximum payment rate that may be claimed for the
drug . . . .” 184 HB 2696 further defines “excess costs” as either exceeding “the
cost of alternative treatment options with equivalent therapeutic benefits” or
imposing costs that are “not financially sustainable for public and private
health care systems over a period of 10 years.” 185
With the exception of New Jersey’s A 583 and Minnesota’s insulinspecific HF 284, every state bill proposed in 2019 covers patented and
180

An Act to Establish Rate Setting of Prescription Drugs in [State], NASHP, https://nashp.org/wpcontent/uploads/2018/08/NASHP-RX-Rate-Setting-Model-Act.pdf
[https://perma.cc/ZLC5-Z6TV]
[hereinafter NASHP Model Rate Setting Law]. Some discuss both affordability and excessive costs. See,
e.g., H. 1133, 191st Gen. Court, § 10A (Mass. 2019). Regarding influence, compare NASHP Model Rate
Setting Law, supra, with Comparison of Bills Creating State Prescription Drug Affordability Review
Boards, supra note 170 (compiling actual legislation and revealing the Model Law’s structural and
substantive influence).
181 NASHP Model Rate Setting Law, supra note 180. The Model Law further defines “excess costs”
in section 4. Id. § 4.
182 See, e.g., H. 1133 (pulling NASHP quoted language nearly verbatim in § 2(a)); H.B. 2696, 80th
Leg. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ore. 2019) (pulling NASHP quoted language nearly verbatim in § 8).
183 See generally NASHP Tracker, supra note 85 (compiling actual legislation and describing the
rate-setting provisions). See also supra note 170 (listing rate-setting bills).
184 H.B. 2696, § 13.
185 Id. § 7(4). Note this two-part definition is a slight variation on NASHP’s model legislation.
Although the second prong is essentially the same, the first prong is different. NASHP’s first prong is
more of a cost-effectiveness test. NASHP Model Rate Setting Law, supra note 180, § 4(2)(a) (“Costs of
appropriate utilization of a prescription drug product that exceed the therapeutic benefit relative to other
therapeutic options/alternative treatments . . . .”).
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generic medications, and price increases as well as launch prices for new
products. 186 Moreover, bills proposed in Illinois (HB 3493) and
Massachusetts (H 1133), and Maryland’s new law (HB 768), have largely
identical triggering criteria for reporting requirements. 187 They authorize
boards to consider reviewing the costs for drugs and biologics with a WAC
at launch of $30,000 or more, or a WAC increase of $3,000 or more over
twelve months; biosimilars with a launch WAC that is not at least 15% lower
than its branded counterpart; generic drugs with a WAC of $100 or more per
month; and generic drugs with a WAC increase of 200% or more over twelve
months. 188 The Maryland law and Illinois bill also include a catchall
provision for drugs creating affordability challenges for the state health care
system and patients. 189 Maine’s new law, by contrast, does not identify
triggering criteria. Rather, Maine’s board will “determine annual spending
targets for prescription drugs purchased by public payors based upon a tenyear rolling average of the medical care services component of the . . .
Consumer Price Index,” taking into account inflation and pharmacy
savings. 190 Maine’s board will further have the ability to identify spending
targets for specific drugs creating affordability issues for those enrolled in
public plans. 191
An important feature of the NASHP model legislation is that the
determination of whether a drug’s cost is excessive is not made primarily by
reference to the manufacturer—for instance, by reference to its research and
development and marketing costs or its gross and net revenues. 192 That
information is considered secondarily if primary considerations for
determining excess cost fail to yield a determination. 193 The primary criterion
186

170.

Comparison of States’ Prescription Drug Affordability Review Board Legislation, supra note

187 See id.; 2019 Prescription Drug Affordability Initiative, HEALTH CARE FOR ALL (2019),
http://healthcareforall.com/2019/01/2019-prescription-drug-affordability-initiative
[https://perma.cc/SU7C-GLQ9] (confirming that triggering criteria remained the same in the final version
of the bill).
188 H. 1133 § 10A(j); H.B. 768, 2019 Gen. Assemb. § 21–2C–08(C) (Md. 2019); H.B. 3493, 101st
Gen. Assemb. § 30(d) (Ill. 2019); see also Comparison of States’ Prescription Drug Affordability Review
Board Legislation, supra note 170.
189 H.B. 768 § 21–2C–08(C)(4); H.B. 3493 § 30(d)(4).
190 Maine Prescription Drug Affordability Board Act, ch. 471, 2019 Me. Laws 471 § 2042; NewlyEnacted Laws, NASHP, https://nashp.org/new-laws [https://perma.cc/UAM8-RAC7].
191 2019 Me. Laws 471 § 2042(1)(B).
192 See Drug Rate Setting Model Act Overview, supra note 178, § 4; see, e.g., H.B. 2696, 80th Leg.
Assemb., Reg. Sess., § 12 (Or. 2019) (listing ten factors to be considered prior to consideration of
manufacturer costs).
193 See Drug Rate Setting Model Act Overview, supra note 178, § 4.
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in determining whether a drug imposes excess costs or an affordability
challenge instead pertains to “commercial payor, provider, and consumer
costs.” 194 Maryland’s law, for instance, requires its Board to consider factors
including the drug’s WAC in the state and other relevant drug cost indexes;
average discounts and rebates to state health plans and pharmacy benefit
managers (PBMs); discounts given to patients through patient assistance
programs; the WAC, discounts, and rebates for competitor therapies; total
costs to health plans; the impact on patient access that results from the drug’s
price in conjunction with the amount of patient cost-sharing that insurance
plans require; how paying for the drug will financially impact overall health
and social-services costs compared to therapeutic alternatives; and “any
other factors as determined by the Board in regulations adopted by the
Board.” 195
Legislative proposals for drug affordability review boards and rate
setting are relatively new but hold promise for addressing costly
medications. As NASHP details, its model legislation has taken some cues
from the Canadian Patented Medicines Review Board, 196 which has played a
role in keeping drug costs in Canada lower than in the United States. 197
As with all state efforts to address excessive pricing, rate-setting
proposals raise concerns, among others, about whether industry opposition
will lead to legal challenges. 198 One legal claim the industry may raise is that
rate setting, insofar as it applies to patented medications, is preempted—
though some experts find this claim to be unavailing. 199 Vagueness claims
are also a possibility.

194

Id.
H.B. 768, ch. 692, 2019 Gen. Assemb., § 21–2C–09(B) (Md. 2019).
196 Drug Rate Setting Model Act Overview, supra note 178, § 4. There are some differences between
the NASHP and Canadian approaches, however. Most notably, Canada’s Board reviews drugs for
excessive price while the NASHP state Commission would consider whether drugs generate excessive
costs for the state. Id.
197 See, e.g., So-Yeon Kang et al., Using External Reference Pricing in Medicare Part D to Reduce
Drug Price Differentials with Other Countries, 38 HEALTH AFF. 804, 810 (2019) (“Compared to other
countries, the U.S. pays substantially higher prices for single-sourced brand-name drugs that have been
on the market for longer than three years”).
198 Jane Horvath, Maryland Rate-Setting Legislation Question and Answer, NASHP (Oct. 17, 2017),
https://nashp.org/maryland-rate-setting-legislation-question-and-answer/#q8
[https://perma.cc/UJH5DEW5]; see also Silverman, supra note 167 (quoting PhRMA as having “serious concerns” about the
constitutionality of Maryland’s rate-setting legislation).
199 See e.g., Feldman et al., supra note 17, at 49–50.
195
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II. VOID-FOR-VAGUENESS CHALLENGES TO EXCESSIVE-PRICE LAWS
As discussed above, courts have already grappled with a number of
different constitutional challenges to state laws regulating excessive drug
prices. Although we and others have reviewed the contours of some types of
challenges, 200 void-for-vagueness claims remain largely unexplored in the
scholarly literature on drug pricing and have not yet been fully adjudicated
by the courts. As parsing “excessive” pricing can be a fraught task and
vagueness challenges have the potential to undermine legislative efforts, we
provide an overview of the void-for-vagueness doctrine and then turn to the
specific application of this claim to the drug-pricing context.
A. Void-for-Vagueness Under the Due Process Clause
The Due Process Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments of
the United States Constitution provide that no person may be deprived of
“life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.” 201 The void-forvagueness doctrine is an integral part of these due-process protections. 202 It
invalidates “laws that are impermissibly vague” 203 and requires that
enactments be “clearly defined.” 204
The void-for-vagueness doctrine serves two important purposes. 205
First, it “guarantees that ordinary people have ‘fair notice’ of the conduct a
statute proscribes.” 206 Second, “the doctrine guards against arbitrary or
discriminatory law enforcement by insisting that a statute provide standards
to govern the actions of police officers, prosecutors, juries, and judges.” 207
200

See generally Buck, supra note 18 (discussing the legal claims brought against Maryland and
Massachusetts laws); Gudiksen & King, supra note 18 (broadly analyzing the pharmaceutical industry’s
challenges to state legislation); Gudiksen et al., California’s Drug Transparency Law, supra note 18
(describing legal challenges to California’s SB-17); Lee et al., supra note 18 (discussing the legal claims
brought against Maryland and Nevada laws); Robertson, supra note 18 (describing dormant Commerce
Clause challenge to Maryland’s HB 631).
201 U.S. CONST., amends. V, XIV § 1.
202 F.C.C. v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 567 U.S. 239, 253 (2012) (“This requirement of clarity in
regulation is essential to the protections provided by the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment.”).
203 Id.
204 Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108 (1972).
205 See, e.g., Sessions v. Dimaya, 138 S. Ct. 1204, 1212 (2018) (noting two protections of ensuring
fair notice and non-arbitrary enforcement); Fox Television Stations, 567 U.S. at 253–54 (“[T]he void for
vagueness doctrine addresses at least two connected but discrete due process concerns . . . .”).
206 Dimaya, 138 S. Ct. at 1212; see also Lanzetta v. New Jersey, 306 U.S. 451, 453 (1939) (“No one
may be required at peril of life, liberty or property to speculate as to the meaning of penal statutes. All
are entitled to be informed as to what the State commands or forbids.” (footnote omitted)); Connally v.
Gen. Constr. Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391 (1926).
207 Dimaya, 138 S. Ct. at 1212; see also Fox Television Stations, 567 U.S. at 253; Grayned, 408 U.S.
at 108–09.
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Thus, a statute can be invalidated as vague if it either (1) “fails to
provide people of ordinary intelligence a reasonable opportunity to
understand what conduct it prohibits,” or (2) “authorizes or even encourages
arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement.” 208 In interpreting the notice
aspect of the doctrine, courts look for “reasonably clear lines” between the
kinds of conduct that are permitted and those that are not. 209 This standard
will be met where the statute’s meaning can be ascertained from review of
judicial interpretations, dictionaries, treatises, or commonly understood
meanings of words. 210 With respect to the enforcement aspect, the doctrine
requires “that a legislature establish minimal guidelines to govern law
enforcement.” 211
The standard applied to determine whether a law is impermissibly
vague varies depending on the nature of the law. 212 Because less is presumed
to be at stake, provisions involving civil penalties are afforded more
flexibility than those imposing criminal penalties.213 Further, the Court has
applied relatively lax review to economic regulation “because its subject
matter is often more narrow, and because businesses, which face economic
demands to plan behavior carefully, can be expected to consult relevant
legislation in advance of action.” 214 Compared to individuals, businesses are
thought to have greater “access to the law and political capitol [sic]” 215 and
greater capability to stay abreast of regulatory developments. 216 The Court
has recognized that in the noncommercial context, “the most meaningful”
aspect of the vagueness doctrine is not the notice aspect—suggesting that
notice may be the most meaningful aspect in the commercial context. 217 The
less strict standard of review for economic regulation will not, however, be
applied if the regulation potentially infringes an individual’s or entity’s
constitutionally protected rights. Under such circumstances, the Court has

208

Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703, 732 (2000).
Smith v. Goguen, 415 U.S. 566, 574 (1974).
210 16B AM. JUR. 2D Constitutional Law § 972 (2019).
211 Goguen, 415 U.S. at 574.
212 Dimaya, 138 S. Ct. 1212–13.
213 Id.
214 Village of Hoffman Ests. v. Flipside, Hoffman Ests., Inc., 455 U.S. 489, 498–99 (1982) (footnotes
omitted).
215 Jennifer Lee Koh, Crimmigration and the Void for Vagueness Doctrine, 2016 WIS. L. REV. 1127,
1138.
216 Village of Hoffman Ests., 455 U.S. at 498–99; Goguen, 415 U.S. at 574 (“We recognize that in a
noncommercial context behavior as a general rule is not mapped out in advance on the basis of statutory
language.”).
217 Goguen, 415 U.S. at 574.
209
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stated that “a more stringent vagueness test should apply.” 218 In particular,
greater precision and clarity are required of a law that threatens rights to
freedom of speech. 219
The Court’s comments on economic regulation and civil penalties have
particular salience for our analysis of potential vagueness challenges to laws
regulating prescription drug prices. Although the fact patterns in many of the
Supreme Court’s modern vagueness doctrine cases are somewhat removed
from the drug-pricing context, 220 several older cases dealing directly with the
regulation of “excessive” and “unreasonable” prices bear striking
similarities. 221
On one February day in 1921, the Supreme Court issued rulings in five
related cases pertaining to the Lever Act, 222 which among other things
criminalized exacting “any unjust or unreasonable rate or charge in handling
or dealing in or with any necessaries” and “excessive prices for any
necessaries.” 223 In the main case outlining the Court’s reasoning, the Cohen
Grocery Company was charged with “willfully and feloniously making an
unjust and unreasonable rate and charge in handling and dealing in a certain
necessary,” which was sugar. 224 Other cases dealt with unreasonable prices
for milk and clothing. 225

218

Village of Hoffman Ests., 455 U.S. at 499; see also Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 561 U.S.
1, 19 (2010) (“We have said that when a statute ‘interferes with the right of free speech or of association,
a more stringent vagueness test should apply.’” (quoting Village of Hoffman Ests., 455 U.S. at 499)).
219 Village of Hoffman Ests., 455 U.S. at 499. Vague statutes “abut[ting] upon sensitive areas of basic
First Amendment freedoms” are especially concerning because they can “inhibit the exercise of those
freedoms” and “lead citizens to ‘steer far wider of the unlawful zone.’” Grayned v. City of Rockford,
408 U.S. 104, 109 (1972) (footnotes omitted); see also F.C.C. v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 567 U.S.
239, 253–54 (2012) (“When speech is involved, rigorous adherence to those requirements is necessary to
ensure that ambiguity does not chill protected speech.”). However, “perfect clarity and precise guidance
have never been required even of regulations that restrict expressive activity.” Humanitarian Law Project,
561 U.S. at 19 (quoting United States v. Williams, 553 U.S. 285, 304 (2008) (citation omitted)).
220 See, e.g., Goguen, 415 U.S. at 583 (small flag placed on seat of pants); Grayned, 408 U.S. at 122
(picketing outside of a school).
221 See United States v. Nat’l Dairy Prods. Corp., 372 U.S. 29, 29–30 (1963); United States v. L.
Cohen Grocery Co., 255 U.S. 81, 86 (1921); C.A. Weed & Co. v. Lockwood, 255 U.S. 104, 105 (1921);
Tedrow v. A.T. Lewis & Son Dry Goods Co., 255 U.S. 98, 99 (1921); Weeds, Inc., v. United States,
255 U.S. 109, 110 (1921); Kinnane v. Detroit Creamery Co., 255 U.S. 102, 103 (1921); see also Johnson
v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2551, 2570 (2015) (Thomas, J., concurring) (describing a 1914 case finding
the phrase “real value” unconstitutionally vague).
222 See supra cases accompanying note 219.
223 L. Cohen Grocery Co., 255 U.S. at 86 (quoting the Smith-Lever Act, ch. 80 § 2, 41 Stat. 297
(1919)).
224 Id.
225 Kinnane, 255 U.S. at 103 (milk pricing); Lockwood, 255 U.S. at 105 (clothing pricing).
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These cases challenged the pertinent provisions of the Lever Act as
unconstitutionally vague, and the Court agreed, 226 finding that “the section
forbids no specific or definite act. . . . It leaves open, therefore, the widest
conceivable inquiry, the scope of which no one can foresee and the result of
which no one can foreshadow or adequately guard against.” 227 Remarking
that the arbitrariness of a standard used for enforcement of the section was
“not a mere abstraction,” the Court included a lengthy footnote detailing
differences in interpretation of the term “unreasonable prices” among lower
courts. 228
A more recent case in 1963, United States v. National Dairy Products
Corp., considered a provision of the Robinson–Patman Act that criminalized
the sale of goods at “unreasonably low prices for the purpose of destroying
competition or eliminating a competitor.” 229 Charged with selling products
for below cost with the intent to drive competitors out of business, National
Dairy alleged that the phrase “unreasonably low prices” was
unconstitutionally vague.
Focusing on the notice issue, the Court upheld the statute. It
distinguished the facts of this case from those of L. Cohen Grocery Co.,
because here the statute made clear which kinds of business practices it
targeted. 230 A seemingly important factor was the statute’s intent element. 231
National Dairy was not just selling its products below cost, but doing so with
the intent to undermine competition. 232 The Court further reiterated that a
vagueness analysis varies depending on whether constitutional rights
(particularly under the First Amendment) are implicated, and here, they were
not. 233
Lower federal courts and state courts considering claims that the term
“unconscionable” is unconstitutionally vague have issued decisions in both
directions. A Massachusetts federal district court, for instance, upheld a
226

Lockwood, 255 U.S. at 105–06; L. Cohen Grocery Co., 255 U.S. at 89.
L. Cohen Grocery Co., 255 U.S. at 89.
228 Id. at 89, 90 n.1.
229 372 U.S. at 29 (1963) (quoting the Robinson–Patman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 13a (1936)).
230 Id. at 35–36.
231 Id. at 37; see also Andrew E. Goldsmith, Note, The Void-for-Vagueness Doctrine in the Supreme
Court, Revisited, 30 AM. J. CRIM. L. 279, 301 (2003) (discussing scienter element as a controversial
mechanism courts sometimes use to mitigate vagueness).
232 Nat’l Dairy Prods. Corp., 372 U.S. at 37 (“[S]ales made below cost without legitimate
commercial objective and with specific intent to destroy competition would clearly fall within the
prohibitions . . . .”).
233 Id. at 36 (“No such factor is present here where the statute is directed only at conduct designed to
destroy competition, activity which is neither constitutionally protected nor socially desirable.”).
227
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mortgage lending statute providing that a mortgage lender could not offer
rates or other terms which “‘significantly deviate from industry-wide
standards or which are otherwise unconscionable.’” 234 Noting the relatively
weak standard of review applied to economic regulations, the court found
that the law gave the defendant sufficient guidance as to what constituted
proscribed behavior. 235 That guidance included the industry-wide standard
for subprime mortgage origination fees (where charging twice as much
would be viewed as a likely deviation) and Massachusetts’s
unconscionability doctrine. 236
On the other hand, the Colorado Supreme Court deemed the term
“unconscionable” unconstitutionally vague in a statute providing that a used
car dealer’s license could be revoked if the dealer “indulged in an
unconscionable practice relating to said business.” 237 At issue in the case was
a dealership accused of resetting odometers to understate a car’s true
mileage. 238 The court invalidated the statute’s “catchall” phrase, reasoning
that “[w]here criminal or quasi-criminal sanctions are to be imposed, we
think the threat of arbitrary enforcement of the law requires more specificity
than is contained” in the statute. 239 The court rejected the state’s argument
that it was impossible to catalog all of the unsavory practices against which
the public required protection, quipping that cars are “not a new mercantile
invention” and regulators “have years of experience to guide them in
formulating their regulations.” 240 As evidence, the court pointed to other
parts of the statute where specific acts were enumerated. 241
To sum up, the void-for-vagueness doctrine encompasses several key
elements. The concept of fair warning and the avoidance of arbitrary and
standardless enforcement are pillars of the doctrine. In addition, regulations
impacting constitutional rights or involving criminal penalties demand a
234 United Cos. Lending Corp. v. Sargeant, 20 F. Supp. 2d 192, 205 (D. Mass. 1998) (citing
940 C.M.R. § 8.06(6)).
235 Id. at 205.
236 Id.
237 Trail Ridge Ford, Inc. v. Colo. Dealer Licensing Bd., 543 P.2d 1245, 1246 (Colo. 1975).
238 Id. Although the court found this particular instance of the term “unconscionable” to be
impermissibly vague, it cautioned that “[w]e should not be understood to say that a reference to
‘unconscionable practices’ will always be unconstitutionally vague. There may be numerous areas of the
law where a stronger argument for the validity of such a reference can be made, particularly in the civil
field.” Id. at 1247.
239 Id. at 1246; cf. State ex rel. Bryant v. R & A Inv. Co., 985 S.W.2d 299, 302 (Ark. 1999)
(permitting the inclusion of unconscionable practice in a catchall provision “because the General
Assembly could not be expected to envision every conceivable violation”).
240 Trail Ridge Ford, Inc., 543 P.2d at 1247.
241 Id.
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higher level of scrutiny than economic regulation and statutes involving civil
penalties. Further, courts that have considered the term “unconscionable”
prices—or adjacent terms such as “unreasonable” prices—on vagueness
grounds have ruled both that in some cases such terms do not violate the
doctrine, but in other cases they do. 242
Although these guideposts are clearly laid out, many commentators
have argued that the void-for-vagueness doctrine is itself vague and the
Court’s application of it lacks predictability. 243 For instance, it is not clear
how the Court balances the two key factors—notice and nonarbitrary
enforcement—against one another; “it has at times seemed to weigh notice
without giving fair enforcement concerns adequate attention, and vice
versa.” 244 Another aspect of the doctrine that lacks clarity is what must be
shown to bring a facial challenge. As we describe below, in the case against
Maryland’s HB 631, the district court noted that the Supreme Court has put
forward different standards. 245 The complainant’s burden of proof has
obvious ramifications for how challenging it will be to invalidate a statute as
unconstitutionally vague.
B. Vagueness Challenges to Drug Price Legislation in
California and Maryland
Industry trade associations have brought void-for-vagueness challenges
against a California drug price transparency law, SB 17, and Maryland’s
anti-price gouging law, HB 631. In the ongoing California litigation, PhRMA
v. David, PhRMA’s vagueness claim focuses on the notice aspect of the
242 Compare United States v. Nat’l Dairy Prods. Corp., 372 U.S. 29, 29 (1963) (finding
“unreasonably low” language constitutional), with United States v. L. Cohen Grocery Co., 255 U.S. 81,
89 (1921) (finding “unreasonable rate[s]” language unconstitutionally vague).
243 Bradley E. Abruzzi, Copyright and the Vagueness Doctrine, 45 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 351, 359–
60 (2012) (“Given the state of the Court’s jurisprudence, one could even argue that the void-for-vagueness
doctrine is itself standardless, vague, and susceptible to arbitrary or selective application by the courts.”);
see also Koh, supra note 215, at 1137 (“Moreover, as a number of scholars have observed, the doctrine
itself seems to lack consistency or predictability.”).
244 Koh, supra note 215, at 1137.
245 Ass’n for Accessible Meds. v. Frosh, 2017 WL 4347818, at *8 (D. Md. Sept. 29, 2017), rev’d,
887 F.3d 664 (4th Cir. 2018), cert. denied, 139 S. Ct. 1168 (2019) (“The precedents do not provide a clear
statement of the proper standard to apply in facial vagueness challenges. Under one formulation of the
test, ‘the complainant must demonstrate that the law is impermissibly vague in all of its applications.’ . . .
However, in a recent decision involving a criminal statute, the Supreme Court rejected the view that ‘a
statute is void for vagueness only if it is vague in all its applications.’” (quoting Village of Hoffman Ests.
v. Flipside, Hoffman Ests., Inc., 455 U.S. 489, 497 (1982); Johnson v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2551,
2561 (2015))). This Court also noted the apparent lack of clarity about how to interpret “plainly legitimate
sweep” of a statute in a civil case that does not involve First Amendment rights. Id. at *9 (quoting Martin
v. Lloyd, 700 F.3d 132, 136–37 (4th Cir. 2012)).
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doctrine 246 and challenges a purported ambiguity that allegedly impinges
upon drug manufacturers’ freedom of speech. 247 By contrast, in the Maryland
case, Association of Accessible Medications v. Frosh, the void-for-vagueness
claim challenged the core definitions and aims of the statute. It raised key
questions about just what kinds of pricing activities constitute a prohibited
“unconscionable increase.”
Because California’s transparency law is outside the ambit of our focus
on price gouging laws, we do not delve into its intricacies here, but its key
component is a requirement that drug manufacturers provide sixty-day
advance notice of price increases that amount to 16% or greater over two
years for drugs with a WAC of more than $40. 248 In David, PhRMA argues
that this notification requirement “offends due process because the Act is
silent on which WAC increases determine whether a manufacturer has
breached the statutory threshold.” 249 The statute became effective on January
1, 2018, but PhRMA claims it is unclear whether the notice provision
calculation includes retroactive price increases occurring between January 1,
2016 and January 1, 2018. 250 PhRMA alleges that “multiple direct requests
to clarify this ambiguity” with the administering agency have been
unsuccessful. 251
This timing issue affects whether and to what extent a drug
manufacturer may impose current or future increases if it wishes to avoid
triggering notification. 252 According to PhRMA, the vagueness is not just a
matter of not knowing how statutory price increases are calculated. PhRMA
argues that the notification requirement violates its members’ First
Amendment free-speech rights by compelling a disclosure: “It is
246 See Plaintiff’s Opposition to Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss at 28–30, Pharm. Research & Mfrs.
of Am. v. David, No. 2:17-cv-02573 (E.D. Cal. Nov. 16, 2018).
247 Id. at 30.
248 S.B. 17 §§ 127677(a), (b).
249 See Amended Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief at 32, Pharm. Research & Mfrs.
of Am. v. David, No. 2:17-cv-02573 (E.D. Cal. Sept. 28, 2018) [hereinafter PhRMA Amended
Complaint].
250 Id.
251 Id. But note that “California law prohibits an administrative agency from providing any preregulatory guidance regarding the application of a law . . . and OSHPD’s regulations when published may
not provide that guidance. Final responsibility for construing SB 17’s retroactive application rests with
courts . . . .” Defendant’s Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Motion to Dismiss First
Amended Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1) and
12(b)(6) at 27 n.8, Pharm. Research & Mfrs. of Am. v. David, No. 2:17-cv-02573 (E.D. Cal. Oct. 24,
2018) (citing CAL. GOV’T CODE § 11340.5(a) (West 2019)).
252 PhRMA alleges that “[m]any of these manufacturers will not increase the WAC of products at
the same time and in the same manner that they otherwise would without the risk of past increases
triggering SB 17’s 60-day notice provision.” PhRMA Amended Complaint, supra note 249, at 33.
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inappropriate to implement a de facto nationwide ban on WAC increases and
to compel self-accusatory statements by manufacturers based on price
increases before adoption of SB 17. . . . Each day, affected members must
refrain from legitimate price increases to preserve their constitutionally
protected silence.” 253
Although much is unclear about the application of the void-forvagueness doctrine, the Supreme Court has consistently stated that a higher
standard applies when First Amendment rights are implicated. 254 The success
of PhRMA’s vagueness claim thus may hinge on the resolution of its
underlying First Amendment claim. As of this writing, the Court has denied
California’s motion to dismiss in David, and the case is still pending. 255
In AAM’s lawsuit challenging Maryland’s HB 631, the Fourth Circuit
ruled the statute unconstitutional under the dormant Commerce Clause and
declined to reach the vagueness claim. 256 Although the void-for-vagueness
challenge was never fully litigated, the District Court’s discussion of this
claim offers some insights.
As detailed above, HB 631 prohibited price gouging for generics, which
it defined as an “unconscionable increase in the price of a prescription
drug.” 257 “Unconscionable increase” was defined using general criteria
relating to whether price increases were “excessive and not justified” by
increases in production costs of “appropriate expansion of access to the
drug,” and whether the increases relate to drugs that consumers have “no
meaningful choice” but to purchase. 258 Further, other provisions of the statute
stipulated what sort of price increases could trigger Maryland’s Medicaid
program to notify the Attorney General that action may be appropriate under
the statute.
253 Plaintiff’s Opposition to Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss at 29, Pharm. Research & Mfrs. of Am.
v. David, No. 2:17-cv-02573 (E.D. Cal. Nov. 16, 2018).
254 See, e.g., Village of Hoffman Ests. v. Flipside, Hoffman Ests., Inc., 455 U.S. 489, 499 (1982)
(“If, for example, the law interferes with the right of free speech or of association, a more stringent
vagueness test should apply.”); Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 109 n.5 (1972) (“Where First
Amendment interests are affected, a precise statute ‘evincing a legislative judgment that certain specific
conduct be . . . proscribed,’ assures us that the legislature has focused on the First Amendment interests
and determined that other governmental policies compel regulation.” (internal citation omitted)).
255 As of this writing, the docket was last updated on January 13, 2020.
256 Ass’n for Accessible Meds. v. Frosh, 887 F.3d 664, 666 n.1 (4th Cir. 2018), cert. denied, 139 S.
Ct. 1168 (2019) (“Because we hold that the statute is unconstitutional pursuant to the dormant commerce
clause, we need not address whether it is also void for vagueness.”).
257 MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH–GEN. § 2–801(c) (West 2017); see also Ass’n for Accessible Meds. v.
Frosh, 2017 WL 4347818, at *9 (D. Md. Sept. 29, 2017), rev’d, 887 F.3d 664 (4th Cir. 2018), cert. denied,
139 S. Ct. 1168 (2019).
258 MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH–GEN. § 2–801(f). For specifics, see also supra Section I.B.1.b.
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AAM alleged that the terms “excessive,” “justified,” “appropriate,” and
no “meaningful” choice were unconstitutionally vague. 259 It argued that the
bill “provides no guidance . . . on how to interpret or apply any of these
provisions,” leaving the plaintiffs unable to determine whether contemplated
price increases “would be considered ‘unconscionable.’” 260 In response,
Maryland argued that HB 631 explicitly drew upon the “centuries-old”
common law doctrine of unconscionability, 261 which provides “droves of
precedents to which manufacturers and wholesale distributors can look to
find guideposts.” 262
In denying Maryland’s motion to dismiss on the claim for vagueness,
the district court rejected Maryland’s assertions about the common law
doctrine of unconscionability. 263 Because the statute provided its own
definition of “unconscionable,” the court found, it was unclear whether
common law understandings were “directly applicable.” 264 The court went
on to find that the terms “excessive,” “justified,” and “appropriate” raised at
least the possibility of vagueness. 265 The phrase “no meaningful choice,” by
contrast, was sufficiently defined, as neither of its two qualifying
subdivisions were vague. 266 Thus, the court “recognize[d] that there are
reasonable—though not necessarily prevailing—contentions [of
unconstitutional vagueness] asserted by the Plaintiff.” 267
The Maryland case illustrates that vagueness challenges are a
cognizable challenge to price gouging laws—one that seems likely to crop
up again as other states and Congress take a bite at the price gouging apple.
To better understand how future laws could be designed to withstand
allegations of constitutional invalidity for vagueness, we turn now to lessons
from legal prohibitions on excessive prices in other domains.

259

Frosh, 2017 WL 4347818, at *10–11.
Ass’n for Accessible Meds. Complaint, supra note 134, at 28.
261 Defendants’ Opposition to Plaintiff’s Motion for Preliminary Injunction at 4, Ass’n for Accessible
Meds. v. Frosh, 2017 WL 4347818 (D. Md. Aug. 15, 2017) (No. 17-cv-01860); see also Frosh Motion to
Dismiss, supra note 122, at 16, 31 (“The doctrine has been applied by courts in literally hundreds of cases
over the course of centuries, without threat to anyone’s constitutional rights.”).
262 Frosh Motion to Dismiss, supra note 122, at 16.
263 Frosh, 2017 WL 4347818, at *10.
264 Id.
265 Id. at *10–11.
266 Id. at *11.
267 Id.
260
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III. DEFINING EXCESSIVE PRICE: LESSONS FROM OTHER AREAS OF LAW
A. Price Gouging Laws for Times of Emergency
The clearest analogue to excessive-price laws for prescription drugs are
price gouging laws adopted by states to keep essential products affordable
during times of emergency. These laws address the practice of escalating the
price of a good or service above the regular selling price when a market
disruption 268 caused by an acute event, typically a natural disaster or
manmade emergency, 269 interrupts supply or causes demand to spike. They
are typically adopted after states have experienced a natural disaster that led
to price spikes for necessities such as gasoline or portable generators. 270 The
broadest of the laws permits the invocations of its price gouging provisions
before a market disruption occurs, if “there is a substantial likelihood that an
abnormal market disruption is imminent.” 271 The statutes’ prohibitions on
price hikes are time limited—for example, they may last thirty days after a
formal declaration of emergency, or for the duration of the emergency. 272
Emergency price gouging laws impose civil penalties for violations,
which may be substantial because they are pegged to each violation (i.e.,
each sale). 273 Some allow for injunctive relief, criminal charges, or a private
right of action for consumers. 274 In some states, the statutes operate by
defining excessive price hikes as a violation of the state’s general consumer
protection statute prohibiting unfair and deceptive business practices; in
others, price gouging laws are freestanding. 275
268

An exception is a Michigan statute, which prohibits “[c]harging the consumer a price that is
grossly in excess of the price at which similar property or services are sold” without any requirement of
an emergency or market disruption. MICH. COMP. LAWS § 445.903(1)(z) (2019).
269 Acts of terrorism and civil unrest are illustrative of the situations commonly contemplated as
manmade emergencies. See, e.g., N.Y. GEN. BUS. LAW § 396-r(2) (Consol. 2019) (listing as potential
causes of market disruption “failure or shortage of electric power or other source of energy, strike, civil
disorder, war, military action”).
270 Geoffrey C. Rapp, Gouging: Terrorist Attacks, Hurricanes, and the Legal and Economic Aspects
of Post-Disaster Price Regulation, 94 KY. L.J. 535, 542–43 (2006) (listing various anti-gouging laws that
were enacted after particular disasters).
271 ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit.10, § 1105(2) (2014); see also Justin Schuster, America’s Drug Problem,
POLITIC (Feb. 11, 2013), http://thepolitic.org/price-gouging-and-the-prescription-drug-gray-market
[https://perma.cc/SJK3-Z7KY] (indicating that Maine has the most expansive anti-price gouging statute
in the nation).
272 Rapp, supra note 270, at 543–45.
273 Price
Gouging Laws by State, FINDLAW, https://consumer.findlaw.com/consumertransactions/price-gouging-laws-by-state.html [https://perma.cc/897Y-WE9Q] (listing enforcement
mechanisms of each law).
274 Id.
275 See Rapp, supra note 270, at 541–42.
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Most states—thirty-four, at last count, plus the District of Columbia as
of a 2012 survey—have adopted some type of emergency price gouging
law. 276 They vary in the scope of products and services covered. Some are
narrowly crafted, with specific products listed, 277 while others are broader,
giving discretion to officials to determine which goods constitute necessities
in the wake of an emergency. Broader statutes typically specify that the
goods and services be essential to the public’s health, safety, or welfare. 278
Prior to the recent wave of adoption of statutes specifically aimed at
prescription drugs, very few state price gouging laws specifically mentioned
pharmaceuticals. 279
1. Approaches to Defining Excessive Price
In describing prohibited conduct, emergency price gouging laws take
three approaches. 280 What we will call “Type 1” laws specify a maximum
percentage price increase that may occur after the market disruption occurs.
276 Id. (summarizing some of the thirty-four states’ laws); Michael Giberson, Thirty-four States and
the District of Columbia Have Anti-Price Gouging Laws, KNOWLEDGE PROBLEM (Nov. 17, 2012),
https://knowledgeproblem.com/2012/11/03/list-of-price-gouging-laws [https://perma.cc/8AUU-TSHZ]
(listing state laws as of November 17, 2012); see also Gudiksen, supra note 96 (identifying Giberson’s
as the most recent available list of laws as of September 2018).
277 Fuel is the most common product mentioned, but statutes also mention water, food, rental
facilities, medical supplies, building materials, transportation services, storage services, housing, and
emergency supplies such as batteries and flashlights. For further details, see the statutes compiled at Price
Gouging Laws by State, supra note 273. See also Joshua Gregg, The Implications, Negative Health
Effects, Legal Issues, and Potential Solutions Associated with the Shortage of Essential Drugs in the U.S.
Medical Care Market, 25.2 ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 381, 431–32 (2015) (summarizing states’ approaches
to price gouging legislation).
278 See Price Gouging Laws by State, supra note 273.
279 But see IDAHO CODE ANN. § 48-603(19) (2014) (listing “pharmaceuticals”); IOWA ADMIN. CODE
r. 61–31.1(714) (2019) (“medicines”); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 367.372(8) (2018) (defining “medical
supplies” to include “prescription and nonprescription medications”); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit.10,
§ 1105(1)(C) (2014) (listing “pharmaceutical products, including prescription medications” among the
“necessities” covered); TENN. CODE ANN. § 47-18-5102(9) (West 2019) (“prescription and
nonprescription medications”); TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE ANN. § 17.46(b)(27) (2019) (“medicine”); VA.
CODE ANN. § 59.1–526 (2019) (“medical supplies and services”); W. VA. CODE § 46A-6J-2(i) (2019)
(“prescription and nonprescription medications”). A few other states’ laws refer to “chemicals,” but that
term is placed among a list of building supplies and may be intended to mean non-pharmaceutical
chemicals. See, e.g., 6 R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 6-13-21(b)(3) (2019).
280 This typology was offered by Rapp, supra note 270, at 543–50, and cited in Caitlin E. Ball, Note,
Sticker Shock at the Pump: An Evaluation of the Massachusetts Petroleum Price-Gouging Regulation,
44 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 907, 912–13 (2011) and Emily Bae, Note, Are Anti-Price Gouging Legislations
Effective Against Sellers During Disasters?, 4 ENTREPRENEURIAL BUS. L.J. 79, 83 (2009) (listing state
laws falling into each of these three groups). Close review of the statutes reveals that some are a
hybrid of the three approaches. For instance, Kentucky’s law sets forth a general standard, “grossly
in excess of the price prior to the declaration and unrelated to any increased cost to the seller,” but creates
safe harbors for price increases below a specified numeric threshold (10%). KY. REV. STAT. ANN.
§§ 367.374(1)(b)–(c).
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“Type 2” laws prohibit any price increase beyond the amount necessitated
by increased operational costs on the part of the seller. “Type 3” laws impose
a general prohibition on the sale of covered goods during emergencies at an
excessive or unconscionable price.281 For example, Idaho’s statute prohibits
selling covered goods or offering them for sale at an “exorbitant or excessive
price.” 282
Type 1 laws commonly limit price increases to 10%–25% above preemergency levels. 283 Some laws allow sellers to argue, in defense to a price
gouging allegation, that increased operational costs arising due to the market
disruption (for example, because supply chains were interrupted) justify the
increase in the product’s price. 284 Others do not, presuming that the allowable
price increase specified in the statute adequately accounts for the fact that
sellers’ costs may increase during emergencies. 285
In defining what constitutes an excessive or unconscionable price, Type
3 laws (like Type 1 laws) typically refer to the difference between the preand post-emergency price of the product. A common approach is to call for
an assessment of whether there is a “gross disparity” between the prices
charged before and after the market disruption in the affected market area.286
Some Type 3 laws also permit benchmarking to the current price of similar

281 Depending on how courts interpret the unconscionability standard, Types 2 and 3 laws may be
functionally similar. For example, a New York court, interpreting the state’s Type 3 statute, held that no
price increase above that necessary to account for increased operational costs would survive review. See
People ex rel. Abrams v. Two Wheel Corp., 525 N.E.2d 692, 696 (N.Y. 1988).
282 IDAHO CODE ANN. § 48-603(19).
283 Ball, supra note 280, at 913; see also Bae, supra note 280, at 83.
284 See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 396(b) (2019) (“However, a greater price increase is not unlawful
if that person can prove that the increase in price was directly attributable to additional costs imposed on
it by the supplier of the goods, or directly attributable to additional costs for labor or materials used to
provide the services, during the state of emergency or local emergency . . . .”); Ball, supra note 280, at
913.
285 Bae, supra note 280, at 84.
286 See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 501.160(1)(b) (2019) (stating that it is prima facie evidence that a price is
unconscionable if either (1) “a gross disparity” exists between the price and the price at which that good
was sold during the thirty days before the emergency declaration, unless the increase is due to increased
costs on the part of the seller, or regional, national or international market trends; or (2) the price “grossly
exceeds” the average price at which the same or similar commodity was readily obtainable in the trade
area in the thirty days prior (unless due to increased costs or market trends)). Some courts have
characterized the gross disparity showing as procedural rather than substantive in nature because its legal
effect is to establish a presumption of price gouging. See, e.g., Two Wheel Corp., 525 N.E.2d at 695
(“[G]ross disparity” provision in New York’s price gouging statute “is procedural rather than definitional;
it simply establishes a means of providing presumptive evidence” of price gouging.).
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goods outside the emergency zone or by other sellers within the zone. 287
Further, some require a showing that the disparity is not attributable to
increased operational costs. 288 In addition to examining the magnitude of
price increases, New York’s law has a procedural element: it permits courts
to find that a price is “unconscionably excessive” if there is a gross price
disparity, “an exercise of unfair leverage or unconscionable means” in the
transaction, or both. 289
2. Legal Challenges
Legal challenges to the validity of states’ emergency price gouging laws
are rare. Our review of the thirty-five laws identified no challenges to Type
1 laws, one challenge to a Type 2 law, and three challenges to Type 3 laws.
The Type 2 challenge was to Mississippi’s statute, which imposes
penalties for raising prices above their level in the “same market area” “at or
immediately before” the market disruption, unless necessitated by increased
costs. 290 The state attorney general brought an enforcement action against a
chain of gas stations that hiked the price of gasoline after Hurricane
Katrina. 291 In its challenge to the statute, the company claimed that the
phrases “in the same market area” and “at or immediately before” were
impermissibly vague. 292 The Mississippi Supreme Court disagreed. Applying
the U.S. Supreme Court’s standard of review for vagueness challenges,293 it
found that the statute’s terms “would be clear to any businessman who wants
to charge competitive prices and attract customers.” 294
Type 3 laws in Kentucky, Massachusetts, and New York have been
challenged on vagueness grounds, but not successfully. In Marathon
Petroleum Co. LLC v. Stumbo, a Kentucky trial court found a gasoline
company’s vagueness claim regarding that state’s price gouging law too
287 People ex rel. Vacco v. Beach Boys Equip. Co., 273 A.D.2d 850 (N.Y. App. Div. 2000)
(examining prices charged for generators by other retailers in the trade area, in applying New York’s
law); Bae, supra note 280, at 85–86.
288 See, e.g., 940 MASS. CODE REGS. § 3.18 (2019) (defining an “unconscionably high” price for
gasoline as one with a “gross disparity” that “is not substantially attributable to increased prices charged
by the petroleum-related business suppliers or increased costs due to an abnormal market disruption”).
289 N.Y. GEN. BUS. LAW § 396-r(3)(a) (Consol. 2019).
290 State ex rel. Hood v. Louisville Tire Ctr., Inc., 55 So. 3d 1068, 1070 (Miss. 2011) (citing MISS.
CODE ANN. § 75–24–25(2) (Rev. 2009)).
291 Id. at 1070–71.
292 Id. at 1071.
293 See Connally v. Gen. Constr. Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391 (1925) (“[A] statute which either forbids or
requires the doing of an act in terms so vague that men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at
its meaning and differ as to its application . . . .”).
294 Louisville Tire Ctr., 55 So. 3d at 1073.

900

114:859 (2020)

Reining In “Unconscionable” Prices for Prescription Drugs

poorly and cursorily argued to be sustained. 295 New York’s law, which uses
an “unconscionably excessive” price standard, has been challenged by sellers
of portable generators and home heating oil. In People ex rel. Abrams v. Two
Wheel Corp., the state’s highest court rejected the vagueness argument
because it found that sufficient guidance as to the meaning of
“unconscionably excessive” was provided by (1) the statute’s enumeration
of factors to be considered in arriving at a determination of
unconscionability, in conjunction with (2) common law decisions on the
unconscionability defense in contract disputes, and (3) the definition of
unconscionable contracts provided in Section 2-302 of the Uniform
Commercial Code. 296 Applying those indicators, the court held that a price
may be unconscionable under New York’s statute either because there is an
extreme price disparity or because “procedurally, the excess was obtained
through unconscionable means,” such as the bargaining advantage gained by
a natural disaster, 297 and that merchants had been given sufficient notice.
Similarly, in People ex rel. Vacco v. Chazy Hardware, Inc., 298 a New York
trial court concluded, without elaboration, that the statute did not impose
“such an amorphous standard that a merchant would be unable to conduct
itself in accordance with the terms.” 299 And in State v. Strong Oil Co., Inc.,
which involved home heating oil, the court had no difficulty concluding that
the statute set forth sufficiently clear criteria in directing the factfinder to
compare the seller’s price after the market disruption to its pre-disruption
price or to prices charged to other consumers in the same trade area.300
The final challenge involving Massachusetts’s law was narrower. In
White v. R.M. Packer Co., Inc., the First Circuit was asked to determine
whether gasoline retailers had engaged in price gouging after Hurricane
Katrina. 301 That required determining whether the state had shown a “gross
disparity” between the pre- and post-disaster prices. The district court,
looking at the plain language of the applicable regulations, rejected the
295

528 F. Supp. 2d 639, 651 (E.D. Ky. 2007).
525 N.E.2d 692, 694–96 (N.Y. 1988).
297 Id. at 695.
298 176 Misc. 2d 960 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1998).
299 Id. at 965. The conduct at issue in Chazy Hardware presented a fairly easy case for the court: the
defendant had purchased fifty-four portable generators during an ice storm and sold them two days later
at double the price. Id. at 961–62.
300 105 Misc. 2d 803, 818–19, 824–25 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1980).
301 635 F.3d 571, 574–75 (1st Cir. 2011). The case involved increases in the price of gasoline on the
Massachusetts island of Martha’s Vineyard following two hurricanes. The price gouging claims were
brought under Massachusetts’s gasoline price gouging statute. See MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 93A, §§ 2(a),
(c) (2019); 940 MASS. CODE REGS. § 3.18 (2019). The gas retailers did not challenge the law on
vagueness grounds, but merely disputed whether their prices violated it. 635 F.3d at 575.
296
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notion that the state could make out a claim merely by showing high profit
margins or large price increases. 302 To the contrary, the regulation also
evinced concern about increases in sellers’ operational costs, so it was
necessary to examine changes in price relative to changes in costs over the
same period. 303 The court concluded that no price gouging was shown under
the facts of the case.
The takeaways from this review of litigation are that the validity of
emergency price gouging statutes is rarely challenged; and when challenges
are brought, courts have little difficulty interpreting and applying even the
relatively nonspecific, Type 3 statutes. A possible reason for the paucity of
litigation may be that the laws are infrequently invoked—fortunately, the
disasters that would trigger them are rare, and consumers and attorneys
general may deem some price hikes as involving consumer harms too trivial
to justify the time and expense involved in bringing an enforcement action. 304
A second reason is that Type 1 statutes, which account for nine of the thirtyfive laws, by our count, 305 are really quite clear. When a percentage price
increase is specified, there is little to quibble about beyond the applicable
time period and market area for measuring the percentage change. Type 2
statutes are somewhat more open to argument because their prohibition on
price increases is typically accompanied by exceptions where the seller’s
increased operational costs justify an increase. Nevertheless, no challenges
have been brought thus far on the basis of increased cost. Finally, although
Type 3 laws may seem quite vulnerable to vagueness challenges, many
specify criteria for assessing whether an excessive increase has occurred.306
Even where they do not, the limited case law available suggests that courts
will seek and find useful standards for operationalizing the concept in the
contract law doctrine of unconscionability. For these reasons, emergency
price gouging laws appear to provide a legally unproblematic model for
prohibiting excessive prices.
302

White, 635 F.3d. at 588.
Id. at 588 (“Dramatic changes in gross margin might illustrate that a price increase is a ‘gross
disparity’ in price because it reflects price increases unexplained by cost increases. But nothing in the
regulation suggests that increases in gross margin alone, in the absence of any price increase and
simultaneous with declining retail prices, can support a price-gouging claim.”).
304 Gary E. Lehman, Price Gouging: Application of Florida’s Deceptive and Unfair Trade Practices
Act in the Aftermath of Hurricane Andrew, 17 NOVA L. REV., 1029, 1049–50 (1993).
305 Type 1 states include Arkansas, California, the District of Columbia, Oklahoma, Oregon, Utah,
West Virginia, and Wisconsin, based on our review of state statutes.
306 See., e.g., IDAHO CODE ANN. § 48-603(19) (2019) (directing courts to take into consideration how
the seller’s cost of acquiring the item compares to the pre-emergency price for the item, any additional
costs of doing business that the seller experienced during the emergency, and the duration of the
emergency).
303
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3. Applicability to Prescription Drug Prices
As noted above, most emergency price gouging statutes as currently
written do not explicitly cover medicines—hence the new bills proposing to
amend or extend them. The interesting question is not whether they presently
apply to drugs, but whether this type of approach is a useful one to take for
drugs.
The approach is appealing because of its simplicity and its apparent
durability before the courts. It asks adjudicators simply to compare prices
before and after a triggering event. In the case of Type 1 statutes, it supplies
a concrete, mathematical calculation to perform. Types 2 and 3 statutes
involve more discretion for the factfinder, but often provide one or more
specific criteria by which to evaluate price hikes.
Yet several shortcomings to this approach for drug prices should be
noted. First and foremost, it has no application to a drug’s launch price. It
may be useful for addressing price increases for generics and (at the federal
level) branded medications, but its focus is solely on the magnitude of price
increases over time, not the reasonableness of the product’s initial price. In
the context of the products and services subject to price gouging during
emergencies, this makes sense: for batteries, generators, building supplies,
diapers, and the like—there is often no public concern about the
reasonableness of their market price. That is because, in ordinary times, the
market functions well as a pricing mechanism. There is robust competition,
consumers have adequate knowledge of and ability to choose among
competing products, and desperate need does not drive purchasing decisions.
For many new prescription drugs, in contrast, such market conditions are not
present, permitting launch prices to be set at very high (often monopoly)
levels. These baseline prices are a substantial public concern, and the
emergency price gouging law approach is unable to address them.
A second question is how to adapt an approach based on acute, timelimited emergencies to the drug-affordability problem, which is longstanding
and likely to endure indefinitely. It is not unprecedented to characterize a
chronic public health problem that has recently increased in seriousness as
an emergency. Several states and President Trump, for example, have
declared a public health emergency in response to the opioid epidemic.307 At
least one state price gouging bill proposed for prescription drugs hewed to
the emergency framework, confining its protections to times when a market
307 See Rebecca L. Haffajee et al., What Is a Public Health “Emergency”?, 371 NEW ENGL. J. MED.
986, 986–87 (2014); Alexander Walsdorf, Note, I Get By With a Little Help from My 750-Dollar-PerTablet Friends: A Model Act for States to Prevent Dramatic Pharmaceutical Price Increases, 102 MINN.
L. REV. 2497, 2522 n.132 (2018).

903

NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

shortage triggers the governor to declare a market emergency. 308 But most
state bills, as well as the federal drug price gouging bills, do not make
reference to an emergency or market disruption.309 Instead, they require
companies to regularly report price increases and authorize enforcement
action whenever those increases exceed a specified standard. That seems the
most straightforward response to the question of how to adapt price gouging
laws to the drug context.
A third issue is what benchmark price could be used to gauge the
excessiveness of drug price increases. 310 The approach of emergency price
gouging laws is nearly always to compare the prices charged by a given seller
in the same market area before and after an emergency declaration.
Occasionally, prices are evaluated by reference to what other sellers in the
same market area charge, or by what is charged in another market area. The
last two approaches are not feasible for drugs because prices do not vary
geographically within the United States in the same way the prices for
gasoline or generators do, and because many drugs have only one seller. 311
Often, there will be no set of comparable products in the market from which
one could infer whether a drug’s current price departs from the usual price
for similar goods. Further, the usual, pre/post approach is not easily applied
if there is no discrete declaration of an emergency. In that case, some dates
must be chosen as setting the price against which future increases will be
benchmarked. Again, the difficulty is that any such price, because of the
monopoly or near-monopoly position of the seller, may be considerably
above what policymakers would consider reasonable or what a more
competitive market would produce.
No way around this problem is apparent. Policy approaches inspired by
emergency price gouging laws must be content with arresting the trend of
escalating drug prices; they will not be able to reverse it. Selecting a Type 3
approach rather than Type 1 at least permits the state to vary what constitutes
an acceptable price increase according to the baseline cost against which the
increase is being assessed. While Type 1 statutes impose a one-size-fits-all
308

H. 7022, 2018 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (R.I. 2018).
For details see supra Part I.
310 This issue has been raised by Professor Isaac Buck, who has noted the lack of an “organic price
equilibrium” for prescription drugs. Zack Buck, Assistant Professor, Presentation at the Health Law
Professors Conference: States of Emergency (June 8, 2018) (on file with authors).
311 NAT’L ACADS. OF SCIS., ENG’G, & MED., MAKING MEDICINES AFFORDABLE: A NATIONAL
IMPERATIVE, at xviii (Norman R. Augustine et al. eds., 2018) (“Historically, the greatest pricing concerns
have focused on on-patent drugs; however, major price increases for generic drugs have become
increasingly common as more than half of existing generics are now produced by a single supplier.”).
Furthermore, the use of foreign benchmarks would appear to be outside the approach embraced by these
emergency laws as the U.S. does not have a comparable foreign market.
309
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standard in specifying a percentage cap on price increases, Type 3 statutes
permit the state to calibrate its actions to the impact of a particular price
increase on consumers. For inexpensive drugs, states may prefer not to
expend resources going after a company’s decision to increase a drug’s price
substantially in percentage terms. In contrast, a drug that starts out costing
several thousand dollars per year might reasonably be targeted for
enforcement for any price increase in excess of general inflation. Such
discretion under a Type 3 statute would create greater uncertainty for
biopharmaceutical companies about what will be deemed acceptable, and
therefore open the statute up to vagueness challenges.
Solutions, however, are available. The statute could provide specific
criteria for evaluating the unreasonableness of a particular percentage price
increase or specify brackets of acceptable increases for drugs with different
baseline costs. But, of course, as with any proposal benchmarking against an
upper limit, this will incentivize regulated entities to price or impose price
increases just below that threshold.
A final issue is whether and how to import the practice of taking
companies’ increased operational costs into consideration from emergency
price gouging laws. Many such statutes provide a defense to price gouging
actions if the company can show that its own costs greatly increased during
the emergency, or provide that operational costs are to be considered when
deciding whether price gouging has occurred. 312 The rationale for this
approach in the context of emergencies is obvious: the same market
disruptions that increase demand for the product, making it possible to price
gouge, may also increase the costs of producing or obtaining it. The supply
of product components or ingredients may have been interrupted or it may
be more costly to locate and transport those components under emergency
conditions. Those considerations apply to a much lesser extent in the day-today operation of the prescription drug market. Acute problems such as
problems at manufacturing facilities do occur and have led to drug shortages
on many occasions. 313 Manufacturers have rarely cited such problems as
justifications for drug price increases, but in some cases reasonably may do
so. Thus, there is an argument for taking them into account.

312

See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 396(b) (2019); FAQs on Price Gouging, STATE OF CAL. DEP’T OF
JUST., https://oag.ca.gov/consumers/pricegougingduringdisasters#8C [https://perma.cc/PXB9-CTZW]
(noting “[i]f the seller can prove that the increased price is directly attributable to increases in the cost of
labor or materials needed to provide the good or service, the seller may not be liable under the statute”).
313 See Frequently Asked Questions About Drug Shortages, FDA (July 5, 2018),
https://www.fda.gov/drugs/drug-shortages/frequently-asked-questions-about-drug-shortages#q4
[https://perma.cc/3XGN-F3R7].
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Permitting such a defense poses risks, however. It may create perverse
incentives in allowing companies to pass on inefficiencies in their operations
to consumers. That problem is why regulators of the price of public utilities
moved away from focusing on companies’ rate of return (which implicitly
accounts for operational costs) in favor of imposing flat price caps.314
Another challenge in the drug context is that biopharmaceutical companies
number among their operational costs the vast amounts they spend on
marketing and promotion activities. 315 More than half of Americans recently
polled think that too much is spent on such activities, 316 so allowing
companies to use such expenses as a basis for increasing prices is
undesirable. Thus, if statutes do permit companies to argue that their drug
price increases are justified by higher operational costs, the allowable costs
should be limited to expenses incurred because of an acute disruption in the
market or their supply chain.
B. Contract Law
Although the term “unconscionable” is used in many places in the law,
it has deep doctrinal roots in contract law. There, the doctrine of
unconscionability permits a court to refuse to enforce a contract or
contractual provision because to do so would yield results that “shock the
conscience.” 317 It permits courts to modify or reject a contractual agreement
or provision on grounds of unfairness. 318 A motivating premise of the
doctrine is that courts ought not to participate in enforcing a contract that is
technically valid but works a deep injustice against one of the parties.319
Furthermore, the doctrine of unconscionability allows courts to “police
bargains overtly,” as opposed to covertly. 320

314

See infra Section III.D.
One study, for instance, found that in 2016 pharmaceutical companies spent $6 billion on directto-consumer advertising. Lisa M. Schwartz & Steven Woloshin, Medical Marketing in the United States,
1997–2016, 321 JAMA 80, 82 (2019).
316 See Kirzinger et al., supra note 5, at figs.2 & 4.
317 156 AM. JUR. 3D Proof of Facts 343 § 1 (2019).
318 E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS 298 (4th ed. 2004); see also U.C.C. § 2-302 cmts. 1–3
(AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2017).
319 See, e.g., Maxwell v. Fid. Fin. Servs., Inc., 907 P.2d 51, 60 (Ariz. 1995) (“[C]ourts will not lend
their hand to the enforcement of oppressive contracts . . . .”).
320 FARNSWORTH, supra note 318, at 298; see also U.C.C. § 2-302 cmt. 1 (“This section is intended
to make it possible for the courts to police explicitly against the contracts or clauses which they find to
be unconscionable. In the past such policing has been accomplished by adverse construction of language,
by manipulation of the rules of offer and acceptance or by determinations that the clause is contrary to
public policy or to the dominant purpose of the contract. This section is intended to allow the court to
315
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The doctrine of unconscionability is now widely recognized as having
two distinct dimensions, one procedural and one substantive. 321 Courts will
examine the fairness of the process by which the contract came into existence
as well as the contract’s actual provisions. 322 It is well established that the
unconscionability doctrine can be applied to a contract’s price terms, 323
although such cases are relatively unusual. 324 Reported cases have involved
door-to-door sales, rent-to-own contracts, loans and interest charges,
royalties, rents, commodities, and water. 325 A typical fact pattern involves an
unsophisticated buyer purchasing goods from an aggressive seller for far
more than their fair market value. 326 The doctrine of unconscionability is
traditionally not a freestanding cause of action, though it is occasionally
treated as such. 327 Rather, unconscionability is conventionally asserted as a
defense by a party alleged to be in breach of a contract. 328 Courts are not in
consensus about whether judges may raise the issue of unconscionability sua
sponte, 329 but it is clear that unconscionability is an issue for the judge, not
the jury. 330 Although facts about context are very important for the analysis,

pass directly on the unconscionability of the contract or particular clause therein and to make a conclusion
of law as to its unconscionability.”).
321 Arthur Leff is generally recognized as the originator of these terms. See Arthur Allen Leff,
Unconscionability and the Code—The Emperor’s New Clause, 115 U. PA. L. REV. 485, 487 (1967).
322 Id.; Frank P. Darr, Unconscionability and Price Fairness, 30 HOUS. L. REV. 1819, 1820 (1994).
323 See Charles L. Knapp, Unconscionability in American Contract Law: A Twenty-First-Century
Survey, in COMMERCIAL CONTRACT LAW: TRANSATLANTIC PERSPECTIVES 312 (Larry A. DiMatteo et al.
eds., 2013) (“Although not seen originally as being applicable to a contract’s price term, § 2-302 was in
time also applied in cases where courts found the contract price for goods or services to be unconscionably
high.”).
324 See FARNSWORTH, supra note 318, at 306–07 (noting that “[c]ourts have been more reluctant to
pass judgment on the fairness of the price term” because it is rarely a surprise to the parties and judging
its fairness is “no simple matter”).
325 Darr, supra note 322, at 1821–22.
326 See, e.g., Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., 350 F.2d 445, 447–49 (D.C. Cir. 1965);
Darr, supra note 322, at 1820–22.
327 See, e.g., Knapp, supra note 323, at 335–37 (discussing court’s treatment of claims of procedural
and substantive unconscionability as a cause of action in In re Checking Account Overdraft Litigation,
694 F. Supp. 2d 1302 (S.D. Fla. 2010)).
328 See FARNSWORTH, supra note 318, at 299.
329 For a discussion, see Hazel Glenn Beh, Curing the Infirmities of the Unconscionability Doctrine,
66 HASTINGS L.J. 1011, 1028–29 (2015) (“Courts typically regard unconscionability purely as an
affirmative defense, which places the burden on the defendant to plead and prove it. On the other hand,
whether a contract is void as against public policy may be raised sua sponte by the court.” (internal
footnote omitted)).
330 Maxwell v. Fidelity Fin. Servs., Inc., 907 P.2d 51, 56 (Ariz. 1995) (“Maxwell contends that the
determination of whether a contract is unconscionable is for the trier of fact. We find no support for this
position given that Arizona law, which is consistent with the law in every other jurisdiction that has ruled
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they do not “convert the determination on unconscionability from one that is
a matter of law as applied to those facts to one that is in whole a matter of
fact.” 331
1. Approach to Defining Excessive Price
Principles of equity underlying the doctrine of unconscionability trace
back to at least the Roman era, but the doctrine got its modern start in the
United States in the mid-twentieth century. 332 Drafters of the Uniform
Commercial Code (UCC), which offers model state legislation for
commercial transactions, codified the doctrine in § 2-302 pertaining to the
sales of goods 333:
(1) If the court as a matter of law finds the contract or any clause of the contract
to have been unconscionable at the time it was made the court may refuse to
enforce the contract, or it may enforce the remainder of the contract without the
unconscionable clause, or it may so limit the application of any unconscionable
clause as to avoid any unconscionable result.
(2) When it is claimed or appears to the court that the contract or any clause
thereof may be unconscionable the parties shall be afforded a reasonable
opportunity to present evidence as to its commercial setting, purpose and effect
to aid the court in making the determination. 334

Similar provisions can be found in the Restatement (Second) of
Contracts § 208, as well as uniform laws dealing with consumer credit,
consumer sales, land transactions, and residential leases. 335 Although UCC
§ 2-302 pertains to contracts involving goods, “it has wisely been applied,
either by analogy or as an expression of a general doctrine, to many other
kinds of contracts.” 336 In addition to wielding authority under state statutes,
many of which are based on the UCC, courts have “asserted the power to
employ the notion of unconscionability as a matter of general common
law.” 337
on this issue, clearly provides that the determination of unconscionability is to be made by the court as a
matter of law.”).
331 Id.
332 Knapp, supra note 323, at 310.
333 Id.; 156 AM. JUR. 3D Proof of Facts 343 § 1 (2016, rev. Sept. 2019).
334 U.C.C. § 2-302 (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2017).
335 FARNSWORTH, supra note 318, at 299.
336 Id. at 298; see also Knapp, supra note 323, at 311 (discussing factors that led to the broader
application by analogy of U.C.C. § 2-302 beyond the sale of goods).
337 Knapp, supra note 323, at 311; see also Beh, supra note 329, at 1016 n.26 (citing Kathleen S.
Morris, Expanding Local Enforcement of State and Federal Consumer Protection Laws, 40 FORDHAM
URB. L.J. 1903, 1928–49 (2013) (identifying several state statutes)).
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Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co. is an important and widely
cited case articulating the common law authority of courts to use
unconscionability as a justification for refusing to enforce a contract. 338 Ora
Lee Williams had a middle school education and supported seven children
on public assistance of $218 per month. 339 As was fairly common in lowincome neighborhoods at the time, Walker-Thomas Furniture deployed
door-to-door salesmen to sell merchandise on credit, to be paid in
installments. 340 Williams purchased a number of household items from
Walker-Thomas Furniture between 1957 and 1962 341 and signed more than
a dozen purchase contracts, “nearly all in response to a salesman’s home
visit.” 342 The contracts included egregious cross-collateralization provisions
effectively forcing her to carry a balance on each item until all her purchases
were paid in full. 343 They further permitted Walker-Thomas Furniture to
repossess all items purchased from its store in the event of default on any
single item. 344
In 1962, Williams defaulted after buying a stereo, and the store “sought
to replevy all the items purchased since December[] 1957.” 345 The lower
courts reviewing Williams’s case rejected her contention that these contracts
were unconscionable and therefore unenforceable. However, the Court of
Appeals disagreed about the power of the courts to find contracts
unconscionable and remanded the case to the trial court for rehearing. 346
Although the existence of the unconscionability doctrine is well
established in contract law, a precise definition of “unconscionable” is
elusive. One commentator has observed the fact that “the term is incapable
of precise definition is a source of both strength and weakness.” 347 It imparts
flexibility but also confusion. Others have been deeply critical of the
doctrine, particularly UCC § 2-302, writing: “If reading this section makes
338

350 F.2d 445 (D.C. Cir. 1965); Knapp, supra note 323, at 311 (calling the case “[p]robably the
most important” to the case law surrounding § 2-302). The paternity of the unconscionability doctrine
can be traced back to pre-UCC equity cases. See, e.g., Campbell Soup Co. v. Wentz, 172 F.2d 80, 83–84
(3d Cir. 1948); FARNSWORTH, supra note 318, at 300 (calling Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co.
“an early but still notable application of the Code’s unconscionability doctrine”).
339 Anne Fleming, The Rise and Fall of Unconscionability as the “Law of the Poor,” 102 GEO. L.J.
1383, 1392 & n.41 (2014).
340 Id. at 1392.
341 Williams, 350 F.2d at 447.
342 Fleming, supra note 339, at 1392–93 (2014).
343 Williams, 350 F.2d at 447.
344 Id.
345 Id.
346 Id. at 450.
347 FARNSWORTH, supra note 318, at 299–300.
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anything clear it is that reading this section alone makes nothing clear about
the meaning of ‘unconscionable’ except perhaps that it is pejorative.” 348 The
comments to § 2-302 shed only a dim light on the term’s meaning. They state
that “[t]he basic test is whether, in the light of the general commercial
background and the commercial needs of the particular trade or case, the
clauses involved are so one-sided as to be unconscionable under the
circumstances existing at the time of the making of the contract.” 349 A bit
more helpfully, they explain that the doctrine aims to prevent “oppression
and unfair surprise,” and is not concerned with the “disturbance of allocation
of risks because of superior bargaining power.” 350
The concept of unconscionability—as with many standards used in
contract and commercial law and beyond—thus involves some
imprecision. 351 Although the unconscionability doctrine has been criticized
for its vagueness, 352 courts have developed fairly standardized and workable
doctrinal analyses for determining if a contract or contractual provision is
unconscionable. 353 Moreover, as discussed below, this doctrine has been
applied to contractual price terms relating to hospital charges.
2. Legal Challenges
Williams has been credited with providing “[t]he most durable answer”
to the meaning of unconscionability. 354 According to the court,
“[u]nconscionability has generally been recognized to include an absence of
meaningful choice on the part of one of the parties together with contract

348

Leff, supra note 321, at 487.
U.C.C. § 2-302 cmt. 1 (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2017).
350 Id.
351 See, e.g., Sonic-Calabasas A, Inc. v. Moreno, 311 P.3d 184, 214–15 (Cal. 2013) (defending
unconscionability analysis against charge of being “hopelessly vague” by noting that imprecision is
“hardly anomalous” in the law).
352 Darr, supra note 322, at 1830–32. One of the earliest and most prominent critics of the
unconscionability doctrine is Arthur Leff, who characterized substantive unconscionability as grounded
in little more than “the emotional state of the trier” and argued that “what may permissibly make the
judges’ pulses race or their cheeks redden, so as to justify the destruction of a particular provision, is, one
would suppose, what the judge ought to have been told by the statute.” Leff, supra note 321, at 516; see
also ROBERT COOTER & THOMAS ULEN, LAW AND ECONOMICS 267 (1st ed. 1988) (calling the doctrine
“troubling because there is no precise definition of when a contract is unconscionable”).
353 See Alpha One v. NYNEX Info. Res. Co., No. 930129C, 1994 WL 879488, at *3 (Mass. Super.
Ct. May 23, 1994) (noting criticism of doctrine’s vagueness, but explaining standards used by the courts);
Abel Holding Co. v. Am. Dist. Tel. Co., 350 A.2d 292, 303–04 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1975), aff’d,
371 A.2d 111 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1977) (noting that “[u]nconscionability is not defined, and the
definition most commonly used is vague and unsatisfactory,” but then proceeding to explain how courts
have fleshed out the doctrine).
354 FARNSWORTH, supra note 318, at 301.
349
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terms which are unreasonably favorable to the other party.” 355 These two
aspects are often referred to, respectively, as “procedural unconscionability”
and “substantive unconscionability.” 356
Procedural unconscionability pertains to the bargaining process itself.357
In general, following the lead of the comment to UCC § 2-302, procedural
unconscionability has been thought to consist of two principal aspects:
oppression and surprise. 358 Oppression refers to the “inability to bargain
about a particular term”—for example, because of extreme inequality of
bargaining power, lack of meaningful choice, or lack of alternative suppliers
in the market. 359 Surprise can arise from “fine print” contracts or other
circumstances that submerge a provision that disadvantages one party. 360
Typical fact patterns of procedural unconscionability involve sharp or
deceptive bargaining practices; fine print, boilerplate or convoluted
contracts; exploitation of language barriers or uneducated, illiterate,
mentally infirm, or otherwise unsophisticated parties; or unequal bargaining
power. 361 Inequality in bargaining power alone is rarely sufficient but may
clear the bar in combination with other elements of either procedural or
substantive unconscionability. 362 Although courts commonly turn to these
factors to make a determination of procedural unconscionability, they “have
not clearly articulated the requisite proof of these factors or specified a recipe
for their successful combination.” 363
355 Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., 350 F.2d 445, 449 (D.C. Cir. 1965); see also
FARNSWORTH, supra note 318, at 301.
356 FARNSWORTH, supra note 318, at 301 (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Leff, supra
note 321, at 487; Knapp, supra note 323, at 312–13 (discussing the influence of Leff’s article and how it
closely tracked elements in the Williams case).
357 Melissa T. Lonegrass, Finding Room for Fairness in Formalism—The Sliding Scale Approach to
Unconscionability, 44 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 1, 9 (2012).
358 U.C.C. § 2-302 cmt. 1 (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2017); Jonathan A. Eddy, On the
“Essential” Purposes of Limited Remedies: The Metaphysics of UCC Section 2-719(2), 65 CALIF. L. REV.
28, 42 (1977).
359 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 208 cmt. d (AM. LAW INST. 1981); Eddy, supra note
358, at 42.
360 Eddy, supra note 358, at 43.
361 Johnson v. Mobil Oil Corp., 415 F. Supp. 264, 268 (E.D. Mich. 1976); Wille v. Sw. Bell Tel. Co.,
549 P.2d 903, 906–07 (Kan. 1976); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 208 cmt. d;
FARNSWORTH, supra note 318, at 301; M. Neil Browne & Lauren Biksacky, Unconscionability and the
Contingent Assumptions of Contract Theory, 2013 MICH. ST. L. REV. 211, 222.
362 FARNSWORTH, supra note 318, at 302; see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 208
cmt. d (summarizing factors courts have said weigh in favor of a finding of unconscionability).
363 Steven W. Bender, Rate Regulation at the Crossroads of Usury and Unconscionability: The Case
for Regulating Abusive Commercial and Consumer Interest Rates Under the Unconscionability Standard,
31 HOUS. L. REV. 721, 752–53 (1994).
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Whereas procedural unconscionability is concerned with the process of
contract formation, substantive unconscionability is concerned with the
fairness of a contract’s terms. 364 Defining standards for substantive
unconscionability appears a more difficult task than defining them for
procedural unconscionability. Scholars “often describe the concept by listing
the types of clauses most commonly deemed substantively
unconscionable.” 365 That said, central themes pertain to the one-sided
allocation of risks and terms that are “commercially unreasonable.” 366 A
substantively unconscionable bargain is one “such as no man in his senses
and not under delusion would make on the one hand, and as no honest and
fair man would accept on the other.” 367
In undertaking a substantive unconscionability analysis, courts have
searched for evidence of a significant disparity between the price and cost or
value of the good, for penalty clauses, and for provisions denying rights and
remedies to the consumer. 368 An illustrative price term case concerned a
transaction in which the price of goods was two and a half times the
“reasonable market price” and several other conditions also pointed to an
unfair bargain. 369 Courts also examine “the basis and justification for the
price,” including prices paid by other, similar consumers in similar
transactions. 370 The California Supreme Court, for example, declined to hold
a high bank fee for processing checks unconscionable on its face; further
inquiry into the context for the price and transaction was required. 371
Courts applying the doctrine of unconscionability have “reviewed
evidence of procedural and substantive unconscionability separately,
requiring a minimum threshold or quantum of each type of unconscionability
to justify intervention in the contract.” 372 Many courts have used a “sliding364

Lonegrass, supra note 357, at 10–11.
Id.
366 Id.
367 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 208 cmt. b (quoting Hume v. U.S., 132 U.S. 406, 411
(1889)); see also Philpot v. Tenn. Health Mgmt., 279 S.W.3d 573, 579 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2007) (quoting
similar language).
368 Wille v. Sw. Bell Tel. Co., 549 P.2d 903, 906–07 (Kan. 1976); Klas v. Van Wagoner, 829 P.2d
135, 139 (Utah Ct. App. 1992); Lonegrass, supra note 357, at 11.
369 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 208 cmt. d (citing Kugler v. Romain, 279 A.2d 640,
653–54 (N.J. 1971) (finding unconscionability where, in addition to the high price, the goods were of
extremely little use to buyers, sellers made many misrepresentations and deceptions, and buyers were
poor, uneducated, and inexperienced)).
370 Perdue v. Crocker Nat’l Bank, 702 P.2d 503, 512 (Cal. 1985) (citing Bennett v. Behring Corp.
466 F. Supp. 689, 697 (S.D. Fla. 1979)).
371 Perdue, 702 P.2d at 513–14.
372 Lonegrass, supra note 357, at 12 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
365
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scale” approach, 373 in which more of one type of unconscionability can
“offset” less of the other. 374 The Arizona Supreme Court, for instance, has
observed that although some courts have questioned whether both kinds of
unconscionability must be present, the majority of courts “have held that
there must be some quantum of both . . . and take a balancing approach in
applying them.” 375
Historically, courts “have been more reluctant” to apply the doctrine of
unconscionability to price terms than to other contractual provisions. 376
Judicial hesitation stems from the facts that price rarely comes as a surprise
in a contract, can sometimes be negotiable, and, most importantly, can be
extraordinarily complex to evaluate on fairness grounds. 377 Given the
centrality of price terms in the overall contract, furthermore, it is difficult for
a court to invalidate price provisions while enforcing the remainder of the
contract. 378 Although some commentators have dismissed the doctrine of
unconscionability as essentially inapplicable to price terms, analysis of
recent cases suggests such a conclusion is mistaken. 379
Courts’ concerns about applying the unconscionability doctrine to price
may, however, help to explain why when they have chosen to do so they
often cite deficiencies in both substantive and procedural aspects of the price
bargain. 380 A 1994 study of forty-four price unconscionability cases found
that among those with an outcome of unconscionable terms, all “involved a
determination that the price was outrageous and in nearly three-fourths of
the cases, the contracting process was procedurally flawed.” 381 Only two
cases held that “a high price alone, without process problems, resulted in an
unconscionable contract.” 382 A more recent analysis identified several
decisions handed down in the wake of the 2008 financial crisis that signaled
373

Id. at 12–19; Knapp, supra note 323, at 322–23.
FARNSWORTH, supra note 318, at 302 (citing Armendariz v. Found. Health Psychcare Servs.,
6 P.3d 669, 690 (Cal. 2000)); Lonegrass, supra note 357, at 12.
375 Larry A. DiMatteo & Bruce Louis Rich, A Consent Theory of Unconscionability: An Empirical
Study of Law in Action, 33 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 1067, 1073–74 (2006) (discussing Maxwell v. Fid. Fin.
Servs., Inc., 907 P.2d 51, 58 (Ariz. 1995)).
376 FARNSWORTH, supra note 318, at 306.
377 Id. at 306–07.
378 Id. at 307.
379 See Jacob Hale Russell, Unconscionability’s Greatly Exaggerated Death, 53 U.C. DAVIS L. REV.
965, 967, app. (concluding that “in stark contrast to the conventional wisdom, the doctrine has quietly
flourished in courts in recent years,” undermining the “widely held belief . . . that ‘price alone is
insufficient to establish unconscionability’”).
380 See id. at app.
381 Darr, supra note 322, at 1842–43.
382 Id. at 1843.
374
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courts’ willingness to hold the price term of consumer credit contracts
unconscionable purely because the price was high, 383 but such cases appear
exceptional.
A 2018 California Supreme Court case represents the sliding-scale
approach and demonstrates the continuing importance of finding at least
some degree of both procedural and substantive unconscionability in a priceterm case. At issue in De La Torre v. CashCall, Inc. was whether courts had
the authority to deem a high interest rate on consumer loans of $2,500 or
more unconscionable. 384 The facts involved high-risk borrowers taking out
unsecured loans of $2,600 with a 96% or 135% interest rate. 385 By statute,
interest rates were capped only on consumer loans less than $2,500. 386 The
issue was not the unconscionability of these interest rates, but whether courts
had authority to rule on the unconscionability of interest rates for loans not
capped by statute. 387 Nevertheless, its analysis is instructive.
The court began by acknowledging that it was “long established under
California law” that “the doctrine of unconscionability reaches contract
terms relating to the price of goods or services exchanged,” including interest
rates. 388 Whether a price term is “unreasonably and unexpectedly harsh” is a
holistic analysis that “depends on more than just a single printed number,”
so courts examine “other provisions and circumstances affecting a
transaction’s benefits and burdens” along with the price itself. 389 The court
further observed that procedural elements are an integral part of the analysis
of the unconscionability of price terms. 390 Although aspects of the doctrinal
analysis lack clarity, the court stated it was clear that “unconscionability
requires . . . procedural unconscionability—along with the overly harsh or
one-sided results that epitomize substantive unconscionability.” 391
The court noted that substantive unconscionability is not sufficiently
established by examining whether the “price exceeds cost or fair value.” 392
Rather, an inquiry must also be made into “the basis and justification for the
383 Russell, supra note 379, at app. (collecting cases, many of which also involve a deficiency of
procedural unconscionability with respect to the price term of the contract).
384 422 P.3d 1004, 1007 (Cal. 2018).
385 Id. at 1008.
386 Id.
387 See id. at 1007. The Court did not rule on whether the terms at issue were unconscionable because
they were not asked to do so by the Ninth Circuit. Id. at 1021.
388 Id. at 1009.
389 Id.
390 Id. at 1009; see also id. at 1014 (describing the sliding-scale approach).
391 Id. at 1014.
392 Id. (citations omitted).
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price” 393 and “whether there are market imperfections that make it less likely
that the price was set by a ‘freely competitive market.’” 394 The court
summarized its approach by emphasizing the flexibility of the
unconscionability doctrine (particularly as compared to a statutory price cap)
and the importance of considering a host of contextual features, both
procedural and substantive. 395 Unconscionability is a finding that “under the
circumstances of the case, taking into account the bargaining process and
prevailing market conditions—a particular rate was ‘overly harsh,’ ‘unduly
oppressive,’ or ‘so one-sided as to shock the conscience.’” 396
The 1995 Arizona Supreme Court case Maxwell v. Fidelity Financial
Services, Inc. offers an example of the minority approach that an
unconscionability finding can be based on substantive unfairness alone. 397 At
issue in Maxwell was a loan for a water heater costing $6,512 “payable at
19.5 percent interest, for a total time-payment price of $14,860.43.” 398 The
contract included provisions that in the event of default, Fidelity would not
only be able to repossess the water heater, but could also foreclose on
Maxwell’s house, valued at approximately $40,000. 399 The court held that
the best reading of Arizona’s unconscionability statute was that procedural
unfairness was not strictly required, “especially in cases involving either
price-cost disparity or limitation of remedies.” 400 It further found that the
interest rate and amount of total payments in Maxwell’s loan raised “a
question
of
grossly-excessive
price,
constituting
substantive
unconscionability,” and that the oppressive default provisions “not only may
constitute substantive unconscionability but also may provide evidence of
procedural unconscionability.” 401
In unconscionable-price cases, courts tend to intervene where market
conditions appear to be such that the usual supply-and-demand mechanism

393

Id. at 1015 (citations omitted).
Id. at 1014–15 (citations omitted).
395 Id. at 1015.
396 Id.
397 Maxwell v. Fid. Fin. Servs., Inc., 907 P.2d 51, 58 (Ariz. 1995) (characterizing the sliding-scale
approach as the approach of “[m]any courts, perhaps a majority,” and cases involving a procedural finding
alone as “exceptional”).
398 Id. at 59.
399 Id. at 53, 60.
400 Id. at 59. This reading was based on, among other evidence, an interpretation of the UCC in the
same manner. Id.
401 Id. at 59–60.
394
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does not adequately constrain prices. 402 Even some commentators who are
skeptical of the unconscionability doctrine, because they believe that
economic exigency should not incur a coercive fix, acknowledge a role for
it under conditions of market failure. 403
But how to determine whether prices reveal a problem with the market?
Professor Steven Bender has identified four different metrics suggested by
the case law for determining substantive price unconscionability. 404 These
are: (1) the difference between the sales price of the good and the seller’s
cost for the good; (2) net profit, i.e., the sales price compared to the seller’s
total cost of operation, including the cost of the good; (3) the sales price
compared to that of other sellers; and (4) the sales price compared to that of
other “similarly situated” sellers.405 Courts applying the retail-price
comparison approach (measures 3 and 4) have generally found
unconscionability where the retail price exceeds the comparator by a ratio of
two to one. 406 Notably, most state statutes (as opposed to court decisions)
employing an unconscionability standard use the retail-price approach rather
than examining the seller’s profits. 407 In terms of which approach is best,
Professor Bender criticizes option (1) for disregarding the seller’s
operational costs, and (3) and (4) for being unhelpful in cases of a
monopoly. 408 Thus, Professor Bender argues, option (2) is best. 409
Before turning to applications of these principles to prescription drugs,
we note that there is precedent for applying the unconscionability doctrine
to medical bills. 410 Medical-bill cases generally concern hospital charges,
particularly for emergency department visits. 411 In gauging substantive
unconscionability in such cases, courts have compared the hospital’s usual
402

Darr, supra note 322, at 1823 (stating that where there is a “lack of market mechanisms to assure
that the gouger is policed,” “the courts may serve as a market surrogate and police prices in conformity
with existing notions of price fairness”).
403 Mark Klock, Unconscionability and Price Discrimination, 69 TENN. L. REV. 317, 354–55, 373
(2002).
404 Bender, supra note 363, at 754.
405 Id. It is also worth noting that others have observed a different kind of reference pricing that
benchmarks prices against other recent transactions between the same parties. See, e.g., Darr, supra note
322, at 1837–38 (quoting Daniel Kahneman et al., Fairness as a Constraint on Profit Seeking: Entitlement
in the Market, 76 AM. ECON. REV. 728, 729–30 (1986)).
406 Bender, supra note 363, at 756.
407 Id. at 764.
408 Id. at 754–55.
409 Id. at 755.
410 For a discussion of cases, see George A. Nation III, Obscene Contracts: The Doctrine of
Unconscionability and Hospital Billing of the Uninsured, 94 KY. L.J. 101, 124–28 (2005).
411 Id.
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charge for the service with what other hospitals charge or what is typically
actually paid after charges are discounted to insurers’ negotiated rates. 412 On
the procedural front, several courts have held that hospital admission and
payment agreements may be held unconscionable merely because under
exigent circumstances a reasonable person may not pay much attention or
have much choice but to sign. 413
A recent example of a medical-bill case concerned an uninsured
California patient’s challenge to charges of more than $10,000 for three
emergency department visits. 414 The plaintiff claimed that the charges were
unconscionable because they were “not tethered to [the providers’] actual
costs,” but were “four to six times” those costs “and far beyond any
reasonable profit margin.” 415 The court held that his claim under the state’s
unlawful competition statute prohibiting “unlawful, unfair or fraudulent”
business practices could proceed over the defendants’ demurrer.416 The fact
that all emergency patients had to sign the admission contract before being
treated could support a finding of procedural unconscionability, 417 and that
although mere demonstration that the “price exceeds cost or fair value” was
insufficient to prove substantive unconscionability, 418 the plaintiff’s
allegations did adequately state a cause of action. 419 The court went on to
note that in assessing substantive unconscionability, it looks to factors such
as the justification for a price, certain costs incurred by the seller, and the
price paid by “similarly situated consumers in a similar transaction.”420
In arguing for the application of unconscionability to hospitaladmission agreements for uninsured patients, Professor George Nation has
argued that the usual concern that courts are bad at deciding what a fair price
is does not apply, because hospitals have, in effect, already set a reasonable
price: what they charge Medicare and other payers. 421 Nation argues for
application of the unconscionability doctrine to hospital agreements, because
(1) there is price discrimination among buyers, which often serves as a basis
for a finding of unconscionability in other cases; (2) the buyer has no
412

Mark A. Hall & Carl E. Schneider, Patients as Consumers: Courts, Contracts, and the New
Medical Marketplace, 106 MICH. L. REV. 643, 686 (2008).
413 See Nation, supra note 410, at 126–28.
414 Moran v. Prime Healthcare Mgmt., Inc., 208 Cal. Rptr. 3d 303, 307 (Cal. Ct. App. 2016).
415 Id. at 315.
416 Id. at 309, 319.
417 Id. at 315.
418 Id. at 316 (quoting Perdue v. Crocker Nat’l Bank, 702 P.2d 503, 512 (Cal. 1985)).
419 Id.
420 Id. (quoting Perdue, 702 P.2d at 512).
421 See Nation, supra note 410, at 131–36. The same could be said about prescription drugs.
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meaningful choice; (3) the buyer may not realize he will pay more than other
patients; and (4) the magnitude of the markup over hospitals’ costs is
shocking. 422
Three key takeaways emerge from the foregoing review. First, despite
unconscionability’s long-held reputation as a hopelessly indeterminate
doctrine, courts have identified a method for consistently applying it to the
price term of contracts. The doctrine has form and force as a mechanism for
policing unfair prices. Second, in a majority of jurisdictions, the method
requires a showing of both procedural and substantive unconscionability.
Under the sliding-scale approach, the procedural unfairness can be relatively
minor if the substantive unfairness of the price term is severe, but it must still
be present to some degree. Finally, courts have articulated three basic metrics
for proving substantive unconscionability: the seller’s markup on the good,
the seller’s profit, and (merging options (3) and (4) identified by Professor
Bender, 423 which are similar) the seller’s price compared to prices offered by
competitors.
3. Applicability to Prescription Drug Prices
At first glance, the unconscionability doctrine in contract law seems to
provide an attractive model for tackling high pharmaceutical prices in several
respects. First, it offers powerful rhetoric drawing on a sense of moral
unfairness. This strongly resonates with current debates about high drug
prices. The unconscionability doctrine arose in the common law out of a felt
need to come to the aid of consumers who were victims of market failures
(e.g., lack of choice due to a paucity of alternative sellers) or were being
exploited because of their vulnerable position. 424 Many people have similar
feelings about consumers who depend on high-cost drugs, especially singlesource drugs. 425
Second, unlike alternative models such as emergency price gouging
laws, the unconscionability doctrine in contract law has potential utility for
policing the base price of prescription drugs, not just price hikes. It therefore
422

Id. at 136.
See supra text accompanying note 405.
424 See, e.g., De La Torre v. CashCall, Inc., 422 P.3d 1004, 1010 (Cal. 2018) (observing that courts
recognize “the justification for unconscionability was to protect social welfare” and that excessively high
prices can indicate market failures); Knapp, supra note 323, at 312 (describing various vulnerabilities to
which courts are sensitive in applying the unconscionability doctrine).
425 See, e.g., Ezekiel J. Emanuel, When Is the Price of a Drug Unjust? The Average Lifetime Earnings
Standard, 38 HEALTH AFF. 604, 604–05 (2019) (“Excessively high prices for basic necessities such as
drugs . . . take advantage of a person’s compromised circumstances . . . . A particularly high-price drug,
especially one that offers to save a life or substantially improve the quality of life, exploits a person’s ill
health for a company’s profit.”)
423
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offers the prospect of creating a regulatory regime in which gaming
(adjusting one aspect of prices to avoid regulatory constraints on another) is
comparatively more difficult. A legislature could simply decree that any drug
price that reaches an unconscionable level—whether through price hikes or
high initial prices—is unlawful.
Third, such a standard is (obviously) very flexible. It allows judges
latitude to apply a more general standard to specific transactions. This is
useful in policing contracts that are against public policy because it is
impossible for legislators and agencies to anticipate every possible provision
that contracting actors might dream up to take advantage of an
unsophisticated party. 426 In the prescription drug space, such flexibility
would be advantageous because of the different contexts surrounding prices
for different drugs. Some drugs cost more than others to bring to market;
some are blockbusters while others target small markets; some are lifesaving
and essential while others are merely quality-of-life-enhancing; some are
sold in markets with many therapeutic alternatives and substantial consumer
choice, and others are alone in their class. Each of those factors arguably
bears on whether the price of the drug is substantively and procedurally
unfair, and the contract law conception of unconscionability allows for a
case-by-case weighing. In contrast, a legislative pronouncement that a WAC
over a certain dollar amount per year is unlawful does not.
Thus, unconscionability doctrine in the common law is flexible not only
as to which price terms are unconscionable, but also how that proof is made.
Under the sliding-scale approach, litigants can advance arguments under a
variety of indicia of procedural unfairness (e.g., unequal bargaining power,
lack of opportunity to bargain, lack of choice, surprise, lack of education or
sophistication) and substantive unfairness (e.g., comparison to the seller’s
acquisition cost, seller’s total costs, or prices charged by others). This
flexibility maximizes opportunities to use the doctrine to go after a wide
range of problematic situations.
Despite these positive features, the contract law approach to defining
excessive price would encounter significant problems if marshaled to combat
high prescription drug prices. A threshold issue is that the model is hard to
scale. Common law contract doctrine evolved to resolve disputes between
the parties to one specific contract. The model is one of private
enforcement—court actions are initiated by one of the parties to the contract,
while state attorneys general and other public enforcers are not involved.
Some of the indicia included in courts’ traditional analysis of procedural and
426 See, e.g., State ex rel. Bryant v. R & A Inv. Co., 985 S.W.2d 299, 302 (Ark. 1999) (permitting
the inclusion of unconscionable practice in a catchall provision “because the General Assembly could not
be expected to envision every conceivable violation”).
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substantive unconscionability only make sense in the context of evaluating a
particular buyer and a particular seller under particular circumstances. For
example, courts often examine the buyer’s likely understanding of the
bargain she was entering into by looking at her level of educational
attainment, language proficiency, and naïveté. 427 All of these considerations
make the contract law model a poor fit if policymakers wish to impose
across-the-board regulation of the ways in which particular goods can be
bought and sold.
It is also unclear how a contract law model would work in light of the
complexity of the prescription drug supply chain. Medicines are not
purchased by the consumer from the supplier. The patient sits at the distal
end of a long supply chain; the actors that directly contract with drug
manufacturers are wholesalers and mail-order pharmacies (many of which
share corporate ownership with a pharmacy benefit manager, or PBM).428 If
those initial contracts produce unfair effects for the ultimate third-party
beneficiaries, it is unclear how they would be redressable under the
unconscionability doctrine.
The remedies available in contract law are another sticking point.
Traditional remedies for unconscionable contracts—refunding the buyer’s
money, eliminating the obligation to pay, or voiding the contract
altogether 429—are not particularly helpful for patients who still need the drug
and have no alternative supplier. These remedies may also be too weak to
incentivize biopharmaceutical companies to change their pricing behavior.
The upshot of this discussion is that although there may be utility in
borrowing something from the common law standard of unconscionability,
there is no allure to leaving the process of policing excessive drug prices as
a matter of contract law (i.e., to police them through litigation relating to
particular contracts).
Second, although the flexible nature of the unconscionability doctrine
is alluring, the flipside of flexibility is unpredictability. Unconscionability is
a judge-made, judge-administered doctrine. Adopting the common law
understanding of the doctrine as the basis for a statutory definition of
427

See e.g., Knapp, supra note 323, at 312.
For a discussion of the complexity of the system, see NAT’L ACADS. OF SCIS., ENG’G, & MED.,
supra note 6, at 19, 41–49.
429 FARNSWORTH, supra note 318, at 305–06; see also Vom Lehn v. Astor Art Galleries, Ltd.,
380 N.Y.S.2d 532, 541 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1976) (noting that UCC § 2-302 “makes no provision for damages,
and none may be recovered thereunder”). See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 208
cmt. g (AM. LAW INST. 1981) (“Perhaps the simplest application of the policy against unconscionable
agreements is the denial of specific performance where the contract as a whole was unconscionable when
made. . . . Where a term rather than the entire contract is unconscionable, the appropriate remedy is
ordinarily to deny effect to the unconscionable term.”).
428
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unconscionability (either expressly or by omitting any explicit definition of
that term in the statute, which will cause courts to default to the common law
understanding) means that it will fall to judges to decide which drug prices
are unconscionable. This may be undesirable because different judges may
reach different conclusions when applying the indicia of unconscionable
prices. They may have different ideological perspectives on the extent to
which market failures must be present before intervention in markets is
justified. Some may hew more closely than others to judges’ historical view
that unconscionability is an extraordinary remedy, not to be applied casually
to bargains that arise in markets that basically function well. These potential
variations in how judges may apply the doctrine to drug prices raise the
question of whether biopharmaceutical manufacturers will have reasonable
notice as to what the legal standard requires of them.
Third, although there are some exceptional cases, 430 most courts have
made clear that a showing of at least some degree of procedural unfairness
is required in order to find a contractual provision unconscionable. 431 Yet
such a showing may be quite tricky in the prescription drug context. It shifts
the focus from an analysis of the price to an analysis of the buyer, the seller,
and their relationship to one another. In practice, the characteristics of the
buyer weigh heavily. If used, this approach to defining excessive price would
push regulators to focus on particular kinds of drugs that are most likely to
raise procedural-unfairness issues (i.e., drugs that patients must take in order
to avoid serious health effects, drugs for which there is no therapeutic
alternative in the marketplace) and possibly on particular classes of
consumers who are especially vulnerable (e.g., patients with conditions that
predominantly
affect
low-income
populations).
Procedural
unconscionability could be hard to establish for other drugs. Even for these
drugs, to the extent that courts consider the relevant buyer for examining
procedural unconscionability to be the wholesaler or mail-order pharmacy
rather than the patient, arguing vulnerability or lack of sophistication would
be difficult.
It is questionable whether courts would find the medical necessity of
even essential drugs sufficient to constitute lack of choice in satisfaction of
the procedural unconscionability requirement. As commentators have noted
about unconscionability cases pertaining to hospital bills for emergency care,
“if need alone vitiated promises to pay, few medical contracts could be

430
431

See supra note 383 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 372–375 and accompanying text.
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enforced.” 432 Courts have also been unmoved by the fact that hospital fees
are not disclosed in advance. 433 These precedents strongly suggest that it is
undesirable to use a definition of unconscionability that requires a
procedural-unfairness showing for prescription drugs.
A final concern is that metrics used at common law for measuring
substantive unconscionability do not straightforwardly apply to prescription
drug prices. Cases examining the difference between the sales price of a good
and the seller’s cost have involved situations where a retailer is marking up
a product made by someone else. 434 Quantifying this difference is more
difficult for prescription drugs, where the seller is also the manufacturer.
Examining its profit requires determining its cost to produce the drug,
including research and development costs. As we discuss in greater depth
when we turn to public utilities regulation, 435 this is extremely difficult to do
for drug companies in general and at the level of individual drugs in
particular. For one thing, it requires allocating the manufacturer’s total costs
over its portfolio of multiple drugs. Additionally, this “cost plus” or “rateof-return” approach simply does not reflect how prescription drugs are priced
even in well-functioning, competitive markets. 436 For the same reason, the
alternative measure of the seller’s profit is fraught for prescription drugs.
Instead, one might compare a seller’s price against prices offered by other
sellers of similar goods. Yet, while rulings of price unconscionability often
involve prices being roughly at least twice that of an item’s market value,437
that rule of thumb appears too blunt an assessment for evaluating drug prices
in light of innovation policy concerns. Further, although market comparisons
are possible for drugs that have competition from generics or from on-patent
drugs with similar efficacy and safety profiles,438 many drugs do not fit that
432
433

2006)).

Hall & Schneider, supra note 412, at 675 (emphasis omitted).
Id. at 675–76 (citing Cox v. Athens Reg’l Med. Ctr., Inc., 631 S.E.2d 792, 796 (Ga. Ct. App.

434 See Bender, supra note 363, at 754 n.166 (citing as an example Frostifresh Corp. v. Reynoso, 274
N.Y.S.2d 757 (Dist. Ct. 1966), reversed on other grounds, 281 N.Y.S.2d 964 (App. Term 1967), in which
the court deemed it unconscionable to price a freezer that cost the seller $348 at $900 for cash sales or
$1,145 for sales on credit).
435 See infra Section III.D.
436 See, e.g., Ezekiel J. Emanuel, Big Pharma’s Go-To Defense of Soaring Drug Prices Doesn’t Add
Up, ATLANTIC (Mar. 23, 2019), https://www.theatlantic.com/health/archive/2019/03/drug-prices-highcost-research-and-development/585253 [https://perma.cc/VF9K-MJ5Q].
437 Bender, supra note 363, at 756.
438 Even in such cases, the seller is likely to argue that its product offers unique advantages. For
example, the Auvi-Q epinephrine auto-injector entered the market at a price seven times higher than its
biggest competitor, the EpiPen. Although the auto-injectors administered the same drug at the same dose
using the same method of administration, Auvi-Q was touted as superior because its dose was delivered
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description. Thus, if the common law notion of unconscionability has a role
to play in addressing high drug prices, it is better suited to serving as a basis
for interventions in drug markets that, despite competition, have seen prices
remain high. Though courts are unlikely to rule a price set by a competitive
market unconscionable, prices set through oligopolies are not “immune from
scrutiny.” 439
Because of these problems, contract law precedent is useful primarily
for establishing a default definition of unconscionability that legislators can
work from and adjust when drafting statutes specific to prescription drugs.
As we discuss further in Part IV, quite substantial adjustments to this
baseline would be desirable.
C. Consumer Lending Laws
Although the common law contracts doctrine of unconscionability
provides consumers some protection against the consequences of borrowing
money via high-interest loans, most states have also adopted provisions that
explicitly regulate the interest rates that may be charged in consumer loans.
States’ efforts to regulate consumer lending practices have taken a bifurcated
approach: (1) freestanding usury laws, 440 which establish a legally
permissible ceiling on interest rates for a specified range of consumer loans;
and (2) more general consumer protection laws, covering lending as well as
sales of goods and services, which prohibit unfair and deceptive business
practices. Statutes in the latter group, instead of specifying maximum interest
rates, typically use terms such as “unfair” or “unconscionable” to describe
the prohibited conduct. Thus, they are analogous to Type 3 emergency price
gouging laws, whereas usury laws look more like Type 1 laws. We discuss
the history, strengths, and weaknesses of these two approaches to protecting
consumers against excessively priced loans, and then discuss their potential
applications to prescription drug prices.

in five seconds instead of ten and it provided audio rather than written instructions. See Mello, supra note
20, at 2275–76.
439 Perdue v. Crocker Nat’l Bank, 702 P.2d 503, 512 (Cal. 1985) (“While it is unlikely that a court
would find a price set by a freely competitive market to be unconscionable, the market price set by an
oligopoly should not be immune from scrutiny. Thus courts consider not only the market price, but also
the cost of the goods or services to the seller, the inconvenience imposed on the seller, and the true value
of the product or service.” (citations omitted)).
440 Usury protections have been almost universally adopted in the states via statute, but some states
have usury provisions in their state constitutions. Ann K. Wooster, Annotation, Construction and
Application of Usury Provisions in State Constitutions, 73 A.L.R. 6th 571, § 2 (2012).
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1.

Approaches to Defining Excessive Price

a. Usury Laws
Usury is defined as the exaction of a greater sum for the use of money
than the highest interest rate allowed by law. 441 Borrowers can assert usury
as a defense to the enforcement of a loan contract, and states may also create
civil or criminal penalties for usurious practices.
Regulation of usury has ancient roots and has been part of American
law since colonial times, 442 but has changed in the last four decades. Until
the 1970s, most states had usury laws of broad scope. 443 With the advent of
hyperinflation, however, lenders who were subject to these statutory caps on
interest rates felt their margins tightly squeezed and pressured legislatures
for relief. 444 Many states responded by easing, or in a few cases abandoning,
interest rate ceilings in the late 1970s and early 1980s. 445 Congress also
responded by preempting the application of state usury laws to major
categories of lenders and loans in a series of new federal statutes; 446 as a
result, much modern consumer lending takes place outside the reach of state
law. Further, in 1978 the Supreme Court held that when a consumer borrows
money from a national bank in another state, the laws of the bank’s state,
rather than the consumer’s, apply. 447 That holding opened the door for states
to compete to attract national banks by permitting higher interest rates.448
This, in turn, spurred state banks (and then nonbank lenders) competing with
national banks to demand equal footing in terms of the rates they could
charge. 449
Today a “legislative patchwork” 450 exists in which most states have
replaced broad caps covering all consumer loans with usury laws covering a
narrower range of products, and a few have abandoned their usury laws
441

44B AM. JUR. 2D Interest and Usury § 2 (2019).
Bender, supra note 363, at 726.
443 Adriel D. Orozco, Note, The Judicial Expansion of an Old Tool to Combat Predatory Lending in
New Mexico, 46 N.M. L. REV. 191, 199–200 (2016).
444 Id. at 200.
445 Bender, supra note 363, at 732–34.
446 For example, the National Bank Act limits the interest rate charged by national banks to that
allowed by the law of the bank’s home state and preempts conflicting state usury laws. 12 U.S.C. § 85
(2018); 75 AM. JUR. 3D Proof of Facts 103 § 13 (2019). The Federal Deposit Insurance Act preempts
state law claims against state-chartered, federally insured banks. See Wooster, supra note 440, § 3.
447 Marquette Nat’l Bank v. First of Omaha Serv. Corp., 439 U.S. 299, 313 (1978).
448 Nathalie Martin, Public Opinion and the Limits of State Law: The Case for a Federal Usury Cap,
34 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 259, 264 (2014).
449 Id. at 264–65.
450 Id. at 266.
442
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altogether. Nevertheless, as we discuss below, courts applying usury statutes
have done so in a manner that robustly protects consumers, rebuffs
vagueness challenges, and construes them to cover a range of situations not
expressly covered in the statutes.
Usury statutes vary considerably in the permissible interest rate, types
of loans covered, and remedies and penalties. 451 Several states adopted the
1968 Uniform Consumer Credit Code (or a subsequent 1974 version), 452
which sought to create greater consistency across states in prohibited
practices and set a maximum interest rate of 18% for consumer loans. 453 In
other states, maximum interest rates range from around 8% to as high as
45%; rates in the 15%–18% range are common. 454 Rather than specifying a
numerical interest rate, some usury statutes peg the maximum to a
benchmark indicator, such as the U.S. prime rate.455 But even these statutes
set forth the basis for calculating the allowable rate with great specificity. 456
For penalties, some statutes provide that the entire contract is void, while
others allow collection of the principal and the legally permitted amount of
interest. Some states, but not all, provide for additional civil or criminal
penalties (fines). 457
Despite these differences, usury laws have some broad commonalities.
Most critically, they have taken a consistent approach to defining excessive
price: specifying, in clear terms, a maximum annual percentage interest

451

9 SAMUEL WILLISTON & RICHARD A. LORD, WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS § 20:2 (4th ed. 2019).
Gary D. Spivey, Annotation, Regulation of Consumer Loans Under Uniform Consumer Credit
Code, 73 A.L.R. 6th 425, §§ 1–2 (2012).
453 UNIF. CONSUMER CREDIT CODE § 2.401(1) (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 1974); UNIF. CONSUMER
CREDIT CODE § 3.201 (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 1968).
454 BANKING LAW—CONSUMER PROTECTION: INTEREST RATES & USURY, LEXISNEXIS 50-STATE
SURVEYS: STATUTES & REGULATIONS (2018).
455 Anne Sraders, What Is the Prime Rate? Definition, History and Rate in 2019, THE STREET
(July 31, 2019, 3:15 PM) https://www.thestreet.com/markets/what-is-the-prime-rate-14742514
[https://perma.cc/F8XL-EZ4S] (defining the prime rate as “the lowest interest rate available for nonbanks to borrow money”)
456 For example, Rhode Island’s statute sets the maximum at 21% per annum or an “alternate rate”
that is “equal to nine percentage points (9%) plus an index that is the domestic prime rate as published in
the Money Rates section of The Wall Street Journal on the last business day of each month preceding the
later of the date of the debtor’s agreement or the date on which the interest rate is redetermined in
accordance with the terms of the debtor’s agreement.” 6 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 6-26-2 (2019). Some states set
as their benchmark the federal discount rate, which was abolished by the Federal Reserve Board in 2003;
however, courts have readily substituted an analogous benchmark from the obsolete one where necessary
to sustain the statute against a vagueness challenge. See, e.g., Pakay v. Davis, 241 S.W.3d 257, 260–62
(Ark. 2006) (substituting the primary credit rate).
457 75 AM. JUR. 3D Proof of Facts, supra note 446, §§ 34–36, 45.
452
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rate. 458 Additionally, they permit consumers to bring a usury claim to get out
of paying some or all of a usurious loan or to recover illegal interest already
paid, as well as to raise usury as a defense in an action to collect on the
debt. 459 They generally require a showing of four elements to make out a
usury claim: (1) the transaction at issue is properly characterized as a loan or
forbearance; (2) what is loaned is money or something circulating as money;
(3) the loan is repayable absolutely; and (4) something was exacted for the
use of the money in excess of the interest allowed by law. Some jurisdictions
also require a fifth element: that the lender intended the transaction to exact
interest in excess of the allowable rate. 460
b. General Consumer Protection Laws
States have also sought to curtail abusive consumer lending practices
using general consumer protection acts (CPAs), which cover sales as well as
lending in most states. 461 CPAs blossomed during the pro-consumer
movement of the 1960s, when consensus emerged that the efforts of the
Federal Trade Commission (FTC) to combat unfair and deceptive practices,
even in conjunction with remedies available in tort and contract, were
insufficient to protect consumers. 462 Several rounds of drafting of uniform
laws gave states the template they needed to adopt additional protections,
and by the mid-1970s nearly every state had adopted a CPA, with most of
those providing consumers with a private right of action. 463 Today, all fifty
states have such laws, and consumer advocates describe them as “the main
lines of defense protecting consumers from predatory, deceptive, and
unscrupulous business practices.” 464 The laws allow both individual
consumers and state attorneys general to bring civil actions in response to
458 Christopher L. Peterson, Usury Law, Payday Loans, and Statutory Sleight of Hand: Salience
Distortion in American Credit Pricing Limits, 92 MINN. L. REV. 1110, 1117 (2008). Interestingly, some
states have established an administrative process for reviewing and updating the interest rate ceiling
which resembles in some respects the way rates are set for public utilities. Virginia, for instance, tasks
the Commissioner of Financial Institutions with setting “fair and reasonable” rates for small consumer
loans. For a discussion, see Bender, supra note 363, at 800 & n.384.
459 75 AM. JUR. 3D Proof of Facts, supra note 446, §§ 34, 38.
460 WILLISTON, supra note 451, § 20:4.
461 Five states carve lenders out of their general CPAs altogether, and another fifteen have CPAs that
cover some but not all lenders or loans. CAROLYN L. CARTER, NAT’L CONSUMER LAW CTR., CONSUMER
PROTECTION IN THE STATES: A 50-STATE REPORT ON UNFAIR AND DECEPTIVE ACTS AND PRACTICES
STATUTES 2 (2009), http://www.nclc.org/images/pdf/udap/report_50_states.pdf [https://perma.cc/Y5JAM7HN].
462 D. Matthew Allen et al., The Federal Character of Florida’s Deceptive and Unfair Trade
Practices Act, 65 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1083, 1085–86 (2011).
463 Id. at 1086.
464 Carter, supra note 461, at 3.
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violations of the statute. In addition to civil penalties, some states permit
criminal sanctions for extreme violations.
Some CPAs are tied to a companion usury statute, serving to expand
the range of remedies available for violating the usury law. For example, “a
violation of the Massachusetts usury statute constitutes a per se violation” of
Massachusetts’s CPA. 465 More commonly, CPAs are freestanding and
prohibit acts that violate a general standard of “unfair” or “unconscionable”
business practices. 466 Florida’s CPA, for instance, prohibits “[u]nfair
methods of competition, unconscionable acts or practices, and unfair or
deceptive acts or practices in the conduct of any trade or commerce”; 467
Arkansas’s prohibits “any other unconscionable . . . practice in business,
commerce, or trade.” 468
CPAs using the term “unfair” often incorporate by reference the FTC’s
understanding of that term. 469 “Unconscionable” acts are not synonymous
with “unfair” ones, however, and in defining “unconscionable” legislatures
and courts have incorporated common law understandings of that term from
contracts cases and UCC § 2-302. 470 As discussed above, 471 such
understandings pin unconscionability to findings of procedural and
substantive unfairness. New Mexico’s CPA, for example, defines
“unconscionable trade practice[s]” to include procedural and substantive
standards lifted directly from the UCC. 472 Thus, our earlier analysis of the
requirements for a finding of unconscionability in contract law also describes
the typical analysis in a CPA case applying an unconscionability standard.
When fleshing out procedural unconscionability, for instance, CPAs
commonly name as key indicia lack of sophistication on the part of the

465

In re Pena, 397 B.R. 566, 577 (B.A.P. 1st Cir. 2008).
They also prohibit deceptive practices, but we confine our discussion to their unfair or
unconscionable practices component.
467 FLA. STAT. § 501.204(1) (2019).
468 ARK. CODE ANN. § 4-88-107(a)(10) (2019).
469 For a summary of the FTC’s evolving definition of unfair practices, see United Cos. Lending
Corp. v. Sargeant, 20 F. Supp. 2d 192, 200–01 (D. Mass. 1998).
470 See Russell, supra note 379, at 984. These understandings were enshrined in the 1971 Uniform
Consumer Sales Practices Act, which does not apply to lending. See UNIF. CONSUMER SALES PRACTICES
ACT § 4(c) (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 1971) (listing six factors that should be considered in determining
whether an act is unconscionable).
471 See supra Section III.B.
472 N.M. STAT. ANN. § 57-12-2(E) (2019); see also Orozco, supra note 443, at 202 (noting that New
Mexico’s statute therefore retains the UCC’s inherent ambiguity as to what sorts of practices and prices
violate these standards, making it vulnerable to vagueness challenges, but also permitting flexibility in
dealing with unjust business practices).
466
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borrower, financial necessity, sharp practices by the lender, and lack of
choice. 473
The two approaches states have taken to defining excessive price in the
consumer lending context—maximum interest rates and prohibitions on
unconscionable lending practices—can and do peacefully coexist as
complementary efforts to protect consumers against predatory lending. 474
Where usury statutes’ protections do not apply, or offer inadequate remedies,
CPAs can fill gaps. The CashCall case discussed earlier illustrates the point:
the court held that the fact that California’s usury law applies only to loans
under $2,500 had no bearing on the plaintiffs’ ability to bring an action under
the state’s general CPA alleging an unconscionably high interest rate on a
loan greater than $2,500 because the legislature had adopted a separate
provision applying the unconscionability doctrine to all consumer loans. 475
Usury statutes, the court went on, simply provide a “bright-line rule” about
excessive price that supplements the more flexible, context-dependent
unconscionability standard. 476
The two approaches have complementary strengths and weaknesses.
One advantage that usury laws offer over CPAs’ unconscionability standard
is that the characteristics of the borrower do not matter. If the loan’s interest
rate is over the limit, usury has been committed. This means that usury laws’
protection, as a practical matter, extends to a broader swath of consumers. It
is also more straightforward to establish in litigation. Although courts have
allowed petitioners in CPA cases to establish procedural unconscionability
based on a showing that the lender’s customers as a class had indicia of
procedural unfairness such as low educational attainment and low income
without establishing that every individual borrower was disadvantaged, 477
even this requirement may constrain the types of loans that can be

473

Bender, supra note 363, at 772.
For an extended discussion of this idea, see id. Professor Bender points out that disputes do
occasionally arise when both regimes are brought to bear—for example, can a court review an interest
rate under the unconscionability standard when it does not violate the state’s usury law or when state
usury law is preempted for that loan by federal law? But these are relatively narrow issues. See id. at 737.
475 De La Torre v. CashCall, Inc., 422 P.3d 1004 (Cal. 2018).
476 Id. at 1010.
477 See, e.g., State ex rel. King v. B & B Inv. Grp., Inc., 329 P.3d 658 (N.M. 2014) (holding that a
general practice on the part of the lender of targeting vulnerable borrowers could be deduced from the
lender’s targeted marketing to low-income, low-educated groups that research showed could not
understand key concepts such as annual percentage rate); see also Orozco, supra note 443 (summarizing
the case).
474
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successfully challenged. In contrast, usury laws can be used to combat high
prices even in the absence of apparent procedural unfairness. 478
A related advantage is that the usury standard is much clearer than the
unconscionability standard. 479 As noted above, 480 even laws that peg the
maximum interest rate to some shifting benchmark in the U.S. economy are
exquisitely specific about what that benchmark is and how the interest rate
ceiling is to be calculated.
On the other hand, relative to the usury approach, the unconscionability
standard arguably offers the contracting parties greater freedom to determine
the terms of their agreement. 481 Additionally, usury laws have proven
vulnerable to gaming on the part of regulated entities. As states narrowed the
range of covered transactions over time, lenders have found ways to evade
these laws by restructuring transactions so that they are not covered. 482 For
example, rent-to-own businesses can achieve lower interest rates while still
exacting the same, high overall price from consumers by simply inflating the
cash price of the item. 483 In contrast, CPAs ordinarily apply the
unconscionability standard to consumer sales and loans generally, without
regard for the specific type of transaction.
In summary, usury laws and CPAs take quite different approaches to
defining impermissible consumer loans, mirroring the approaches taken in
Type 1 and Type 3 emergency price gouging laws. Each approach has
important limitations, which may explain why states have tended to pursue
them in tandem. The implications for prescription drug pricing laws are
discussed shortly. Before reaching that discussion, we comment on how
these laws have fared in the face of vagueness challenges.
2. Legal Challenges
Some facial challenges to state laws regulating interest rates have
questioned whether these laws are permissible exercises of the state’s police

478 For an example of this problem outside the lending context, see People ex rel. Hartigan v. Knecht
Servs., Inc., 575 N.E.2d 1378, 1386 (Ill. App. Ct. 1991) (rejecting, in a suit against a plumbing, heating,
and air conditioning business, the contention that unconscionably high prices alone are sufficient to find
a contract in violation of the Illinois Consumer Fraud Act).
479 Cf. Bender, supra note 363, at 744 (noting criticisms that the unconscionability standard
engenders too much uncertainty as applied to loan pricing).
480 See supra note 456 and accompanying text.
481 Bender, supra note 363, at 744–55.
482 Id. at 739–40; Orozco, supra note 443, at 203.
483 Bender, supra note 363, at 740. Although market forces might ordinarily be expected to correct
this price inflation, limited competition in the rent-to-own market and their low-income customers’
inability to pay full price up front may undercut this corrective force.
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power. 484 The courts’ answer has been a resounding yes: they are
constitutionally acceptable forms of economic regulation that do not violate
substantive due process by interfering with freedom of contract. 485 States
have wide latitude to regulate interest rates, as long as the classifications
adopted in the statute satisfy basic equal protection requirements.486 In
particular, courts have allowed legislatures wide discretion in selecting a
maximum interest rate. 487
Usury statutes have been challenged on vagueness grounds. Because
these laws so clearly state the maximum interest rate, vagueness challenges
have centered on issues other than what constitutes an excessive price. Some
vagueness claims have questioned whether particular charges in the
transaction at issue count toward the statutorily-defined “interest” on the
loan, but most concern whether the transaction fits within the scope of the
usury law. 488 For example, is the transaction a “loan” or some other type of
transaction? 489 Does the defendant’s conduct constitute a “scheme or
business” of making usurious loans? 490
In analyzing such claims in challenges to civil usury statutes, courts
apply the comparatively lenient vagueness standard applicable to economic
regulation. 491 Criminal usury statutes typically invite application of the
tougher standard for criminal laws, but that has not served as a bar to
upholding these statutes. 492 Courts have upheld usury statutes against
484 See, e.g., Ardsley Constr. Co. v. Port of New York Auth., 417 N.Y.S.2d 649 (App. Div. 1979)
(challenging interest rate cap on claims against public corporations).
485 75 AM. JUR. 3D Proof of Facts, supra note 446, § 7 (collecting cases).
486 Id. at §§ 7, 8; see also Glenn v. State, 644 S.E.2d 826 (Ga. 2007) (finding that Georgia’s criminal
payday lending statute did not violate equal protection by confining its scope to loans by Georgia
residents); Aros v. Beneficial Arizona, Inc., 977 P.2d 784, 789 (Ariz. 1999) (en banc) (finding a rational
basis for treating consumer and commercial borrowers differently).
487 Wooster, supra note 440, § 14 (summarizing cases).
488 See generally id. (collecting and summarizing cases relating to usury provisions in state
constitutions).
489 See, e.g., 47 C.J.S. Interest & Usury § 169 (2019) (citing Glenn, 644 S.E.2d 826, and SAL
Leasing, Inc. v. State ex rel. Napolitano, 10 P.3d 1221 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2000)); see also Fogie v. THORN
Ams., Inc., 95 F.3d 645, 650 (8th Cir. 1996) (applying the “more tolerant” vagueness standard to hold
that Minnesota’s law was sufficiently clear in its definition of “consumer credit sales” as encompassing
rent-to-own transactions).
490 See, e.g., People v. Lombardo, 460 N.E.2d 1074, 1077 (N.Y. 1984) (holding that “scheme” and
“business” are not vague because their legal meaning is the same as their dictionary definitions, and
clearly applied to the defendant’s conduct); People v. Di Raffaele, 420 N.Y.S.2d 109, 110–11 (N.Y. Sup.
Ct. 1979) (same).
491 Fogie, 95 F.3d at 650; United Cos. Lending Corp. v. Sargeant, 20 F. Supp. 2d 192, 204 (D. Mass.
1998).
492 See, e.g., Di Raffaele, 420 N.Y.S.2d at 110–11 (upholding criminal loansharking law).
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vagueness challenges even where their holding required lenders to have a
rather detailed knowledge of the state’s case law concerning what factors
militate in favor of calling a transaction a loan rather than a sale.493 Cases in
which vagueness challenges have been sustained appear to be rare and
connected to rather exotic issues. 494
Case law also speaks to the clarity of CPAs’ “unconscionable” standard
and the interrelationship between usury laws and general state CPAs. The
Arkansas Supreme Court, rejecting a vagueness challenge brought by a titlepawn business, held that one permissible vehicle for enforcing the state’s
usury prohibition (contained in the state constitution) was for the attorney
general to bring an action under the state’s general CPA, which prohibited
“unconscionable, false, or deceptive” business practices. 495 The contract at
issue was unquestionably usurious; the issue was whether it could also be
prosecuted as “unconscionable.” The court found that the “unconscionable”
standard was not unconstitutionally vague because interpretations were
available in the common law of contracts. 496 Further, it found that it was
consistent with the legislature’s purpose of protecting consumers against
usury to permit the attorney general to bring enforcement actions relating to
usurious loans under the state’s CPA. 497
Other courts have similarly upheld CPAs’ using the “unconscionable”
standard against vagueness challenges. Courts have rebuffed claims of
vagueness by pointing to the extensive fleshing out of its meaning in
contracts cases, as well as provisions in some statutes and regulations that
specify particular dimensions of unconscionability. 498 For example,

493 See SAL Leasing, Inc., 10 P.3d at 1229 (holding that state consumer lending law applied to a titlepawn business because “[u]sury case law—including [two particular decisions]—gave appellees fair
warning that their conduct was proscribed and made arbitrary prosecution impossible”); see also Glenn,
644 S.E.2d at 828 (rejecting claim that criminal payday lending law was unconstitutionally vague because
it did not specifically name the particular lending schemes defendants used).
494 See Bisno v. Kahan, 170 Cal. Rptr. 3d 709, 724 (Cal. Ct. App. 2014) (concerning application of
the usury state’s interest rate cap to forbearance fees, which are a separate element of a loan contract);
State v. Roderick, 704 So. 2d 49, 54–55 (Miss. 1997) (finding no vagueness problem with the usury
statute itself but holding that its deployment as a predicate violation for prosecution under the state’s
RICO statute raised vagueness problems); Harvey v. Nissan N. Am., Inc., No. C-12016-04, 2005 WL
1252341, at *5–6 (N.J. Super. Ct. Apr. 29, 2005) (sustaining an as-applied vagueness challenge to a state
CPA where the attorney general sought to enforce the statute against a carmaker, which had not informed
past buyers of the availability of a new anti-theft device).
495 State ex rel. Bryant v. R & A Inv. Co., 985 S.W.2d 299, 301–02 (Ark. 1999).
496 Id. at 302.
497 Id. at 302–03.
498 See, e.g., United Cos. Lending Corp. v. Sargeant, 20 F. Supp. 2d 192, 204–05 (D. Mass. 1998)
(stating that in order to “[t]o establish that the Regulation is unconstitutionally vague, United ‘must
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Massachusetts issued regulations under its CPA prohibiting mortgage loans
that “significantly deviate from industry-wide standards” 499—a phrase
calling to mind the reference to “reasonable market price” in the Restatement
(Second) of Contracts’ definition of substantive unconscionability. 500 The
district court examining those regulations also noted a policy concern
favoring a tolerant posture toward the unconscionability standard: “In
speaking of unfair or deceptive practices, Congress and the [FTC] have taken
the position that a specific definition of such practices is not appropriate as
it would necessarily be underinclusive, creating a shield for subsequent
unfair or deceptive practices as the markets for goods and services evolve.”501
To summarize, vagueness challenges present little threat to either usury
statutes or application of CPAs to high-interest consumer loans.
3. Applicability to Prescription Drug Prices
Sharp lending practices share some notable features with high-priced
prescription drugs, making them an intuitive analogue in many respects.
Most notably, the consumers availing themselves of these hard bargains are
often in a desperate situation: for example, in the case of predatory lending,
because their credit history and assets are too poor for them to find credit in
the mainstream market, and in the case of medications, because of serious
health conditions. Although some may find consumers and patients
differently situated morally—consumers may have poor credit due to
irresponsible spending, while sick patients may be less blameworthy—the
notion that the law should protect desperate people from predatory
companies has moral force for both groups. Further, both situations often
involve little choice of alternative products—for borrowers, because they are
excluded from the mainstream market, and for drugs, because of a lack of
therapeutic alternatives. In both cases, opacity in the transaction makes it
hard for consumers to understand the full cost of what they are buying.
Finally, both circumstances can involve a cycle of dependence. Just as
patients are reliant on medications for chronic conditions, high-interest loan
customers often find they cannot repay their debt and must take out new debt
to ease their obligations under the existing loan. Although it is arguably
unfair to paint drug manufacturers with the same moral brush as predatory
lenders, from the consumer’s perspective the situations may feel similar.

demonstrate that the law is impermissibly vague in all of its applications’” (quoting Whiting v. Town of
Westerly, 942 F.2d 18, 22 (1st Cir. 1991))).
499 Id. (citation omitted).
500 See supra note 369 and accompanying text.
501 United Cos. Lending Corp., 20 F. Supp. 2d at 205.
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Usury laws’ approach of setting a maximum interest rate has clear
applicability to drug price increases: legislation could specify a maximum
allowable price increase over a specified time period. (Usury statutes do not
address changes in interest rates over time, only absolute rates, but the
approach of stating a maximum percentage is exportable to drug price
increases.) As discussed earlier, 502 recently introduced price gouging
legislation for medications has taken exactly that approach. Such bright-line
rules create clear targets for enforcement action—any manufacturer who
steps over the statutory line—and puts companies unambiguously on notice
of how much is too much in terms of a price hike. Moreover, in reviewing
usury statutes, courts have clearly signaled that legislatures have wide
latitude in their choice of a ceiling rate.503 They can essentially select
whatever rate they like; courts will not require them to provide a justification
beyond the argument that it is reasonably related to a legitimate state interest.
The usury approach is also potentially applicable to drugs’ launch
prices: Congress (but not the states, given patent preemption issues) could
establish a statutory maximum launch price. However, there is broad concern
among experts that such crude price controls are undesirable from a
standpoint of preserving incentives for innovation. 504 Particularly given the
widely varying investments in research and development and anticipated
market sizes for different drugs, imposing a single statutory cap is illadvised.
One advantage of the usury approach is its imperviousness to
procedural-unfairness issues. It is a “consumer-blind” standard, in the sense
that the characteristics of the particular consumers or group of consumers
who are the target market do not matter in determining whether a violation
has occurred. Not having to worry about showing procedural unfairness
might allow attorneys general more discretion about which drugs to target
for enforcement actions—they would not need to worry about making out a
claim that the drug is essential, for example, or that patients lack choice due
to absence of competition in the market. Further, although usury statutes
currently apply only to individual borrowers, the general approach could be
deployed more broadly. Whereas the procedural-unfairness requirement
makes it hard to persuade a factfinder that a sophisticated, corporate entity
has been subjected to unconscionable practices, no comparable barrier
502

See supra Section III.B.
75 AM. JUR. 3D Proof of Facts, supra note 446, § 7 (“It is within the discretion of state legislatures
to set the rate of interest for various types and classes of claims.”).
504 NAT’L ACADS. OF SCIS., ENG’G, & MED., supra note 6, at 18 (noting this concern among members
of an expert committee that did not include direct price controls in a suite of recommended measures for
making prescription drugs more affordable).
503

933

NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

precludes application of a usury approach to prices charged to drug
wholesalers and mail-order pharmacies.
The usury approach has a slight advantage over CPAs using an
unconscionability standard in terms of clarity, but neither has proved
particularly vulnerable to vagueness challenges. Courts have felt
comfortable relying on contract law doctrine to interpret the standard. But
importantly, CPAs or their implementing regulations may flesh out the term
“unconscionable” to reduce ambiguity about the legislature’s intent. CPAs
thus illustrate the potential for careful drafting to improve upon common law
understandings of unconscionability. 505 States and Congress can write
legislation with as specific a definition as desired to reduce the risk of
vagueness challenges and send the clearest possible signals about what is
expected of biopharmaceutical companies. In this sense, CPAs offer a highly
appealing model for proscribing excessive drug prices.
State CPAs have already been used by two state attorneys general as
well as private plaintiffs as a basis for suing drug companies over their
pricing practices, illustrating the possibilities for a consumer protection law
approach to excessive prices. To date, such litigation has primarily
emphasized a deception theory rather than an argument that prices are simply
too high. In all of these cases, the plaintiffs allege that the three largest insulin
manufacturers used a deceptive pricing scheme by “artificially inflating
benchmark [list] prices to offer large rebates to the PBMs.” 506 That is, they
claim manufacturers raised and publicly disseminated their drug’s WAC so
that they could give PBMs larger rebates, though they knew wholesalers and
other organizations would use the WAC to set prices for some groups of
consumers, such as the uninsured. Despite the emphasis on deception, one
recent case filed by the State of Kentucky also characterizes the
manufacturers’ conduct as an “unconscionable pricing scheme” involving
“unconscionably and unreasonably inflated list prices,” an apparent
reference to the “unfair” prong of Kentucky’s CPA. 507

505 This observation is inspired by the discussion in Bender, supra note 363, at 746–803, of ways in
which states can sharpen the language in their CPAs to clearly define unconscionability, thereby choosing
how tightly to tether the statute’s definition of that term to the default interpretation that courts will give
it, which is based on U.C.C. § 2-302 (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2017).
506 Complaint at 153, In re Insulin Pricing Litig., No. 17-699(BRM)(LHG) (D.N.J. Dec. 26, 2017)
(consolidating multiple suits initiated in federal court of other states); accord Complaint at 2, Minnesota
ex rel. Swanson v. Sanofi-Aventis U.S. LLC, No. 3:18-cv-14999 (D.N.J. Oct. 16, 2018).
507 Complaint at 4, 20, Kentucky ex rel. Beshear v. Novo Nordisk, Inc., No. 19-CI-00473
(Ky. Cir. Ct. May 13, 2019), https://ag.ky.gov/pdf_news/20190513_Insulin-Pricing-Complaint.pdf
[https://perma.cc/5B3R-KKM5].
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Notwithstanding these strengths of the consumer lending law model,
three sticking points are worth bearing in mind when considering its potential
applicability to prescription drugs. First, usury laws and CPAs have
traditionally pegged enforcement to actual transactions. They do not prohibit
merely offering a loan product at a usurious price; a transaction with a
consumer must take place.508 If this approach were preserved, taking action
against high-priced prescription drugs would require waiting for a sale to
take place. This may be a relatively minor concern because although some
patients may be unable to afford the medications, others with better insurance
coverage will purchase them. Yet, for newly approved drugs with lifesaving
potential, the delay in access for some patients could be consequential.
Second, part of the simplicity of usury statutes is that they announce a
single price ceiling for all covered loans, regardless of who the borrower is.509
Drugs, of course, are not sold at a single price, nor are they typically sold at
the list price. Price discrimination among payers is the norm, implemented
through a series of rebates and discounts off the list price. 510 How, then, to
apply the usury model? Which price should it target? Imposing limitations
that merely apply to the WAC is an obvious answer, but this would not keep
a manufacturer from imposing de facto price increases on particular payers
by reducing the magnitude of the discounts and rebates it is willing to give.
The strong bargaining position of PBMs and large wholesalers may mitigate
concerns about such behaviors, but the law would not address it directly.
This brings up a third, related concern: gaming. Usury statutes have
inspired strategic behavior by lenders seeking to step out of the laws’
scope. 511 It would be much more difficult for drug manufacturers to argue
that their products are not covered by the statute, unless the statute applied
only to a narrow class of products. But they could inflate a new drug’s launch
price so that they could painlessly remain within statutory ceilings on price
increases, or they could manipulate discounts and rebates to maintain or
increase a drug’s average net price. This is a significant concern that even
careful drafting may be unable to eliminate.

508 See 75 AM. JUR. 3D Proof of Facts, supra note 446, § 1 (“Usury has been judicially defined by
the various states as the receiving, securing, or taking of a greater sum or value for the loan or forbearance
of money, goods, or things in action than is allowed by law.”).
509 See, e.g., CAL. FIN. CODE § 22303 (West 2019) (providing that for consumer loans, “[e]very
licensee who lends any sum of money [under $2,500] may contract for and receive charges at a rate not
exceeding” the amount set forth in the statute).
510 For a primer on this topic, see Richard G. Frank, Prescription Drug Prices: Why Do Some Pay
More Than Others Do?, 20 HEALTH AFF. 115 (2001).
511 See supra note 412 and accompanying text.
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In conclusion, although existing CPAs are not an optimal vehicle for
redressing unconscionable drug pricing, the general approach they employ
has considerable appeal. The usury model is also attractive, though its
limitations suggest it should be thought of as a companion to a more general,
CPA-like statute—as states have done for consumer lending. There is
significant potential to use such statutes to tailor a definition of
unconscionability that makes sense for prescription drugs and avoids some
of the baggage of the common law unconscionability standard. Specifically,
legislators can make clear that plaintiffs and attorneys general need not show
any procedural unfairness. 512 We expand on this possibility in Part IV.
D. Public Utilities Rate Regulation
Public utilities have long been subjected to extensive regulation in the
United States. 513 In addition to price regulation via formal rate-setting
processes, regulated aspects of public utilities include market entry and exit,
the addition or abandonment of service offerings, service standards, financial
structure, and accounting methods. 514
State regulation of public utilities dates to the turn of the twentieth
century, when widening economic inequality led to concern about
Americans’ ability to access essential products and services such as rail and
other transit, telecommunications, electricity and gas, and finance.515 The
impetus for intervening into the markets for these goods and services arose
not only from their status as necessities, but also from realization that many
of these industries tended toward natural monopolies 516—and further, that
512 Cf. Bender, supra note 363, at 796–97 (advocating this approach for CPAs relating to consumer
lending).
513 Public utilities are generally defined by reference to several characteristics: “(1) economies of
scale, (2) the provision of an ‘essential’ service, (3) heavy capital requirements, (4) production of services
or nonstorable goods, (5) demand and cost fluctuation, (6) exclusive franchises, and (7) the obligation to
supply services to anyone willing to pay the price.” William S. Brewbaker III, Health Care Price Controls
and the Takings Clause, 21 HASTINGS CON. L.Q. 669, 705 n.149 (1994) (citing JAMES C. BONBRIGHT ET
AL., PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC UTILITY RATES 8–10 (1988)).
514 Id. (citing BONBRIGHT ET AL., supra note 513, at 6).
515 William Boyd, Just Price, Public Utility, and the Long History of Economic Regulation in
America, 35 YALE J. ON REG. 721, 755 (2018); K. Sabeel Rahman, Essay, Constructing Citizenship:
Exclusion and Inclusion Through the Governance of Basic Necessities, 118 COLUM. L. REV. 2447, 2460–
63 (2018).
516 REGULATORY ASSISTANCE PROJECT, ELECTRICITY REGULATION IN THE US: A GUIDE 3, 7
(2011), https://www.raponline.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/05/rap-lazar-electricityregulationintheusguide-2011-03.pdf [https://perma.cc/R4NR-ATB7]; Adam Plaiss, From Natural Monopoly to Public
Utility: Technological Determinism and the Political Economy of Infrastructure in Progressive-Era
America, 57 TECH. & CULT. 806, 814 (2016). A natural monopoly occurs when it is most efficient for an
industry to consist of only one firm—for example, because the industry involves very high fixed costs.
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well-regulated monopolies could actually be superior to competitive markets
from a consumer welfare perspective. 517 Public utility services tend toward
natural monopoly because providing them is capital intensive, creating a
barrier to market entry, and because the marginal price of production
continues to decrease as output increases, solidifying the position of large
companies. 518 Further, the need for extensive physical facilities (for example,
electrical wires) to distribute the utility to customers makes it more efficient
for a geographic area to be served by a single provider. Thus, rather than
resisting monopoly, the main regulatory move has been to protect retail
customers against the consumer harms associated with monopolies,
including supracompetitive prices and poor service. 519
Regulation is executed by public utility commissions (PUCs) at the
federal and state levels. In exercising their powers, PUCs seek to balance
consumers’ interest in affordable prices against the need to set rates at a level
sufficient to motivate production and allow utilities to attract investment.520
They also aim to set rates in a manner that gives utilities incentives to operate
efficiently. 521 Scholars have conceived of rate setting as reflecting a sort of
“regulatory contract” between utilities and their customers, in which the
utility commits to provide reliable, accessible service at minimum cost in
exchange for the exclusive right to sell in a particular market, and customers
(through the PUC) agree to compensate the utility for the costs it prudently
incurs in meeting that commitment. 522

Paul L. Joskow, Regulation of Natural Monopoly, in 2 HANDBOOK OF LAW AND ECONOMICS 1227, 1229
(A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell eds., 1st ed. 2007).
517 W.M. WARWICK, U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, A PRIMER ON ELECTRIC UTILITIES, DEREGULATION,
AND
RESTRUCTURING
OF
U.S.
ELECTRICITY
MARKETS
5.2–5.8
(rev.
2002),
https://www.pnnl.gov/main/publications/external/technical_reports/PNNL-13906.pdf
[https://perma.cc/DE85-JXC9] (“[B]oth utilities and the public recognized that regulation of service
territories and rates at the state level was preferable to continued customer competition, duplication of
service, and different regulations in myriad municipalities.”).
518 Lino Mendiola, The Erosion of Traditional Ratemaking Through the Use of Special Rates, Riders,
and Other Mechanisms, 10 TEX. TECH. ADMIN. L.J. 173, 174–75 (2008) (citing ELI CLEMENS,
ECONOMICS AND PUBLIC UTILITIES 25 (Appleton-Century-Crofts 1950)).
519 Timothy J. Brennan, Entry and Welfare Loss in Regulated Industries, in COMPETITION AND THE
REGULATION OF UTILITIES 141, 141 (Michael A. Crew ed., 1991).
520 Paul L. Joskow & Richard Schmalensee, Incentive Regulation for Electric Utilities, 4 YALE J. ON
REG. 1, 12 (1986).
521 See BONBRIGHT ET AL., supra note 513, at 92–95. For some utilities, particularly energy,
establishing rate levels and structures that encourage consumers not to overconsume is also a regulatory
goal. See id. at 93–94.
522 See Joskow & Schmalensee, supra note 520, at 8–9.
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Public utilities rate regulation spans many industries, 523 with some
significant inter-industry differences in approach. We focus on retail
electricity services as an illustrative example. Electricity is a useful case
study 524 because methods of rate setting in that industry have been
extensively reviewed by the courts and have evolved over time. 525 Although
the industry has undergone considerable deregulation since the 1980s, its
history, and the rate-setting methods still applied in states that have not
deregulated, provide insight into how rate setting might be carried out in the
prescription drug industry. We conclude, however, that the approach through
which electricity prices have been set, known as rate-of-return regulation,
despite its merits, is pragmatically unsatisfactory for prescription drugs. By
contrast, a distinct but related approach—setting rates that payers will pay
when a drug’s market price exceeds some “affordability” threshold—has
pragmatic appeal for controlling costs, albeit not insignificant normative
vulnerabilities.
1. Approaches to Defining Excessive Price
About two-thirds of the U.S. population is served by investor-owned
(private) utility companies, with the remainder served by publicly-owned
utilities, cooperatives, and other entities. 526 Electricity rates and terms of
service for investor-owned utilities are set by state PUCs. 527 With regard to
rate setting, state PUCs have two main functions: determining the utility’s
revenue requirements and then, based on that requirement, setting retail
electricity rates for each class of customers.

523 Aside from electricity and telecommunications, these include natural gas, water, oil pipelines, rail
transportation, surface freight, and (until deregulation in the 1980s) air transportation. See William M.
Capron, Introduction to THE BROOKINGS INSTITUTION, TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE IN REGULATED
INDUSTRIES 1, 1–12 (William M. Capron ed., 1971). Among the earliest targets of rate regulation in the
United States were grain elevators, warehouses, and canals, for which nineteenth-century courts held that
rate regulation was justified because they were “monopoly” providers of services “affected with a public
interest.” Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113, 150–51 (1876).
524 Although a useful analogue to prescription drugs in many ways, retail electricity regulation does
not face the same preemption challenges as drug regulation because it is specifically reserved to the states
in the Federal Power Act, 16 U.S.C. § 796(15) (2018).
525 See infra Section III.D.2.
526 Jessica Shipley, Traditional Economic Regulation of Electric Utilities, REGULATORY
ASSISTANCE PROJECT (Dec. 17, 2018), https://www.raponline.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/12/
rap_shipley_pucs_regulation_overview_2018_dec_17.pdf [https://perma.cc/LP32-93Q4].
527 In most states, public utilities are not subject to regulation; co-ops are subject to some form of
regulation in about twenty states. REGULATORY ASSISTANCE PROJECT, supra note 516, at 24. Wholesale
rates (i.e., prices that electricity retailers pay to generators) are regulated by the Federal Energy
Regulatory Commission. Id. at 13.
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Although a few states require periodic review of electricity rates, in
most states, rate review is initiated upon the request of the utility or an
intervenor, such as a consumer organization. 528 Typically in these
proceedings, known as “rate cases,” the utility submits a proposed rate
change and the PUC conducts a review and approves or disallows the
change. The basis for the PUC’s decision is established by state statute;
generally, statutes require that rates be set at “just, reasonable and nondiscriminatory” levels, 529 considering the utility’s costs to provide service.
Statutes sometimes provide more specific guidance—for instance,
specifying which operating or investment costs may be taken into
consideration. 530
Two main approaches have dominated rate setting for utilities.
Agencies may use a combination of these approaches (as well as others).531
The first, and dominant, method is rate-of-return regulation. Reflecting the
regulatory-contract idea, rate-of-return regulation seeks to quantify what it
costs the utility to provide service and set rates at a level that permits the
utility to recover its investment as well as a return on investment that is
sufficient to attract investors. The PUC examines what the utility spends on
operating expenses and investments and sets a valuation on its productive
assets, taxes, and depreciation. It may disallow expenses and investments it
deems imprudent. 532
The second approach is to impose a price cap. The PUC sets a baseline
price ceiling that is intended to reflect prevailing costs in the industry. It then
adjusts it upward annually for economy-wide inflation and certain changes
that are outside the utility’s control (for example, unusual events that make
the inputs to its services more expensive), and downward to the extent that
productivity in the industry is expected to improve faster, and/or input costs
are expected to increase less, than in the economy as a whole.533 A firm that
increases its productivity over expected industry norms, or decreases its
528

See WARWICK, supra note 517, at 5.8–5.9.
Joskow & Schmalensee, supra note 520, at 4 (citations omitted).
530 See id. at 4–5.
531 See William M. Capron & Roger G. Noll, Summary and Conclusion, in TECHNOLOGICAL
CHANGE IN REGULATED INDUSTRIES, supra note 523, at 197, 197–226 (“While rate-of-return control is
commonly the principal device used in regulating prices and profits of electric utilities, transportation,
and communications firms, the federal agencies responsible for regulating these sectors also regulate
some prices directly.”).
532 Joskow & Schmalensee, supra note 520, at 1, 5–6, 12.
533 See James Ming Chen, Price-Level Regulation and Its Reform, 99 MARQ. L. REV. 931, 943–44
(2016); David E.M. Sappington & Dennis L. Weisman, The Price Cap Regulation Paradox in the
Electricity Sector, 29 ELECTRICITY J. 1, 3–4 (2016). Some states also factor in other adjustments—for
instance, a major new investment that is necessary to serve customers’ needs. Id. at 3–4.
529
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input costs below them, may keep the difference. 534 Whereas rate-of-return
regulation involves regulatory scrutiny of the utility’s spending decisions,
under price-cap regulation, the utility can “conduct its business as it sees fit,
provided that its prices do not rise above a certain level.” 535
Although the telecommunications industry was subject to price-cap
regulation in the late 1980s and early 1990s, 536 electricity regulators
historically have hewed closely to the rate-of-return approach. 537 In applying
that approach in rate cases, PUCs begin by determining the company’s
revenue requirement—the amount of revenue it should be permitted
to receive. The basic regulatory formula for the revenue requirement is:
rate base × rate of return + operating expenses. 538 The rate base is the total
of all investments made to serve customers (for example, buildings, wires,
and computer software), net of depreciation.539 The revenue requirement thus
requires determining the amount of investment allowed in the rate base, a
fair rate of return on that investment, and reasonable operating expenses—
all based on some test year, which could be historical or a future year for

534

See Sappington & Weisman, supra note 533, at 3–4.
Jim Chen, The Nature of the Public Utility: Infrastructure, the Market, and the Law, 98 NW. U.
L. REV. 1617, 1668–69 (2004) (reviewing JOSÉ A. GÓMEZ-IBÁÑEZ, REGULATING INFRASTRUCTURE:
MONOPOLY, CONTRACTS, AND DISCRETION 217–43 (2003)).
536 JEAN-JACQUES LAFFONT & JEAN TIROLE, COMPETITION IN TELECOMMUNICATIONS 4–5, 86
(2000); Alexander Larson, Predatory Pricing Safeguards and Telecommunications Regulation, in
COMPETITION AND THE REGULATION OF UTILITIES, supra note 519, at 51, 51–69. The Federal
Communications Commission switched from rate-of-return regulation to price caps for common carriers
in 1989. State PUCs regulating local exchange telephone companies used rate-of-return regulation until
the 1980s, when they began introducing reforms: some loosened their control over states, others moved
to price caps, and others pursued different approaches. By the mid-1990s about half the states were using
price caps. THOMAS W. BONNETT, TELEWARS IN THE STATES: TELECOMMUNICATIONS ISSUES IN A NEW
ERA OF COMPETITION 59–63 (1996).
537 Sappington & Weisman, supra note 533, at 1–2 (noting that by 2003, forty states had adopted
price cap regulation for telecommunications, whereas by 2015 only fourteen states employed multiyear
rate plans in their electricity sectors). These authors posit that both institutional differences and
implementation-related factors for price cap regulation account for the disparity. Id. at 2–5. Notably,
California’s experiment with price cap regulation was (wrongly) blamed for the “meltdown of
unprecedented proportion” in the state’s electricity sector in 2000. Id. at 3.
538 REGULATORY ASSISTANCE PROJECT, supra note 516, at 38 fig.9-1; see also BONNETT, supra note
536, at 62. This description of rate-of-return also relies on Mendiola, supra note 518, at 176–77, and
Megan J. Hertzler & Mara N. Koeller, Who Pays for Carbon Costs? Uncertainty and Risk in Response to
the Current Patchwork of Carbon Regulation for Public Utilities, 36 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 904, 931–
38 (2010). Those accounts, in turn, draw from two classic works in the field, BONBRIGHT ET AL., supra
note 513, and CHARLES F. PHILLIPS, JR., THE REGULATION OF PUBLIC UTILITIES (3d ed. 1993).
539 Big investments such as a new power plant may be reflected in the test year so that the rates will
allow the utility to recover the costs of that investment in the future when it will be “used and useful.”
REGULATORY ASSISTANCE PROJECT, supra note 516, at 39 (emphasis omitted).
535
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which companies and regulators are making cost projections.540 In
determining the rate base, the regulator may choose to exclude investments
it deems imprudent or not yet in use for the benefit of customers.541 Similarly,
in determining recovery for operating expenses, the regulator can disallow
any unreasonable or imprudent costs. Finally, once the test-year amounts are
established, utilities, taxpayer representatives, and regulators may argue that
the test-year data do not accurately represent the operating conditions that
are likely to prevail in the future and that an upward or downward adjustment
is appropriate.
Setting the rate of return is equally, if not more, challenging. The
general standard is that the regulator must set a rate of return on investments
in the rate base that is sufficient to allow the utility to attract additional
capital under prudent management. 542 As is discussed below in Section
III.D.2, PUC determinations as to appropriate rates of return have been
subject to extensive legal challenges, and several Supreme Court decisions
have provided guidance as to the standards and permissible range of
methodological approaches for reaching such determinations.
Rate-of-return regulation has endured as the preferred approach in
regulated electricity markets 543 despite some widely recognized problems. 544
One problem relates to information asymmetries: “[R]elative to regulators,
firm managers enjoy vastly superior access to information about the firm’s
true costs and opportunities for profit.” 545 Regulators, who rely on
submissions by the utilities for information, are therefore handicapped in
their ability to accurately distinguish prudent expenses and investments from
imprudent ones. A second problem is that the process of establishing the
inputs to the rate-of-return formula is time consuming and expensive. 546
540 Id. at 38–39. The utility proposes adjustments to the test-year data to reflect changes in costs that
have occurred since then or will occur in the forecasted test year. Id. at 40.
541 For details of rate-of-return regulation methods, see REGULATORY ASSISTANCE PROJECT, supra
note 516, at 38–41, 45.
542 Id. at 42. In satisfying that requirement, regulators consider what the utility must pay in interest
on long-term debt and stock dividends, in addition to what a reasonable profit would be. Mendiola, supra
note 518, at 177.
543 However, a large number of retail electricity markets have been deregulated in some respects
since the 1980s. See discussion infra notes 513–553.
544 Among the reasons for the persistence of this approach is that the outcomes of forays into pricelevel regulation for natural gas and oil were “not encouraging.” Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Price Level
Regulation Based on Inflation Is Not an Attractive Alternative to Profit Level Regulation, 84 NW. U. L.
REV. 665, 680 (1990) (reviewing JORDAN JAY HILLMAN & RONALD BRAEUTIGAM, PRICE LEVEL
REGULATION FOR DIVERSIFIED PUBLIC UTILITIES (1989)).
545 Chen, supra note 533, at 933.
546 Chen, supra note 535, at 1669.
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A third, more fundamental issue is the perverse incentive inherent in
setting rates based on operating costs: utilities have little reason to become
more efficient if they can pass their expenses along to ratepayers and their
revenue stream is based around building more infrastructure. 547 In theory, the
threat of having particular costs disallowed during rate review should
incentivize utilities to avoid imprudent spending and investment decisions;
in reality, the informational-asymmetry problem means this prospect may
impose insufficient discipline. 548 As a result, utilities may overinvest in
infrastructure and operate less efficiently than they would in a competitive
market or under alternative rate-setting schemes. 549
These and other complaints about the traditional model of price
regulation for electricity led to a deregulatory movement in the 1980s and
1990s. 550 Consumers were groaning under the burden of high electricity
rates, and both consumer groups and utilities complained that rate cases had
become protracted, adversarial, and expensive. Many states responded by
partially or fully deregulating the retail electricity market. 551 Electric power
generation was unbundled from power transmission and distribution, and
retail customers were allowed to buy electricity from any supplier they
chose. 552 As of 2018, seventeen states and the District of Columbia had
deregulated the retail electricity market to allow at least some choice of
providers. 553
547

Id.; Boyd, supra note 515, at 769.
Joskow & Schmalensee, supra note 520, at 12. Moreover, if the PUC errs on the side of being too
strict in disallowing expenses, it may scare off investors and jeopardize the utility’s ability to continue to
provide service. Id. at 9.
549 This phenomenon reflects the Averch-Johnson Effect—the tendency of regulated firms to
overinvest capital to increase property when their allowed return is a function of the amount invested.
REGULATORY ASSISTANCE PROJECT, supra note 516, at 60–61 (discussing Harvey Averch & Leland L.
Johnson, Behavior of the Firm Under Regulatory Constraint, 52 AM. ECON. REV. 1052 (1962)). For
further discussion, see Chen, supra note 533, at 935–36 (citing several classic works in the field advancing
this theory).
550 Rebecca McNerney, Overview: What’s Changing and Why, WASH. POST, http://www.
washingtonpost.com/wp-adv/specialsales/energy/report/article10.html [https://perma.cc/WPY4-DS9K]
(summarizing factors driving electricity deregulation).
551 WARWICK, supra note 517, at 6.4–6.6. Additionally, at the federal level, the Federal Energy
Regulatory Commission deregulated wholesale electricity and natural gas prices as well as long-distance
delivery charges in the 1990s but later backed off efforts to force states to restructure due to a variety of
problems encountered. Id. at 7.1. For a general discussion of federal statutes that contributed to
deregulation, see Chen, supra note 535, at 1638. For a summary of problems in federal restructuring, see
Richard J. Pierce, Jr., The Past, Present, and Future of Energy Regulation, 31 UTAH ENVT’L L. REV. 291,
295 (2011).
552 WARWICK, supra note 517, at 6.5 fig.6.2.
553 Map of Deregulated Energy States & Markets (Updated 2018), ELECTRIC CHOICE,
https://www.electricchoice.com/map-deregulated-energy-markets [https://perma.cc/3RBQ-Z2YZ].
548
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Regulators in these states (and at the federal level) did not completely
abdicate oversight of rates, however. They adopted rules and procedures to
try to prevent utilities from engaging in market manipulation, 554 carved some
components of a consumer’s energy bill out of deregulation, and protected
retail customers against price increases arising from volatility in the
wholesale electricity market by maintaining default rates provided by the
utility that dominated the market before deregulation (effectively, price
caps). 555 Most retail-choice states have seen few consumers switch providers,
suggesting that rate regulation remains important even in these markets. 556
This deregulatory history teaches that price regulation in the electricity
industry has been a bumpy ride. Litigation brought by utilities under the rateof-return regime illuminates some of the reasons why.
2. Legal Challenges
The earliest challenges to rate regulation questioned whether it was
permissible for states to regulate prices at all. This question was resolved
definitively in Munn v. Illinois, 557 in which the Supreme Court found that
price regulation of “businesses affected with public interest” sat squarely
within states’ police powers. 558 However, because the Court articulated no
test or standard to govern regulators’ rate setting, 559 litigation then turned to
disputes over the basis on which regulators were setting rates. In the 1898
case of Smyth v. Ames, concerning railroads, the Court articulated the basis
that was to hold for more than a half century, the “fair value” standard. 560
The Smyth standard held that the rate base should be set by reference to the
fair value of the utility’s assets. 561
Implementing this standard quickly became a morass, the untangling of
which was repeatedly thrust back upon the courts. Among the standard’s
554

One example of manipulation is restricting power generation to drive up price. WARWICK, supra
note 517, at 6.8–6.9.
555 WARWICK, supra note 517, at 7.2. Price caps were also adopted for wholesale markets in some
states. Id. at A.35.
556 Electricity Residential Retail Choice Participation Has Declined Since 2014 Peak, U.S. ENERGY
INFO.
ADMIN.
(Nov.
8,
2018),
https://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.php?id=37452
[https://perma.cc/DF8L-QKBV].
557 94 U.S. 113, 150 (1876).
558 Id. at 130; Boyd, supra note 515, at 750.
559 Boyd, supra note 515, at 751 (citing Walton Hamilton, Affectation with a Public Interest,
39 YALE. L.J. 1089, 1094 (1930)).
560 169 U.S. 466 (1898), overruled by Fed. Power Comm’n v. Nat. Gas Pipeline Co., 315 U.S. 575
(1942).
561 Id. at 546–47 (“[T]he basis of all calculations as to the reasonableness of the rates to be charged
by a corporation maintaining a highway under legislative sanction must be the fair value of the property
being used by it for the convenience of the public.”)
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problems was that the fair value of a utility’s assets depended in part on the
rates it would be charging; thus, asset valuation and rate setting had a circular
quality. 562 Further, when inflation skyrocketed during World War I and
beyond, the fair-value method tilted away from the balance that courts sought
to achieve between the public’s interest and those of utility investors: the
value of the utility’s assets far exceeded investors’ investments in the
company, and the method could not adequately protect the public from high
prices. 563
Ultimately, the Supreme Court abandoned the fair-value standard in the
1944 case of Federal Power Commission v. Hope Natural Gas Co. 564 Rather
than looking at whether the regulator’s valuation of the rate base provided
just compensation, the Hope Court held, courts should henceforth confine
their review to whether the “end result”—the rate itself—was “just and
reasonable,” as required by the governing statute.565 Though Hope concerned
federal regulation of natural gas rates, its standard has had enduring force in
federal and state regulation of electricity providers and other utilities. 566
The Hope Court had little to say about the specific method through
which a PUC could arrive at its result, so long as basic hallmarks of
procedural due process in agency decision-making were present (i.e., the
decision was based on substantial evidence and was not an abuse of
discretion). 567 It confined its review to ensuring that, whatever method was
used, “the resulting rates were not so low as to be confiscatory.” 568
Subsequent cases have made clear that this constitutional bar is quite low:
even a rate-setting scheme that results in some utility providers not receiving
562

Boyd, supra note 515, at 762–63.
John N. Drobak, From Turnpike to Nuclear Power: The Constitutional Limits on Utility Rate
Regulation, 65 B.U. L. REV. 65, 81 (1985).
564 320 U.S. 591 (1944).
565 Id. at 600 (“Congress has provided . . . that all natural gas rates subject to the jurisdiction of the
Commission ‘shall be just and reasonable . . . .’”); id. at 602 (“It is not theory but the impact of the rate
order which counts. If the total effect of the rate order cannot be said to be unjust and unreasonable,
judicial inquiry under the Act is at an end. The fact that the method employed to reach that result may
contain infirmities is not then important.”).
566 See REGULATORY ASSISTANCE PROJECT, supra note 516, at 42 (noting that Hope is one of two
decisions that “set out the general criteria that commissions must consider when setting rates of return”
for electricity providers).
567 Basil L. Copeland, Jr. & Walter W. Nixon, III, Procedural Versus Substantive Economic Due
Process for Public Utilities, 12 ENERGY L.J. 81, 81, 89 (1991).
568 Boyd, supra note 515, at 766–67. Despite the language of confiscatory rates, Hope is generally
read has having rejected Smyth’s view of rate setting through the lens of eminent domain. Instead, the
Hope Court “treated ratemaking as one species of the legislative police power and recognized that
stringent ratemaking could be confiscatory. It did not adopt the regulatory takings doctrine . . . as the
constitutional limit on ratemaking.” Drobak, supra note 563, at 85 (citation omitted).
563
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a fair rate of return may be permissible if it furthers the broad public interests
that the PUC was created to promote. 569
Although Hope declined to set forth a range of permissible approaches
to rate setting, it did explicitly approve the use of the utility’s historical cost
of providing service. 570 Under this “historical cost” standard, regulators set
rates “at a level that allows the utility to recoup its reasonably and prudently
incurred costs plus a reasonable rate of return; otherwise, the rate is held to
constitute a taking.” 571 If this sounds like rate-of-return regulation, that is no
accident: since Hope, historical cost ascended to dominance in utility rate
setting and has become closely identified with rate-of-return regulation. 572
The upshot of this brief history is that courts have moved over time
from intensive review of the method and inputs into a PUC’s rate decisions
to a high-level, deferential assessment of whether the end result is
reasonable, and in some cases to even lighter review. 573 A key purpose for
establishing PUCs was ensuring universal access to a steady supply of
electricity; so, among PUCs’ considerations should be what rate of return is
needed to attract investors, cover operating expenses, and keep utility
providers in business. Rates set too low may benefit the public in the short
term, but if they damage the provider too much, consumers suffer in the long
term574—an issue with notable parallels to innovation incentives in the drug
context. Nevertheless, courts will generally leave judgments about how low
is too low to PUCs, stepping in only to prevent grossly unfair treatment of
investors—that is, confiscatory rates. 575 And in addition to resolving disputes
over rates that are purportedly too low, they are also called upon to review
rates that consumers argue are too high. 576
569 In re Permian Basin Area Rate Cases, 390 U.S. 747, 821 (1968) (upholding an area-wide rate for
natural gas although some individual gas producers did not receive a fair rate of return); see also Federal
Power Comm’n v. Texaco Inc., 417 U.S. 380, 391–93 (1974) (reiterating that the Constitution requires
only that the rate “be higher than a confiscatory level” and that courts need only assess whether the
commission has balanced investors’ interests and the public’s interests in a reasonable way (quoting Fed.
Power Comm’n v. Nat. Gas Pipeline Co., 315 U.S. 575, 585 (1942))); Copeland & Nixon, supra note
567, at 99–100, 102 (discussing the relevance of the interests entrusted to the commission in the overall
assessment of the reasonableness of a rate).
570 Hope Natural Gas, 320 U.S. at 604–05.
571 Brewbaker, supra note 513, at 703.
572 Chen, supra note 535, at 1681 (citing Verizon Commc’ns, Inc. v. F.C.C., 535 U.S. 467, 485, 500
(2002)).
573 See Copeland & Nixon, supra note 567, at 104.
574 Drobak, supra note 563, at 124–25.
575 Id. at 124 (citing JAMES BONBRIGHT, VALUATION OF PROPERTY 1155 (1937)).
576 See, e.g., Washington Gas Light Co. v. Baker, 188 F.2d 11 (D.C. Cir. 1950) (challenging high
gas rates in the District of Columbia).
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3. Applicability to Prescription Drug Prices
The public-utilities model has intuitive appeal as an analogue for
prescription drugs 577 and has attracted interest from state lawmakers. Its
appeal derives from its longstanding place in the American regulatory
scheme and the prospect of applying “a persistent, ongoing practice of using
state power to curb unfair and oppressive practices” in the market. 578 As
discussed in Part I, Maryland and Maine have passed rate-setting legislation
for prescription drugs 579 and several other states have introduced similar
bills, 580 encouraged by NASHP. 581 These rate-setting bills are often described
as being modeled after public utilities regulation, 582 but there are also
important differences in the approaches, discussed below.
There are striking similarities between public utilities and prescription
drugs. Both markets are plagued by the specter of monopoly pricing: utilities
because of their tendency toward natural monopoly and drugs due to the
government-granted patent monopoly and other regulatory exclusivities.
Both involve essential products, and therefore are “affected with a public
interest.” 583 States’ regulation of health insurance premiums and hospital
charges over the last five decades buttresses the idea that the utilities model
has application to healthcare. 584

577

See Nicholas Bagley, Medicine as a Public Calling, 114 MICH. L. REV. 57, 60 (2015) (arguing
for the appropriateness of the public-utilities model for healthcare and concluding that “[t]he fit is
natural”).
578 Id. at 61, 71 (discussing the approach’s suitability for healthcare generally); id. at 96–99
(summarizing the history of hospital rate regulation).
579 See supra notes 171–172 and accompanying text.
580 NASHP Tracker, supra note 85 (listing and summarizing bills introduced through February 2019
in Connecticut, Illinois, Massachusetts, Minnesota, Missouri, New Jersey, and Oregon, in addition to
Maryland).
581 NASHP’S PHARMACY COSTS WORK GROUP, STATES AND THE RISING COST OF
PHARMACEUTICALS: A CALL TO ACTION 7–8 (2016), https://nashp.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/10/RxPaper.pdf [https://perma.cc/8QWD-62JW].
582 See, e.g., id.; Ed Silverman, A Growing Number of States Consider Legislation to Treat Pharma
as a Utility, STAT (Oct. 10, 2018), https://www.statnews.com/pharmalot/2018/10/10/pharma-legislationutilities-review-boards [https://perma.cc/G84B-BUPG] (characterizing prescription drug rate-setting
initiatives in several states as “much like the rate-setting bodies that control public utilities”).
583 Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113, 149–51 (1876); see also Bagley, supra note 577, at 75–79, 84–85
(discussing what makes a business imbued with a public interest).
584 See, e.g., Bagley, supra note 577, at 96–99 (briefly summarizing the history of insurance rate
regulation). We have focused on electricity rather than insurance or hospitals because the regulatory
approach originated in the energy sector. Additionally, rate regulation for hospitals has typically been
implemented by limiting what particular payers will pay, rather than a formal imposition of price controls
that apply to all customers. For a useful review of the history of hospital rate setting, see John E.
McDonough, Tracking the Demise of State Hospital Rate Setting, 16 HEALTH AFF. 142 (1997).

946

114:859 (2020)

Reining In “Unconscionable” Prices for Prescription Drugs

The appeal of the utilities model also springs from its potential reach; it
provides a conceptual basis for regulation of the base price of a drug, in
addition to price increases. 585 Although it is more straightforward to apply
utility rate-setting methods to price increases, the “rate base” element of rateof-return regulation 586 provides a way of thinking about how regulators could
limit launch prices.
Another normatively appealing aspect of the traditional ratemaking
model for utilities is the idea of setting explicit limits on sellers’ returns in a
manner that strives to be fair to all parties. Among the criticisms levied at
biopharmaceutical companies is that their profit margins are too high. The
industry is among the most profitable in the United States. 587 Although there
are large variations in margins across companies, in 2017 the average
operating margin among the twenty-five largest drug companies was 22%. 588
Rate-of-return regulation strikes at the heart of this concern. It could also
facilitate the curbing of high marketing and operational expenses. A recent
study concluded that among twelve large biopharmaceutical companies,
expenditures on marketing and administration (including executive pay)
exceeded spending on research and development by up to 80%. 589 An
estimated $6.1 billion was spent on direct-to-consumer advertising alone in
2017, not counting social media promotion. 590 Although such advertising can
help alert patients to the availability of therapies to treat their symptoms, it
is responsible for driving demand for expensive, branded drugs where more
affordable alternatives are available. 591 Regulators who deem these expenses
imprudent or not in the public interest could disincentivize them by
disallowing them in rate-setting calculations.
585 A limit on its reach, however, is that the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA),
29 U.S.C. § 1001, may prevent application of the upper payment limit to ERISA plans. See NAT’L ACAD.
FOR
STATE HEALTH POLICY, ERISA PRESUMPTION PRIMER,
https://nashp.org/wpcontent/uploads/sites/default/files/ERISA_Primer.pdf [https://perma.cc/JZ6S-U5DE].
586 See supra note 539 and accompanying text.
587 U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-18-40, DRUG INDUSTRY: PROFITS, RESEARCH AND
DEVELOPMENT SPENDING, AND MERGER AND ACQUISITION DEALS (2017).
588 Top 25 Global Pharma Companies by Market Cap (End of 2017), GLOBAL DATA (Apr. 3, 2018),
https://www.globaldata.com/top-25-global-pharma-companies-market-cap-end-2017
[https://perma.cc/D3XN-AHH9]. In contrast, the average operating margin for the overall U.S. market
for 2017 was 14.93%. Total Market Profitability. CSIMARKET.COM, https://csimarket.com/Industry
/industry_Profitability_Ratios.php?&hist=4 [https://perma.cc/AXL2-ZRX8].
589 NAT’L ACADS. OF SCIS., ENG’G, & MED., supra note 6, at 89–90.
590 Alison Kanski, Pharma Advertising Up 14% Across All Media in October: Standard Media,
MM&M (Nov. 30, 2018), https://www.mmm-online.com/home/channel/pharma-advertising-up-14across-all-media-in-october-standard-media/[https://perma.cc/Q5B8-MC9L].
591 See NAT’L ACADS. OF SCIS., ENG’G, & MED., supra note 6, at 90-93 (summarizing studies on the
effects of direct-to-consumer advertising).
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Given these benefits, how might the utilities model be applied to
prescription drugs? At least two possibilities arise. First, rate-setting
approaches from utilities could be used to evaluate whether a particular price
increase is excessive. A federal statute of broad application or a state statute
that (given likely patent-preemption challenges) focuses on medications for
which federal exclusivities have expired 592 could peg the definition of an
unconscionable increase to a formula for calculating a non-unconscionable
price (akin to the formula for a reasonable rate of return or price ceiling for
utilities). When a regulator suspects that a price increase is excessive, it could
require the company to show that, to the contrary, the increase satisfies the
demand of the formula. The rate of return, a key part of the formula, could
be set by reference to what is allowed for utilities. In recent years, regulators
have chosen rates converging around 10% 593 and courts have declined to
intervene on the basis that those rates are too low. Because electricity is
considered a low-risk investment, a higher rate of return would be
appropriate for those biopharmaceutical companies funding high-risk
research and development.
The second alternative would be to adopt a pure rate-setting model.
Rather than simply prohibiting unconscionable or excessive prices,
regulators would impose formal price controls as they do for utilities,
informed by the guideposts from utilities cases about what sort of rate is
legally permissible and statutory guidance as to the goals the rate-setting
commission is meant to pursue.
In some respects, that approach resembles the rate-setting legislation in
Maryland and similar bills proposed in other states. 594 However, there are
important differences. One technical distinction is that PUCs establish prices
that may be charged to customers in the jurisdiction, whereas most state bills
creating DABs would establish maximum amounts that payers in the state
will pay. Reportedly, one reason for this frame shift in Maryland’s legislation
is to minimize concerns about intruding on patentholders’ ability to
monopoly-price their products—the DAB leaves drug manufacturers free to
charge whatever they wish, although payers in the state may not pay it.595 A
592 Though even with a focus on generics, the dormant Commerce Clause could still pose challenges
and may be foreclosed within the Fourth Circuit, as noted in the discussion of Ass’n for Accessible Meds.
v. Frosh, 887 F.3d 664, 666 n.1 (4th Cir. 2018), supra notes 143–151.
593 Coley Girouard, How Do Electric Utilities Make Money?, ADVANCED ENERGY PERSPECTIVES
(Apr.
23,
2015,
10:55
AM),
https://blog.aee.net/how-do-electric-utilities-make-money
[https://perma.cc/TJ8T-N286] (stating in 2015 that the average return on equity allowed for power
companies was 10.13%).
594 See supra Section I.B.2.
595 Horvath, supra note 198.
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second difference is that the triggering conditions for review are different.
PUCs in most jurisdictions review rates whenever a stakeholder initiates a
rate case, while DAB review only occurs when certain trigger conditions
occur. Specifically, the Maryland DAB is authorized to review launch prices
that exceed a specified dollar amount and annual price increases that exceed
a certain percentage amount, 596 an approach common in other states’ bills. 597
This difference in trigger is substantive as well as procedural. Because PUCs
have historically grappled with predatory pricing in some industries, they
review downward as well as upward adjustments in prices. In contrast, DAB
review as described in current legislation is only triggered by certain price
increases or a high initial price.
Finally, the basis for making determinations that a price is excessive
differs in the utilities and drug contexts. Unlike PUCs, DABs proposed in
most states do not examine, in the first instance, the producer’s costs or
calculate a reasonable rate of return when setting upper payment limits. The
task of Maryland’s DAB, for example, is to determine whether a particular
drug creates an “affordability challenge” for the state healthcare system or
patients paying out-of-pocket costs. 598 If it finds that an affordability
challenge exists, then further regulatory action is triggered. NASHP’s
model-legislation approach calls for a payment ceiling to be imposed. 599 In
Maryland, that provision was substantially enervated in the final version of
the legislation. 600
The key point is that in taking further regulatory steps, the DAB does
not focus on drug manufacturers’ revenue or profit, but rather on indicators
that patients and health insurers in the state may have difficulty affording the

596 As discussed earlier, see supra Section I.B.2, nearly all prescription drug rate-setting bills to date
have taken this approach because they are patterned on model legislation developed by NASHP. See
NASHP Model Rate Setting Law, supra note 180.
597 Comparison of States’ Prescription Drug Affordability Review Board Legislation, supra note
170.
598 See Prescription Drug Affordability Board Act, ch. 692, 2019 Md. Laws 692, §§ 21–2C–08(b)(2),
(c)(3) (2019).
599 NASHP Model Rate Setting Law, supra note 180.
600 Whereas early versions of the bill would have required the DAB to set an upper payment limit
for all Maryland payers when it found that an affordability challenge exists or will occur, the adopted
version directed it to undertake further study of policy options and, if it determined an upper payment
limit was desirable, to “draft a plan of action for implementing the process” for setting such limits.
H.B. 768, 2019 Gen. Assemb. § 21–2C–13 (Md. 2019). It further provides that after January 1, 2022,
with the approval of the state General Assembly’s Legislative Policy Committee, the DAB may begin
setting upper payment limits, but only for drugs purchased by the Maryland Medicaid program and other
state or local government payers. The legislation also commissions a study on the legality of setting upper
payment limits for other payers. See id.
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drug. 601 Biopharmaceutical companies’ research and development costs,
marketing costs, and gross and net revenues (as well as revenues realized by
PBMs and wholesale distributors) are only considered if the DAB is unable
to reach a determination whether the drug produces an affordability
challenge based on the other factors. To date, only one state, New Jersey, has
proposed a DAB model in which the board would focus on drug companies’
costs and other metrics. 602
Thus, except for New Jersey, the DAB approach focuses on burdens on
consumers, while PUCs are supposed to balance the interest of the public
with that of the utility. If the overall goal is cost containment, the
affordability-based approach for drugs may be an effective strategy. As we
describe below, applying rate-of-return regulation to drug companies would
present numerous, intractable practical challenges. On the other hand, failing
to consider the effect of an upper payment limit on producers’ rate of return
entails inherent risk of improperly balancing consumers’ and companies’
interests. That is, affordability standards have the normative deficiency that
they do not require fair treatment of all parties. Furthermore, if DABs err on
the side of strict payment limits in the short term, they risk discouraging
investment in drug research and development if the limits were widely
adopted—an issue of obvious import for consumer welfare.
Assuming these risks could be sufficiently mitigated in practice, the
affordability-based rate-setting model is pragmatically preferable to the
traditional utilities model. History teaches that rate-of-return regulation
involves complex, technical determinations that invite legal challenges.
Further, applying such an approach to pharmaceuticals would be
substantially more challenging than applying it to electricity. In particular,
calculating the rate base would be far more complex. Electricity companies
produce a single product. Biopharmaceutical companies typically sell a
range of products, and a price must be calculated for each. Does this mean a
separate rate base should be calculated for each? How are the company’s
assets and research and development investment to be allocated among its
products? There is general agreement among economists that in calculating
the cost of bringing a drug to market it is appropriate to include not just the
cost of developing that product, but the amounts the company invested in
products that never succeeded in reaching FDA approval as well, because

601

For details, see supra note 195 and accompanying text.
See Comparison of States’ Prescription Drug Affordability Review Board Legislation, supra note
170 (summarizing N.J. No. 583/983).
602
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those amounts represent forgone investments. 603 The entire pool of research
and development investment for a given year would have to be allocated
across the marketed products in that year, and it is not clear how that
allocation should be performed.
A related problem is how to think about historical cost for drugs. Since
the Hope decision, a power company’s historical cost in a test year has served
as the foundation of rate setting in regulated retail electricity markets.604
Arguably, biopharmaceutical companies are subject to greater volatility in
their year-to-year costs because of variations in their research and
development costs depending on where their promising molecules are in the
pipeline. Electricity regulators have evolved ways of dealing with lumpiness
in investment and operating costs—for example, allowing power companies
to present evidence of unusually high spending on large new construction
projects and spread those costs over several future years of ratemaking. 605
But it adds complexity to the rate-setting process.
A third challenge is what to do about entrants and exits in the
pharmaceutical market. Rate setting for public utilities has been premised on
the notion that one company will have the right to sell in a local retail market.
In contrast, markets for treating particular health conditions will be subject
to entries (and occasional exits) as new drugs are developed, older ones go
off patent and generic competitors spring up, and existing sellers reevaluate
what constitutes the best use of their resources. This poses challenges for
regulating price using a traditional utilities model. What, for example, should
be done with a new company that has no historical costs to use to set the rate
base? When the number of alternative drugs for treating a particular
condition increases, should regulators ratchet the allowable rate of return
downward, approximating what would be expected to occur under fully
competitive market conditions? Electricity sales within a territory can be
projected with reasonable certainty, so as to calculate the appropriate rate by
dividing revenue requirement by sales; estimating future sales for a given
drug is harder, given uncertainties about new market entries by competitors
and other factors.
603 NAT’L ACADS. OF SCIS., ENG’G, & MED., supra note 6, at 88. For two prominent studies that have
taken this approach, see Joseph A. DiMasi et al., Innovation in the Pharmaceutical Industry: New
Estimates of R&D Costs, 47 J. HEALTH ECON. 20 (2016) and Vinay Prasad & Sham Mailankody,
Research and Development Spending to Bring a Single Cancer Drug to Market and Revenues After
Approval, 177 JAMA INTERNAL MED. 1569 (2017). But see Emanuel, supra note 436 (objecting that the
DiMasi study assumed an excessive interest rate for capital invested in research and development and
noting that many failed drugs did not involve substantial investments in research and development
because they failed at an early stage).
604 See REGULATORY ASSISTANCE PROJECT, supra note 516, at 42.
605 See id. at 40.
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For these reasons, pursuing rate-of-return regulation for drugs faces
significant hurdles on many fronts. The technical and conceptual (let alone
political) challenges are formidable. Even if regulators were able to
surmount them, they would also need to have an appetite for fighting what
seem to be inevitable, recurrent court battles about the permissibility of their
judgments. Judicial decisions affording electricity regulators a wide berth for
ratemaking decisions give cause for optimism about the eventual resolution
of such disputes, but the fight may be long and expensive. Moreover, familiar
concerns about the perverse incentive for inefficiency associated with rateof-return regulation are likely to surface for pharmaceutical production as
they did for electricity production—notwithstanding regulators’ best efforts
to disallow imprudent expenses.
In summary, the public-utilities model is normatively attractive in its
efforts to fairly regulate prices and useful in inspiring initiatives that imagine
similar rate-setting exercises for drugs. Yet, it is less conducive to suggesting
particular methods by which prices for drugs ought to be set. Alternative
approaches such as Maryland’s affordability-based rate-setting model may
be more pragmatic for controlling drug prices, although, as already
discussed, are vulnerable to normative criticism on fairness grounds.
IV. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR POLICY DESIGN
Our purpose is to identify approaches to imposing legislative
restrictions on excessive drug prices that are likely to withstand void-forvagueness challenges while substantially advancing the government’s
purpose of curbing the “financial toxicity” 606 of high drug costs. In this Part,
we offer a series of recommendations for drafting new legislation and
strengthening previously introduced bills at the state and federal levels.607
In arriving at recommendations based on our review of four relevant
areas of law, we bear in mind that the approach must not only be legally
defensible but should also satisfy the normative criteria previously
articulated. 608 First, it must withstand legal challenge. Legislation that is
constitutionally or otherwise legally vulnerable will ultimately be ineffective
policy—and more immediately—a waste of state or congressional resources.
As discussed earlier, 609 although our analysis focuses on vagueness
606

“Financial toxicity” is the concept that the cost of medicines causes patients financial hardship
and stress. See, e.g., NAT’L CANCER INST., Financial Toxicity (Financial Distress) and Cancer Treatment
(PDQ®)—Patient
Version,
https://www.cancer.gov/about-cancer/managing-care/track-carecosts/financial-toxicity-pdq [https://perma.cc/2R4B-RJ3C].
607 Our analysis is also summarized in Table 1, infra, for easy reference.
608 See supra Introduction.
609 See supra note 17 and accompanying text.
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challenges, state legislation in particular must also anticipate other potential
avenues of challenge, such as patent preemption. Second, any plausible legal
strategy must hold promise of substantially advancing the objective of
curbing excessive prescription drug costs. Third, it must not be unduly
subject to gaming. Fourth, proposals must be operationally feasible. Fifth,
they should be fair to biopharmaceutical companies. Across the fields we
have surveyed, which approaches hold the greatest appeal when measured
against these criteria? We begin by offering four major conclusions in
answer to that question and then apply our findings to generate specific
recommendations for legislation.
A. Findings Concerning Analogous Areas of Law
We have analyzed four areas of law in which legal interventions to
prevent excessive or unconscionable pricing have long been imposed and
upheld by the courts: emergency price gouging laws, contract law, consumer
lending, and public utilities rate-setting. In reviewing each, we have explored
how the legal interventions operate, how courts have dealt with vagueness
challenges, and the ease with which the approach could be applied to
prescription drugs. Our analysis leads to several conclusions.
First, although emergency price gouging laws would seem to be a
natural model for price gouging laws for prescription drugs, the approach
would need to be stretched considerably in order to accommodate
prescription drugs. Even if agreement can be reached that it is reasonable to
declare excessive prescription drug prices to constitute an emergency, the
approaches taken in these statutes to benchmarking price increases would
have to be adapted considerably to be applied to medicines (see Table 1). As
we have discussed, 610 it is difficult to find appropriate comparison prices for
drugs. Further, because the pre-“emergency” prices arguably were already
inflated, it is not as straightforward as it is for batteries or gasoline to deem
a price increase of a given percentage reasonable. Supplementing this
feasibility problem is a gaming concern that could undermine the approach’s
effectiveness: it is not applicable to launch prices, and companies marketing
new products likely will respond accordingly. These issues call into question
the potential effectiveness, operational feasibility, and resistance to gaming
of the emergency price gouging law approach.
On the other hand, price gouging laws are strong in the domain of legal
defensibility—they set out very clear criteria, rarely draw legal challenges,
and are durable in the face of vagueness arguments when challenged. Their
clarity and specificity are appealing on procedural fairness grounds. And
610

See supra Section III.A.3.
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although they have not done so in the past, they could be drafted to set forth
different allowable price increases for different kinds of products—for
example, by allowing more permissive ceilings for drugs with a low initial
price. Overall, the maximum-percentage approach of emergency price
gouging laws is attractive in many respects, but new methods would have to
be generated for identifying benchmark prices.
Second, our review of contract law suggests that if legislators do not
define the term “unconscionable” by statute, courts will apply common law
understandings of that term from contract disputes—and that is not optimal
for advancing the goal of regulating drug prices. Although the contracts
approach has several appealing aspects, overall, its disadvantages caution
against relying too heavily upon it (see Table 1).
Its appeal arises from its flexible standards, which bolster its ability to
meet the criteria of resistance to gaming and fairness. It can address
situations of unfair pricing not expressly contemplated by legislative
drafters. As discussed above, such flexibility would be advantageous
because of the very different contexts surrounding prices for different drugs,
which makes it challenging to simply “pick a number” and call prices above
it excessive. 611 Flexibility in what factors can be incorporated into a calculus
of what is “unconscionable” is also appealing for this reason.
However, a critical drawback of the common law conception is that, in
most jurisdictions, a showing of procedural unfairness is required. This
requirement could foreclose action against high drug prices in a broad swath
of circumstances where it would be hard to argue that buyers have been
subject to oppression and surprise. A second disadvantage we have noted is
that the traditional benchmarks courts use to assess the substantive unfairness
of a price term—the seller’s markup of the product, the seller’s profit, and
prices charged by competitors—will often be difficult to apply to
manufacturers’ prices for drugs. The concept of reseller markup does not
apply, there may not be other sellers of similar products to compare to, and
drug-specific profit is hard to gauge because the production cost is not easily
quantified. A third disadvantage is its heavy reliance on judges for
interpretation. Judges may be too timid in applying the doctrine 612 and may
not fully effectuate the legislature’s intent. They may also be inconsistent in
their applications, undermining deterrence. For these reasons, the contract
law approach presents effectiveness and feasibility concerns.

611
612
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Our third conclusion is that traditional methods of utilities regulation
likely would be impracticable to apply to prescription drugs. Rate-setting
commissions like Maryland’s may be an effective strategy for addressing
affordability issues, but as discussed, they depart from the rate-making
method employed by PUCs for electricity—rate-of-return regulation. 613
Despite its potential fairness to all parties—consumers and companies alike,
its resistance to gaming, and its potential effectiveness in reducing
excessively high drug costs by regulating companies’ profit (see Table 1)—
rate-of-return regulation for drugs fails the feasibility criterion. The history
of electricity regulation demonstrates the difficulty of establishing a rate base
even for simple products. The technical complexity involved in doing so for
drugs would be much greater. New entries into the market by competitor
companies present additional challenges in setting rates. Further, the
electricity case suggests that although the prospects for withstanding
vagueness challenges and other legal challenges are sunny, rate-of-return
regulation invites costly and time-consuming litigation.
Our final conclusion is that, of the four areas of law reviewed, consumer
lending law offers the most promising model for regulating excessive drug
prices. The two-pronged approach states have taken to regulating loan
prices—coupling a usury statute with a prohibition on unconscionable
business practices under a more general consumer protection act—is a very
attractive approach for prescription drugs. The analogue for usury in the drug
context would be a statutory provision establishing a maximum percentage
ceiling for increases in the price of the drug, annually or cumulatively over
some time period, with an exception for situations where the company can
show a larger increase is required by an acute market condition such as an
ingredient shortage. This price-increase law would provide a first line of
defense in policing high drug prices; it would be sufficient to address many
of the pricing practices of greatest concern in the current environment; and
given its straightforward, clear standard for violations, it would be relatively
easy to implement. 614 But it would be supplemented by a backup strategy.

613

As discussed above, Maryland’s rate-setting commission would set upper payment limits based
on a different method. See supra Section I.B.1.b.
614 It may be noted that we recommend the usury approach here although we dismissed as infeasible
the emergency price gouging law approach, which bears some similarities to usury laws. The distinction
is that the emergency price gouging approach consists solely of a comparison of the price at a designated
emergency time to the price of the same product at the pre-emergency time, or to the price of the same
product in another market area or retail outlet (the latter two options are not helpful prescription drugs,
as we have discussed). If the baseline price is already inflated, it is not a helpful benchmark. The usury
approach also has this problem, but the problem can be overcome by coupling it with provisions allowing
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Analogous to the role of general CPAs in consumer lending law, a consumer
protection act specific to medicines could impose a general prohibition on
“unconscionable” or “excessive” drug prices (either at launch or as a result
of price increases). The statute would provide a definition of
“unconscionable” or “excessive” in order to untether them from the UCC
and common law understandings of unconscionability. 615 The general
provision would be deployed where the price-increase provision is not
suitable for addressing the price problem posed by a particular drug.
Before discussing what that definition might look like, we offer a few
reflections on why this two-pronged model is attractive (see Table 1). First,
because it addresses both price increases and high base prices, it has strong
potential to be effective in curbing drug costs and to limit opportunities for
gaming. Further, the ability to write a definition of “unconscionable” into the
statute that does not require a showing of procedural unfairness means that
this approach can be consumer blind—that is, applicable to all purchasers of
prescription drugs regardless of their sophistication. The legal defensibility
of the approach against vagueness challenges is high. In the usury context,
courts have repeatedly demonstrated their willingness to defer to
legislatures’ choice of a maximum interest rate, and in the CPA context, they
have rebuffed vagueness challenges to statutory definitions of
unconscionable business practices. (It should not be forgotten, however, that
for state laws other legal challenges could be problematic if the laws were
not carefully drafted and applied.) Applying the standards does not raise
significant feasibility problems, if appropriate benchmarks for the general
standard are identified. It does, of course, raise the issue of which prices are
to be evaluated—as do all price regulations.
Objections to this proposal will likely relate to its fairness and collateral
effects. Regarding the general unconscionability standard, companies will
take a dim view of efforts to assess a substantively unreasonable base price,
assessment of the excessiveness of the base price. Thus, although looking at price increases alone is not
sufficient, it is useful as part of a broader regulatory scheme.
615 Our recommendation in this regard is inspired by Professor Bender, supra note 363 (discussing
the advantages of statutory, as opposed to common law, definitions of unconscionability in the consumer
lending context). Notably, Maryland took this approach in HB 631. However, the definition it provided
in the statute was not a model of clarity. MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH–GEN. § 2–802 (West 2017); see also
Brief of Appellees at 35–63, Assoc. for Accessible Medicines v. Frosh, 887 F.3d 664 (4th Cir. 2018) (No.
17-2166). Further, in briefings responding to the AAM’s vagueness challenge, Maryland took the position
that the provision was not vague because decades of common law in the contracts arena provided ample
guidance as to the meaning of the term. That strategy muddies the waters as to what the legislature
intended in establishing the statutory standard. If the statutory definition had been more specific (for
example, if it had connected the general definition to the specific conditions that triggered a notification
from the state Medicaid program of a potential affordability problem), an alternative defense that simply
defended the clarity of the statutory language might have been more feasible to pursue.
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even when they are anchored in cost-effectiveness calculations or other
transparent methods. Attempts to overtly cap drugs’ base prices involve a
risk of failing to reward companies for their investment at a level sufficient
to ensure their continued commitment to innovation, and applying an
unconscionability standard to the base price risks similar consequences.
Regarding price increases, drug companies may, of course, also claim that
capping price increases is unfair. If the law permits exceptions for situations
where market disruptions justify larger increases as well as substantial
discretion over setting the initial price, however, this objection will be partly
answered.
B. Recommendations for Policy Design
We now turn to specific recommendations for legislators wishing to
apply the consumer lending-inspired, two-pronged model we have outlined.
We discuss five important decisions that will need to be made.
First, should the law be state or federal? The approach could be
implemented through either Congressional or state legislative action.
Although states are the historical locus of consumer protection law and in
many ways the most natural choice to carry out the approach we have
described, congressional action is far preferable in light of the numerous
legal challenges states are likely to face beyond issues of vagueness,
depending upon how the law is written. One model for federal–state
coregulation might be for states to address the excessive pricing of generic
drugs while a federal statute focuses on products possessing federal
exclusivities. Yet, Maryland’s recent attempt at regulating unconscionable
generic price increases was struck down. Given the Fourth Circuit’s
interpretation of the dormant Commerce Clause in that case and the U.S.
Supreme Court’s decision not to grant certiorari, 616 a state-level consumer
protection law focused on generic drug prices is still risky. At the very least,
such laws ought to be explored within a different jurisdiction. Teeing up a
circuit split attractive enough for the U.S. Supreme Court’s attention may be
a strategy to push for a final resolution of this issue, although it risks a
Supreme Court holding adverse to the states’ interests.
Second, what remedies should the statute provide? A full discussion of
remedies is beyond the scope of our analysis, but the importance of providing
meaty remedies is clear. Given the size of many biopharmaceutical
companies and the billions in revenue associated with the sales of many
616 Ass’n for Accessible Meds. v. Frosh, 2017 WL 4347818 (D. Md. Sept. 29, 2017), rev’d, 887 F.3d
664 (4th Cir. 2018), cert. denied, 139 S. Ct. 1168 (2019).
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drugs, laws that do not provide significant financial consequences for
violations will be ineffectual. The types of remedies specified in the CURE
High Drug Prices Act and Prescription Drug Price Relief Act, for example,
have real bite. 617 Legislators should also ensure that the statute explicitly
supplements other remedies at common law or under state or federal
statutory law. 618
Third, which price should be evaluated? Some federal bills propose to
use the average manufacturer price (AMP), while most state price gouging
bills for medicines specify the WAC (some state bills do not define a specific
price, however). 619 The WAC, which is often referred to as the list price, is
the offering price set by the manufacturer for wholesalers and direct
purchasers, before discounts and rebates. 620 The AMP is the average price
actually paid by wholesalers for drugs distributed to the retail pharmacy class
of trade, after prompt-pay discounts but before rebates. 621 It is calculated
based on actual sales according to specifications set out by statute. 622 AMP
is, on average, considerably lower than both the WAC and AWP. 623
The WAC is published in various private datasets and therefore, readily
obtainable by anyone (albeit for a fee). 624 It is also simple: it is one number,
set by the manufacturer and adjusted periodically at its discretion. In
contrast, AMP data are proprietary and nonpublic. However, drug
manufacturers are required to report the AMP for all Medicaid-covered drugs
to the federal Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services on a quarterly
basis. 625 The AMP thus has the benefit of already being in the hands of a key
regulator. Further, manufacturers’ AMP reporting is subject to audit from the
617

See supra Section I.A.
This recommendation is offered by Professor Bender, supra note 363, at 796–97, 803, for
consumer lending laws.
619 For details, see Gudiksen, supra note 98, tbl.1. For example, Illinois’s HB 4900 used the WAC
as a benchmark for evaluating drug price increases, see id., while the federal Prescription Drug Price
Relief Act of 2019 used the AMP, see supra note 66. A third alternative is the Average Wholesale Price
(AWP), another representation of the list price, which includes no discounts or rebates. See DANIEL R.
LEVINSON, OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., OEI-05-05-00240,
MEDICAID DRUG PRICE COMPARISONS: AVERAGE MANUFACTURER PRICE TO PUBLISHED PRICES 3
(2005), https://oig.hhs.gov/oei/reports/oei-05-05-00240.pdf [https://perma.cc/8F28-PFHE]. Colloquially
known as “Ain’t What’s Paid,” see Patrick Mullen, The Arrival of Average Sale Price, 4 BIOTECHNOL.
HEALTHCARE 48, 53 (2007), the AWP is the least meaningful of the alternatives, in terms of its
relationship to actual acquisition costs, and has the disadvantage of not being publicly available.
620 LEVINSON, supra note 619, at 3.
621 Id. at 4.
622 Id. at 3.
623 Id. at ii.
624 Id. at 3.
625 Id. at i.
618

958

114:859 (2020)

Reining In “Unconscionable” Prices for Prescription Drugs

Office of Inspector General to ensure compliance with Medicaid
requirements, and is believed to be quite accurate.626
A third possibility is to peg price standards to the average net price after
rebates and discounts paid by the first purchaser (for federal laws, to avoid
dormant Commerce Clause challenges, state laws could specify the initial
purchaser in the state). This approach more accurately represents the real
prices paid—which can be substantially lower than either the WAC or the
AMP. Another advantage is the avoidance of gaming. Under the rebate
system, manufacturers can attempt to recoup lost revenue from a lower WAC
or AMP by reducing the rebates they are willing to give, with the result that
health plans and patients see little or no improvement in their own drug
costs. 627
For these reasons, targeting average net price is most consonant with
the goals of drug price regulation. The price-regulation statute should set
forth a detailed explanation of how this net price is to be calculated, including
which purchasers are to be included, which discounts and rebates are to be
netted out before the calculation is performed, and what the relevant time
period for sales is. We consider the AMP to be the second-best option, and,
where the AMP is unavailable, the WAC as next best. 628
Targeting net price is likely to encounter political resistance. Not only
is that information not publicly available, many drug manufacturers and
PBMs treat it as a trade secret. 629 Manufacturers also argue that having to
reveal the discounts and rebates they offer to particular buyers would
undercut their ability to offer them, because other purchasers would demand
the same deal. Mitigating this concern is the fact that it is unnecessary to
disclose average net price publicly in order for a price gouging law’s
objectives to be carried out. Disclosure need only be made to the relevant

626

See, e.g., BRIAN P. RITCHIE, OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS.,
A-06-13-0014, AVERAGE MANUFACTURER PRICE DETERMINATIONS BY SELECTED DRUG
MANUFACTURERS GENERALLY WERE CONSISTENT WITH FEDERAL REQUIREMENTS, at i (2014),
https://oig.hhs.gov/oas/reports/region6/61300014.pdf [https://perma.cc/P6NK-BH4A] (concluding that
“[t]he methodologies that selected drug manufacturers used to determine [AMPs] for drugs reimbursed
by Medicaid generally were consistent with Federal requirements”).
627 Uninsured patients and patients paying coinsurance and deductibles at the pharmacy would,
however, benefit from lower list prices, because their payments are typically pegged to the list price.
628 Using either net price or the AMP would involve a delay in implementing the price-increase
ceiling for newly launched products. The first price increase for a new product may not be observed until
after twelve months after market entry, and then a year beyond that point would be required in order to
calculate the average net price over the past year.
629 Lee et al., supra note 18, at 865 (noting drug manufacturers’ defense that disclosing drug pricing
under state laws would affect commerce in other states).
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oversight body. 630 Lawmakers who find the trade-secret argument credible
can choose to protect it from further disclosure on that basis.
Fourth, what should the maximum increase in price permitted by the
price-increase provision be? Here we do not have a strong recommendation
other than that a numeric limit ought to be expressed clearly in the statute.
However, we offer two points for consideration. First, if the ceiling is to be
pegged to inflation, we believe the Consumer Price Index for All Urban
Consumers (CPI-U) is a better choice than the CPI for Medical Care.
Prescription drug prices comprise 15% of the CPI for Medical Care, 631 so
using that index as a benchmark involves a circularity. The CPI-U is a better
measure of how much the prices of other goods in the economy are rising. 632
Second, the statute ought to permit the manufacturer to provide evidence that
an unanticipated shock necessitates a price increase above the statutory
maximum. Such circumstances might arise, for example, in a time when key
ingredients rapidly escalate in price or a problem at a particular
manufacturing facility forces the company to switch facilities to avert a
shortage.
A fifth question is how should the general CPA-style provisions of the
statute define an excessive drug price (for purposes of evaluating a drug’s
overall price rather than price hikes)? Our review of other areas of law using
this type of standard suggests that if the statute uses the word
“unconscionable,” that term should be defined in a manner that explicitly
requires no showing of procedural unfairness. Additionally, the statute
should set forth a definition of substantive unconscionability that does not
require comparisons that, though entrenched in the common law or general
CPAs, are hard to make for drugs. 633 Value-based pricing models can vary, 634
but one reasonable approach would be to adopt a value-based pricing
standard informed by, for example, the value assessment framework

630 NAT’L ACADS. OF SCIS., ENG’G, & MED., supra note 6, at 128–29 (suggesting that body be the
U.S. Department of Health and Human Services).
631 Measuring Price Change in the CPI: Medical Care, BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS (Mar. 21,
2019), https://www.bls.gov/cpi/factsheets/medical-care.htm [https://perma.cc/6EKG-X2LM].
632 See CPI-All Urban Consumers (Current Series), BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS (Feb. 20, 2018),
https://www.bls.gov/help/one_screen/cu.htm [https://perma.cc/KXR6-S47T] (defining the CPI-U as “a
monthly measure of the average change over time in the prices paid by consumers for a market basket of
consumer goods and services”).
633 See supra Part III.
634 See, e.g., Rachel Sachs et al., Innovative Contracting for Pharmaceuticals and Medicaid’s BestPrice Rule, 43 J. HEALTH POL., POL’Y & L. 5, 7–12 (2018) (describing different value-based pricing
models).
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proposed by the Institute for Clinical and Economic Review (ICER). 635
Value-based pricing is based on the normative position that “there should be
a relationship between price and benefits.” 636 It pegs the price a payer is
willing to pay for a drug to the amount of clinical value the drug is shown to
generate—that is, the magnitude of the improvements in quality of life,
functioning, and longevity the drug is shown to produce, either overall or for
defined populations or indications. Value is typically established by using
cost-effectiveness analysis to quantify gains in quality-adjusted life years
(QALYs) or disability-adjusted life years (DALYs). 637 Dividing a
treatment’s cost by the number of QALYs or DALYs generated produces a
cost-effectiveness ratio. A price regulation statute employing a value-based
standard could set forth a numeric cost-effectiveness ratio (or other measure
of value) above which the drug’s price would be considered excessive or call
for a broader assessment along the lines of ICER’s framework.
Value-based pricing raises a thicket of difficult technical and normative
issues, 638 which are beyond the scope of this Article to explore and resolve.
For example, should value calculations be performed at the time of a drug’s
launch based on information from clinical trials, or should they await data
from a broader group of real-world patients? Should value be measured
based on clinical improvement alone, or also on the basis of whether
improvement in functioning or longevity allows the person to contribute to
society, as some have argued? 639 Are QALYs an ethically defensible metric
given that in practice they value therapies for young, able-bodied persons
higher than those for the aged and disabled? 640 Because of ongoing debates
over these technical issues, a 2017 National Academies of Sciences,
Engineering, and Medicine consensus report concluded that value-based
635

INSTIT. FOR CLINICAL & ECON. REV., OVERVIEW OF THE ICER VALUE ASSESSMENT
FRAMEWORK AND UPDATE FOR 2017–2019, at 6 (2018), https://icer-review.org/wpcontent/uploads/2017/06/ICER-value-assessment-framework-Updated-050818.pdf
[https://perma.cc/A6LQ-YTBY] (examining a drug’s long-term value for money as a function of its
estimated incremental cost-effectiveness, comparative clinical effectiveness, and other benefits and
disadvantages, as well as contextual considerations).
636 Emanuel, supra note 425, at 606.
637 Id. at 607; NAT’L ACADS. OF SCIS., ENG’G, & MED., supra note 6, at 54–55.
638 NAT’L ACADS. OF SCIS., ENG’G, & MED., supra note 6, at 53–55, 58.
639 See Emanuel, supra note 425, at 606 (“A drug that allows the average person to obtain a normal
education or continue to work should be priced higher than one that merely keeps someone alive but not
well enough to be employed . . . because it saves costs in other nonmedical domains.”).
640 For a summary of this debate, see, for example, David L.B. Schwappach, Resource Allocation,
Social Values and the QALY: A Review of the Debate and Empirical Evidence, 5 HEALTH EXPECTATIONS
210 (2002); William S. Smith, The U.S. Shouldn’t Use the ‘QALY’ in Drug Cost-Effectiveness Reviews,
STAT (Feb. 22, 2019), https://www.statnews.com/2019/02/22/qaly-drug-effectiveness-reviews
[https://perma.cc/8RT3-HLJ7].
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pricing approaches were not yet ready to take to scale.641 However, it
recommended the continued development and testing of these strategies.642
We believe value-based pricing, particularly approaches that are
grounded in cost-effectiveness, holds promise as a future basis for regulating
excessive prices. It is worth noting, however, that the most valuable drugs
may also be the most expensive. Thus, this approach could permit very high
drug prices to persist, provided the drug offers commensurate benefits. 643 It
simply provides a means of identifying prices that are excessive relative to
the benefits delivered to the public.
Another possibility for defining substantive unconscionability would
simply be to name a dollar amount above which the price may not rise—that
is, establish a price cap (perhaps waivable if the company can show good
value for money). Maryland’s HB 631, for instance, drew upon a price cap
approach as a trigger for the state’s Medicaid program to report a drug to the
attorney general for possible enforcement action. 644 There are ethical
arguments in favor of such an approach. Professor Ezekiel Emanuel has
argued, for example, that people should have enough earnings left over, after
paying for their prescription drugs, to allow them to pursue “valuable [life]
activities and life goals” beyond paying for necessities and their children’s
college expenses. 645 After extensive calculations, he concluded that to satisfy
this principle, the cumulative lifetime cost of a drug must not exceed 11% of
total lifetime disposable income for a college-educated male, or $70,715. 646
Despite the moral appeal of such arguments, our view is that the dangers
of setting an absolute price cap either too high (thereby missing opportunities
for regulatory action against nevertheless excessively priced drugs, as
measured by a value-based standard) or too low (thereby chilling investment
in research and development) are, on balance, too great. 647 A price cap would

641

NAT’L ACADS. OF SCIS., ENG’G, & MED., supra note 6, at 72, 127.
Id. at 127.
643 For example, the Hepatitis C drug, Sovaldi, was launched at a list price of $84,000 for a twelveweek course of treatment. Amidst the controversy over this price, experts pointed out that the higher cure
rate of Sovaldi relative to alternative therapies for Hepatitis C meant that it would save more than it cost.
See, e.g., John LaMattina, What Price Innovation? The Sovaldi Saga, FORBES (May 29, 2014, 8:25 AM),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/johnlamattina/2014/05/29/what-price-innovation-the-sovaldi-saga
[https://perma.cc/4CYF-KWPA].
644 See supra note 128 and accompanying text.
645 Emanuel, supra note 425, at 606–08.
646 Id. at 608–09.
647 The National Academies report also did not endorse “direct controls or setting limits on drug
prices” because of concerns about chilling new drug development. NAT’L ACADS. OF SCIS., ENG’G, &
MED., supra note 6, at 132–33.
642
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also create clear incentives for manufacturers to set the price just below the
statutory maximum, to the extent that market conditions allow it.
What about the possibility of pegging substantive unconscionability to
the company’s investment in developing the drug? For example, one
criterion for excessive price in Maryland’s HB 631 was whether increased
drug prices were justified by the cost of producing the drug or expanding
access to it. 648 As we discussed in our review of other areas of law, definitions
of excessive price that involve assessment of a company’s return on its
investment are likely to be troublesome. Implementing Maryland’s
approach, for instance, would require agreement about which costs are
appropriate to include in these calculations, as well as agreement about a
reasonable return on investment (though that is more a concern for novel
drugs than for generics). Because the calculation also requires understanding
the company’s expected revenue stream for the drug at various prices, it also
implicitly requires estimation of the size of the global market for the drug,
the prices that the company will be able to get for the drug around the world,
the range of current and future market exclusivities the company is likely to
get, and the likelihood and timing of market entry by generic competitors.
These bumpy roads are best avoided.
We turn now to a final question: among products covered by the statute,
how should agencies charged with enforcing the statute decide which drugs
to target? With the price-hike provision, the answer is clear: anything and
everything above the maximum. Given the clear limit it imposes, this
provision should not be complex or costly to enforce. Harder choices may
have to be made about which products to target under the general
unconscionability provision, the enforcement of which may involve higher
complexity and more resources. High-priced, newly launched drugs are a
natural target for regulatory scrutiny, especially since they are not yet subject
to the price-increase provision. Among older drugs, priority should be placed
on reviewing for possible enforcement products that are most important from
a public-health perspective and/or have the highest prices for a typical dose
or course of treatment. 649 Drugs that meet both criteria should receive the
highest priority.
Work by Professor Mariana Socal and colleagues at Johns Hopkins
University is helpful in analyzing factors relevant to assessing the public-
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See supra note 125 and accompanying text.
This review may determine that some very high-priced drugs should not be enforcement targets
because they offer commensurately great clinical benefit.
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health importance of a drug. 650 In recommending criteria for the Maryland
Attorney General’s office to act under HB 631, Professor Socal and
colleagues suggest that key considerations might include (1) whether the
drug saves lives or averts serious harms; (2) the number of people dependent
on the drug; and (3) how many alternative therapies are available for the
health condition(s) the drug treats. 651 Drugs used by children may merit
particularly close monitoring “because of the smaller set of drugs available
for use” in pediatric populations. 652 These criteria, in combination with the
high-price criterion, would target scarce resources for enforcement to the
drugs that present the most objectionable prices. Notably, they would point
regulators toward drugs in the clinical area that are consistently identified as
the most important driver of the nation’s prescription drug bill: specialty
oncology medicines. 653 To help foreclose vagueness challenges, these criteria
should be set forth clearly in the statute’s text or implementing regulations.
CONCLUSION
In this Article, we have investigated how federal and state legislation
aimed at curbing excessive drug prices might be crafted so as to survive voidfor-vagueness challenges. Insights are available from each of four adjacent
areas of law we have reviewed in which a standard of “unconscionable” or
“excessive” price has been operationalized: price gouging laws relating to
times of emergency, contract law, consumer lending laws, and public utilities
rate regulation. Based on our examination of these areas, we have argued that
there are viable and promising ways to pursue regulation of drug prices using
a standard of unconscionable or excessive price. As we summarize in Table
1, consumer lending law offers the most promising model, particularly if
advanced via federal legislation. Any state legislation along these lines will
have to run the gauntlet of litigation alleging dormant Commerce Clause and
patent-preemption claims, which pose formidable challenges. But vagueness
challenges can be headed off if legislators provide standards up front. Being
clear also increases the deterrent force of the statute by putting companies
on notice of what type of conduct will trigger enforcement action.
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Memorandum from Mariana Socal et al. on behalf of the Johns Hopkins Drug Access and
Affordability Initiative to Josh Auerbach, Assistant Attorney General, State of Maryland 1–5 (Sept. 21,
2017) (on file with authors).
651 Id.
652 Id. at 3.
653 See Bradford R. Hirsch et al., The Impact of Specialty Pharmaceuticals as Drivers of Health Care
Costs, 33 HEALTH AFF. 1714 (2014); Vinay Prasad et al., The High Price of Anticancer Drugs: Origins,
Implications, Barriers, Solutions, 14 NATURE REV. CLINICAL ONCOLOGY 381 (2017).
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In his classic 1967 article about the vagueness of unconscionability
doctrine in contract law, Arthur Allen Leff urged drafters of legal standards
to avoid the temptation of “say[ing] nothing with words,” 654 citing Karl
Llewellyn’s admonition that “‘[c]overt tools are never reliable tools.’” 655
Heeding this advice will move lawmaking in the prescription drug pricing
space toward policy that is effective, fair, and defensible.
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Leff, supra note 321, at 559.
Id. (quoting Karl N. Llewellyn, Book Review, The Standardization of Commercial Contracts in
English and Continental Law, 52 HARV. L. REV. 700, 703 (1939)).
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TABLE 1. SUMMARY OF ADVANTAGES AND DISADVANTAGES OF
APPROACHES TO DEFINING EXCESSIVE PRICE

Advantages
• Rarely draw legal challenges; durable to
vagueness arguments when challenged
• Describe prohibited conduct with great
specificity and clarity. Even Type 3 statutes
(which set forth a general standard rather than a
maximum percentage price increase) usually
have criteria for what constitutes an excessive
increase
• Conceivable to specify different allowable price
increases for drugs with different base costs
• Flexible standard; can address situations not
expressly contemplated in statutes
• Flexible proofs; elements can be shown through
a wide variety of factors

Disadvantages
• Not possible to apply to launch prices
• Hard to find appropriate benchmark
(comparison) prices for drugs
• Considering companies’ increased operational
costs as justification for price increases may
encourage undesirable spending (e.g.,
marketing)

• Requires showing of procedural
unconscionability
• Relies heavily on judges for interpretation
• Traditional benchmarks for substantive
unconscionability of price may be difficult to
apply to drugs
• Relies on contracting parties to bring claims
(no public enforcement; court reviews one
transaction at a time)

Conclusion

Maximum-percentage
approach is appealing
for drug price increases,
but approach to
identifying benchmark
prices is inapposite

Useful primarily for
establishing a default
definition of
unconscionability that
legislators can work
from and adjust in
statutes specific to
prescription drugs
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Consumer lending laws
Public utilities (rate-of-return) regulation

Advantages
• Durable in the face of vagueness
challenges

• Although potentially applicable to launch prices, setting
maximum prices for new drugs may be unduly risky
from an innovation standpoint

Disadvantages

Conclusion

• Enforcement would take place after a drug sale, not
when prices are announced
• Challenges determining which price would be regulated

• Deference given to legislatures’ choice of
maximum interest rate
• Usury approach has clear application to
drug price increases

• Usury model is vulnerable to gaming by regulated
entities

Rate-of-return
regulation appears
infeasible and
inadvisable for
prescription drugs

Highly promising to
couple a federal level
usury-model approach
for drug price increases
with a consumer
protection act specific to
medicines that sets forth
an unconscionability
definition that is
untethered from the
UCC definition

• Challenging to calculate a rate base for each drug

• Regulators must rely on companies for key information,
which companies have incentive to mischaracterize

• Rate setting is a complex, highly technical, informationintensive process

• Risk of erring in setting rates too low, discouraging
investment and innovation

• Potential for perverse incentives if allowances are made
for high operational costs

• Attracts extensive litigation

• Enforcement need not require a showing
of procedural unfairness

• Utilities and drug markets share key
features (monopolies, essential goods)
• Potential applicability to both price
increases and base prices
• Concept of limiting companies’ rate of
return has public/moral appeal
• Courts afford regulators broad discretion
in setting rates, including levels and
methods, so long as the rates are not so
low as to be confiscatory

• Challenging to deal with market entrants and exits
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